6.1 Human Rights[1]
By Kevin Bloor
Reused from “Chapter 4: Global Governance: Human Rights and Environmental Governance.” Bloor, Kevin. Understanding Global Politics under a CC-BY-NC 4.0 license.
This chapter begins with an examination of attempts by the international community to uphold the universality of human rights. Humanitarian intervention will be contextualised via the prism of international law, judicial institutions and the impact on national sovereignty. This invites a discussion of selective intervention, the responsibility to protect and Western hypocrisy on the topic of human rights.
Human Rights
Origins and Development of International Human Rights Law and Institutions
Whilst human rights are a relative concept, the international community often justifies humanitarian intervention on the assumption that the concept is a universal one. Human rights are upheld via domestic legislation alongside a number of international agreements and judicial bodies. There is an inherent moral (and often legal) character to the concept of human rights. Since the turn of the century, there has been an increase in the number of institutions and agreements that seek to uphold human rights.
Before we consider the various sources of authority in regards to defining human rights, there is a useful distinction to be made between positive and negative rights. The former consists of those rights that place a positive duty upon others (usually the state). An example would be the right to healthcare and social welfare provided by the government. A negative right consists of the right to non-interference (such as freedom of speech and religious worship). These are sometimes called ‘civil rights’ and entail those rights consistent with being a citizen of that particular state. The exercise of rights is also beholden on the recognition of an obligation to others, and that rights cannot be taken away unless due process has been followed. In addition, positive and negative rights are grounded upon the principle of equal opportunities regardless of social background. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) lists both positive and negative rights.
The doctrine of human rights has been influential within international law and various institutions of global governance. This process of influence has occurred alongside an expansion in the scope and scale of human rights within the context of global politics. The main sources of international law derive from treaties, conventions and general principles recognised by state and non-state actors. The obvious reference point remains the UDHR. Signed in 1948, the UDHR entails thirty articles affirming the rights of the individual. Although the declaration is not legally binding, it does provide a framework for the debate surrounding the protection of human rights and a template for humanitarian intervention. The UDHR has also provided the background for subsequent treaties and agreements within international law. Most notably, it marked the first step towards the formation of the International Bill of Human Rights. The three opening Articles set the tone of the document that reflect liberal discourse, emphasising: (a) that all are entitled to free and equal rights and dignity, (b) that no distinction shall be made on access to such rights based upon sovereign legal jurisdiction, and (c) that ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person’ (United Nations 1948). Other key elements include Article Seven (which deals with discrimination) and Article 20 (freedom of assembly and association).
Treaties consist of a formal written agreement between sovereign states (and in some cases international organisations) which are considered binding within international law. Treaties form a contract between the signatories involved and can take a number of forms, such as protocols, covenants and pacts. Treaties therefore impose a set of obligations recognised and upheld by the signatories. A breach of contract can result in sanctions imposed by quasi-judicial bodies. Treaties often have a regional basis and can at times play a central role within the process of regional integration. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights maintains human rights amongst every member-state of the Council of Europe, under the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and thus this includes not just all continental European states, Belarus aside, but also Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia to name but a few.
A convention is an agreement between different countries that is also binding upon the signatory states. International conventions cover a wide remit of areas such as trade, disarmament and human rights. Conventions play a surprisingly influential role within the anarchic system of states. In contrast, general principles consist of normative values such as justice and equitable treatment. In the context of international law, general principles act as ‘gap fillers’ when codified and uncodified elements do not provide a satisfactory course of action. For instance, the principles surrounding warfare consist of five inter-related areas: military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality, discrimination and chivalry. As a core element of international human rights law, the Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 196 states, including all 193 United Nations member-states.
A small number of institutions are responsible for the implementation of international human rights law. First and foremost, institutions such as the ICJ and the ICC have undoubtedly helped to advance the human rights agenda. Once considered the preserve of the domestic realm, such institutions provide a framework of global governance to uphold the universality of human rights. International institutions have imposed sanctions against those who might at one time have escaped censure due to their broader significance within the Cold War. It should also be acknowledged that some of these institutions are relatively new, which should be considered when reaching an assessment of the ICC.
The effectiveness of said institutions is dependent upon a number of factors. Of these, arguably the most significant factor is the role played by national governments. The role of international institutions cannot be viewed separately from the support (or lack of support) provided by national institutions in terms of protecting human rights. The successful protection of human rights requires action at the national and international level (Cassel 2001), and thus, in a realist frame, befall subject to the demands of national interest, as all else. There are also other applicable factors to consider, such as public awareness of human rights, the impact of NGOs and the political culture of those countries in question. There was, for instance, sufficient scope within the United States for the Biden administration to present the ICC as an unwelcome intrusion upon national sovereignty, following the policy of past administrations.
The UDHR remains the most important element of international human rights law. All signatories are obligated to protect and promote human rights for their citizens in accordance with the declaration. It also provides a global standard for all others to accept. This however needs to be balanced alongside the reluctance of certain states to uphold the declaration. The abuse of human rights can at times be the direct consequence of states pursuing their own national interests (such as Israeli military strikes against residents in Gaza). In all cases, the Westphalian conception of state sovereignty trumps international law. Indeed, Articles two through seven of the UN Charter protect such claims and thereby limit external intervention (even on humanitarian grounds). Thus, international law in relation to human rights can be considered somewhat contradictory. The Human Rights Committee of the UN has also been subject to criticism for its lack of effectiveness. As with any assessment of the UN, the reluctance of the international community to transfer power and authority is a key factor.
Key Issues in Dealing with Human Rights
The Impact of Human Rights on State Sovereignty
There is an inescapable conflict between the sanctity of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention in order to protect human rights. The institutions of global governance clearly have the capacity to implement decisions that undermine the sovereignty of the state. However, in regards to a failed (or failing) state, action taken by the international community may actually restore the sovereignty of the ruling regime. For instance, the UN mission in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2006 helped bring stability and re-establish normality after a lengthy civil war. It should also be noted that some governments actively seek the involvement of external forces in order to restore the territorial integrity of the state.
Violation of human rights inevitably leads towards a consideration of humanitarian intervention from the international community. Given the universal character of human rights, a rogue state places its sovereignty under threat when acting in a manner contrary to international human rights law. The very existence of legal precedent in this area underlines the porous nature of state boundaries (Guillaume 2011). Authoritarian regimes in particular are more likely to ignore the rules, norms and conventions surrounding the universal character of human rights. In contrast, those countries with a political culture that respects human rights and associated liberal-democratic values are least likely to experience outside interference from the international community. Having said this, the charge of Western hypocrisy is often valid in the case of human rights abuses in countries based in North America and Europe. The United States and their allies have been reluctant to address human rights abuses in several Western countries, placing political reality above abstract normative rhetoric concerning human rights.
States that continually violate human rights are more likely to face sanctions from international institutions. For instance, in the context of the ECHR, both Russia and Turkey have been frequent visitors to the courts in Strasbourg. Nonetheless, exhibiting a tradition of liberal democracy does not necessarily mean that the government in question will fully adhere to human rights legislation. As a result of its draconian measures against terrorist organisations, the UK government has at times found itself in contravention of the ECHR.
In terms of international courts, the inability to impose effective sanctions upon rogue states such as North Korea and Venezuela underlines the undoubted significance of national sovereignty. Although there has been a great deal of progress in terms of global governance since the establishment of the UDHR, there’s only so much that international institutions can do without impeding upon the sovereignty of states. This observation is central towards an understanding of the selective character of humanitarian intervention and its relative success. Academic research suggests that international human rights legislation has the least effect on those states that need it the most (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005).
The Rise of Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s
Humanitarian intervention has proved an increasingly marked feature of global politics since the end of the Cold War. The landscape of international relations changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The international community gained greater scope to intervene without provoking a Soviet reprisal. A unipolar world characterised by American hegemony presented an opportunity to establish a new world order based upon liberal values of democracy and the rule of law.
Humanitarian intervention may consist of: (a) military coercion against another state with the aim of bringing any violation of human rights to an end in a given territory, or (b) the use of non-military intervention such as economic sanctions or forceful aid provision. The target of humanitarian intervention via the international community has typically been rogue states and/or failed states, although this is not always the case. Non-state organisations with global ambitions may also be targeted by the international community.
There are several factors that determine the effectiveness or otherwise of humanitarian intervention. In an era characterised by an increasing reliance upon soft power, official authorisation from the United Nations undoubtedly confers a degree of legitimacy upon the intervention. However, this alone is insufficient for the intervention to secure legitimacy from the stakeholders affected. In many cases, the warring parties have chosen not to recognise the legitimacy of external interference from the UN. Other factors include the relative capacity of the actors concerned, the political will to act and the existence of an exit strategy.
In terms of a successful intervention, one illustration to consider would be the 1994–95 intervention in Haiti. In the mid-1990s, Operation Uphold Democracy was designed to remove the military regime that seized power after the election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. The US-led intervention had the necessary political will, capacity and legitimacy to secure a clear objective (namely the restoration of democracy). The UN Mission in Haiti sent peacekeeping troops in order to maintain law and order until their eventual withdrawal in the year 2000. A similar observation applies to the actions of the international community in East Timor. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) provided an interim civil administration and a peacekeeping presence for three years until national independence was secured in 2002.
In stark contrast, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) is widely regarded as an abject failure. The international community was highly reluctant to intervene in the ethnic cleansing that ensued between Hutus and Tutsis. Right from the very beginning, there was a lack of clarity concerning UNAMIR’s rules of engagement and overall mandate. After the initial intervention by Belgium, and the collapse of any international will to intervene; realists claimed that Rwanda was yet another illustration of power politics. Despite the liberal rhetoric of the UN, national interest triumphed over any moral considerations. The total death count in the Rwandan Civil War ranges from half a million to just over a million (about 70% of the Tutsi population). Estimates of sexual violence against women vary from around a quarter to half a million incidents (Human Rights Watch 1996).
It is too early to reach an accurate judgement about some of the on-going illustrations of humanitarian intervention. For instance, the UN is currently engaged in combat with what remains of ISIS. The international community has become involved due to human rights violations within territory controlled by Islamic extremists. There are also justifiable concerns as to the spillover implications within Syria. Fourteen countries led by the United States have executed airstrikes on Islamic State forces. With the support of the Syrian government, Russian forces have also launched bombing raids against Islamic State fighters located in Syrian territory. Whilst Islamic State has been driven back from areas in Iraq and Syria, the organisation remains a threat to international security and it would be too early to declare victory over them. If this does eventually occur, it will be one of the most successful interventions in recent years, albeit staggered and lacking in widespread mutual conduction.
Reasons for Selective Interventionism, Development of Responsibility to Protect and Conflict with State Sovereignty
There are many reasons for the reluctance of the international community to intervene when faced with a humanitarian crisis. Of these, perhaps the most important is the centrality of national interests. For instance, the cause of a humanitarian crisis may be a strategic ally of the United States. This is often couched within the charge of Western hypocrisy. Similarly, the perpetrating regime may be an important ally of China or the Russian Federation. This can often lead to criticism of double standards from the permanent five of the UN Security Council, potentially blocking a resolution that would allow for intervention in the name of their own interests, and as such, wilfully undermining international security.
Secondly, humanitarian intervention may prove difficult to achieve due to the power balance between various states. During the Cold War, there were clearly defined spheres of influence within the liberal democratic and communist world. Humanitarian intervention within that defined sphere of influence could have instigated all-out war between the US and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, intervention was always on a selective basis. Dictatorial regimes committed several atrocities with the support of either Washington or Moscow.
Another plausible explanation for selective intervention is the inability of the international community to reach a common position. Any member of the P5 can impose a technical veto upon possible UN intervention stemming from Article Seven. Selective intervention is also the result of the international community’s reluctance to address violations of human rights by powerful states. For instance, human rights violations by the Chinese government against dissidents have been met with a muted response from the international community. It seems highly improbable that territory controlled by The People’s Republic of China would be subject to any form of humanitarian intervention. This observation also applies to other great powers on the world stage, and those states supported by a powerful ally (such as Israel with the US).
Martin Binder (2015, 2017) argues that the response from the UN is based upon four factors. The first of these is the extent of human suffering and the pressure generated by such violations. UN intervention also depends upon the threat to neighbouring countries and regions. This may derive from the spread of terrorism, civil strife and an influx of refugees (as in the case of Bosnia during the 1990s). The UN must also consider the ability of a target state to resist such intervention. This was certainly a consideration in the case of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, prior to the 2011 intervention. Finally, humanitarian intervention can be further understood by the level of material and reputational resources available to the UN (as in the case of the Ivory Coast in 2004). The combination of such factors offers a valid explanation of selective intervention.
The actual consequences of selective intervention are debatable. On the downside, it could be argued that it undermines the entire legitimacy of the United Nations. Successful intervention on humanitarian grounds requires this crucial element of soft power (Nye, 1990), and legitimacy is undermined when intervention is designed to serve the economic interests of the powerful. However, it could also be argued that selectivity is desirable because it prevents the UN becoming embroiled in poorly thought-out commitments (Roberts and Zaum, 2008). For instance, the UN has been reluctant to intervene in the Syrian Civil War due to its sheer complexity. It must also be acknowledged that the Assad regime has support in the Security Council from both Russia and China.
The relationship between state sovereignty and the responsibility to protect (R2P) is a fascinating issue to consider. It is based upon the principle that sovereignty comes with certain duties and obligations that broadly match with the most basic predicates or norms of liberal democracy. These are based upon the norms and values inherent within international law (most notably over human rights). The principle has formed debate over planned intervention in countries such as Libya, Kenya and Sudan.
It is often claimed that the doctrine of R2P is an infringement upon the sovereignty of the state. This seems a relatively uncontroversial judgement given that it enables the UN and the wider international community to intervene as an act of last resort. However, the former Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, argues that R2P actually reinforces sovereignty. This is because the international community intervenes without consent only when that state concerned is allowing (or committing) mass atrocities. In these situations, the state no longer upholds the duties and in certain cases may be unable to do so. Intervention thereby supports – rather than undermines – the sovereignty of the state.
In order to properly assess the relationship between state sovereignty and the R2P doctrine, it is useful to consider real-life examples. Although authorisation was secured in the case of Libya in 2011, there was criticism of the selective character of humanitarian intervention and as a means to achieve regime change. The notion of R2P was therefore undermined due to the phenomenon of ‘mission creep’ within a failed state. This term is used to describe an unplanned long-term commitment arising during the course of a military campaign. In the same year, both China and Russia vetoed an attempt by the United States to gain a resolution invoking R2P within the Syrian Civil War. The Russian Federation and the Chinese government claimed that Washington had abused the doctrine within Libya and therefore acted contrary to the notion of upholding state sovereignty.
The most controversial aspect of the R2P is the third pillar and the use of military intervention. The use of military instruments as a necessary adjunct to successful intervention on humanitarian grounds has its detractors and supporters. The deployment of troops and other military hardware undoubtedly raises the stakes in the debate concerning R2P and the sovereignty of the state. Given the complexity of cost-benefit analysis, the international community will always have to balance a number of variables when considering military intervention on humanitarian grounds.
Western Double Standards / Hypocrisy
As far as humanitarian intervention is concerned, the charge of Western hypocrisy is based upon two factors. Firstly, the ‘West’ adopts a selective approach towards humanitarian intervention. Some of the most powerful countries within global affairs have opposed humanitarian intervention against an important ally. For instance, Israel is a long-term ally of the United States and repeated human rights violations against the Palestinians have been largely ignored by the UNSC, of which the US is a permanent member. In contrast, the actions of rogue states, as classified by Washington, have been dealt with on an effective and co-ordinated basis. The ‘West’ has also been complicit in turning a blind eye to the actions of human rights abuses in supportive states. For example, violations against journalists and members of minority groups within Saudi Arabia have been largely ignored. To take just one example, in 2018 the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey after his criticism of the Saudi government.
As a consequence of Western hypocrisy, the international community has often refused to intervene, regardless of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding. This usually occurs either because: (a) an ally of the West has been involved in some manner (such as Saudi Arabian forces in Yemen), or (b) there were no vital national interests involved. The latter is the more common of the two and can be applied to humanitarian crises in Darfur (2003–2009) and Sri Lanka (1983–2009). In the case of the former, attempts by the Sudanese government to defeat separatists have contributed to thousands of casualties. Rather, in the case of the latter, the Sri Lankan government had a hand in the murder of thousands in their conflict against the Tamil Tigers. The ‘West’ have also been accused of hypocrisy in their failure to deal effectively with the quagmire of the Syrian Civil War, which began during the Arab Spring.
Accusations of hypocrisy were particularly noticeable during the Cold War. In order to defeat the threat and spread of Soviet Communism, the United States and its Western allies supported a number of right-wing dictatorial regimes. Human rights violations were a feature of several Western allies, including the Shah of Iran and General Pinochet in Chile. However, the West was prepared to ignore such violations in order to keep on friendly terms with important strategic allies – gaining both political and financial capital in the process. After the end of the Cold War, former allies did on occasion become enemies. In such cases, they were able to use military hardware previously purchased from Western powers.
A particularly clear illustration of this argument concerned Iraq under Saddam Hussein. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the US and the UK provided arms to Iraq. However, during both the Gulf War (1990–91) and the Iraq War (2003), US-led invasions of Iraq saw these exact same arms used against the US. Despite claims of humanitarian intervention in the 2003 instance, the US Bush administration and the Blair-led British government were accused of seeking international authorisation and legitimation for the invasion of Iraq in order to impose regime change. The appearance of ulterior motives in the 2003 American-led intervention in Iraq remains one of the most controversial military conflicts of the twenty-first century.
Reused from “Chapter 4: Global Governance: Human Rights and Environmental Governance.” Bloor, Kevin. Understanding Global Politics under a CC-BY-NC 4.0 license. ↑