“Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism” in “Introduction to International Relations”
Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism
1.5 The Realist Worldview[1]
By Rom, Mark, Hidaka, Masaki, & Bzostek Walker, Rachel
Reused from Chapter 14 of Rom, Mark, Hidaka, Masaki, & Bzostek Walker, Rachel. (2022). Introduction to Political Science. OpenStax. https://openstax.org/details/books/introduction-political-science under CC-BY 4.0 license which can be accessed for free at https://openstax.org
Learning Outcomes
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
- Describe how theories and worldviews can be used to understand international relations.
- Explain the realist worldview, including fundamental concepts and possible limitations or critiques.
- Identify and differentiate among various branches of realist theory.
- Apply principles of game theory to explain a state’s decision-making process.
- Explain the types of polarity in an anarchic system.
- Discuss the role of comparative advantage in a unipolar system.
- Analyze the ways tensions can escalate, destabilizing the system, in a realist worldview.
Several key theories have emerged to explain the different ways states see the world and their place in it and to understand the decisions they make and the courses of action they choose based on those views. The primary theories come from three major groups of worldviews: the realist worldview, liberal and social worldviews, and critical worldviews. This section discusses realism and its variants.
In popular culture, international relations is usually presented through the filter of the basic tenets of realism. Whether it’s Jack Ryan working with the FBI, risking his life to rescue soldiers held by drug cartels, or Jason Bourne running from his past involvement with clandestine operations as a former CIA assassin, representatives of states are shown as engaging in actions focused on self-preservation, no matter the cost.
Realism is distinctly characterized by marked self-interest. According to realism, states embark on policy initiatives with a go-it-alone attitude that aims solely to preserve their own safety and security. In a realist’s mind set, the state is the primary actor of the international system. According to realists, self-interested states do what they can to gain more power to increase their ability to structure the rules of the system to their advantage.
As a general rule, realists believe that states see it as being to their benefit to withhold some of the details about their goals and aspirations in a given situation. The thinking is that if a state is completely transparent about its capabilities and how far it is willing to go to get what it wants, it makes itself vulnerable to other states that might try to take advantage of it.34 This air of distrust underlies the thinking of a realist state. Because a state cannot trust other states, realists consider diplomacy and negotiations unreliable methods of self-preservation. Instead, realists try to implement policies that send a clear, strong message about the ability of a state to protect itself.
Game theory is a way of conceptualizing what motivates a political actor in terms of the steps the actor takes to reach what they deem to be the optimal outcome for themselves. The general discussion of political behavior in Chapter 2: Political Behavior Is Human Behavior briefly introduces the idea of game theory. Based on the idea that all the actions players take in a specific game or situation have a certain probability of being taken, game theory helps illustrate a realist view of state strategy in international relations. Have you ever played a game of strategy, such as Risk or Settlers of Catan? In these types of games, you, the player, focus on amassing the most land and resources you can, relative to the other players, to win. You try to anticipate and consider all the information you have about the current situation and what other players might do when calculating what actions you should take to achieve your goals. In the realist view, states have the same mindset in their interactions with each other.
For states, every decision-making process is part of a complicated equation, the result of which is an action the state will take. States weigh the risks and rewards of possible courses of action, seeking the greatest net benefit for their purposes. States can only base their strategic decision-making on the information they have—for example, intelligence information about another state’s true motivations—and if that information is faulty, a state’s chosen course of action may not achieve the desired results. By accounting for the weight of all the probable variables a state considers in calculating what course it will take versus the benefit a state expects an action to yield, one can calculate the likelihood, or probability, that a state will make a decision or implement a policy in response to another state’s actions.
Figure 1.10 Game theory can be applied to many situations, such as labor negotiations to end a workers’ strike, in which opposing sides strategize to optimize the chances of achieving their desired outcomes. (credit: “picket line” by Susan Jane Golding/Flickr, CC BY 2.0)
Realism characterizes states as rational actors, meaning that all the actions they take or policies they implement are a function of what they see as the outcome of a situation. Realists see the international system as a zero-sum game grounded in the idea that all facets of the system are finite. In a zero-sum game, a state seeks to take something, whether it be power or a physical resource, away from another state; in essence, if I win, then you lose, and there can only be one winner. When all aspects of a system are finite, one state can control all of a particular resource, preventing another state or states from having that resource. You can apply this idea to your everyday life. Suppose you and your friend are hungry for a snack and there is only one bag of chips that is readily available. If this situation were a zero-sum game, whoever got to the bag of chips first would have all the chips, and the other person would have none.
The balance of power is a classic realist way of seeing the structure of the international system. Realists see the world as populated by states in a race to set the rules of the system to work for their own benefit. Because the system is inherently anarchic, poles, or centers of power, form within the system around the states that have the capacity, in whatever the system deems to be the currency of power, to gather other states to their side. Three different types of polarity emerge in an anarchic system: unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar.
In a unipolar system, one country, the hegemon, sets itself up as the main player who decides the rules of the international system. By virtue of having the strongest economy, largest military, or most stable political and social institutions, the hegemon is able to use its position to extend its power. A hegemon might simply use its military might to extend its power, or it might employ less aggressive means. When a hegemon expands the institutions that benefit it to other countries, it encourages those countries to be like the hegemon. In doing so, the hegemon expands its sphere of influence with the underlying premise that states that are similar in culture, economy, and political structure are less likely to fight one another. While these states share a number of similarities, they have differing abilities to allocate the skills and resources necessary to create certain goods or services. When a hegemon expands its sphere of influence, it expands its access to resources, goods, and services in areas where it lacks a comparative advantage. An imbalance in comparative advantage is what drives a country to trade for a good or service that it needs.
In a bipolar system, two states with equal relative power but different underlying institutional characteristics vie to create opposing spheres of influence. This creates two groups of allied countries that allow the states at the center of the poles to expand their power with the support of other actors in the system, giving those two states similar strength as if each were a hegemon. In a multipolar world, multiple states form many smaller spheres of influence, creating a pared-down version of a unipolar or bipolar system. A multipolar system, where three or more states have equal or relative power, is pared down even further.
While anarchy is inherent in the international system, from the realist’s view, a state is motivated to create an environment, and therefore a balance of power, that protects the state. Rational actors prefer order. Order allows actors to have a greater sense of what is coming next. Essentially, states—especially the bigger, stronger, more powerful ones—see anarchy as an opportunity to create order in a way that favors their interests and fits their long-term goals. The balance of power between states is a way to understand who succeeds in creating a world that benefits them the most.
The relationship between the United States and Russia from World War II to the present is perhaps the most accessible way to see shifts in polarity in the international system. Before World War II, colonial European powers had divided up the world, and the United States and Russia were doing what they could, in smaller ways, to expand their own reach. After World War II, the United States and Russia emerged as the two major powers at opposite ends of the economic ideological spectrum, pitted against each other for supremacy, thus creating a bipolar world. The interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War provides a glimpse of the best and worst of decisions states have made. The Cold War represents a period in world history in which there was a slowly simmering conflict35 on multiple fronts between the Soviet Union and the United States, who had emerged from World War II as the states with the economic strength and political stability to exert their influence and preferences on other states in the international community.
Figure 1.11 This map of Cold War allies illustrates the spheres of influence in a bipolar world. (credit: “Map Of The Cold War” by The1994JMan/Flickr, CC BY 2.0)
The intense competition between these two major world powers for global supremacy spilled into all parts of society, from the propaganda and policies of the United States focused on weeding out suspected communists in all aspects of society and government to the race to see who could make the greatest advancements in space exploration, which spurred a steep increase in scientific and technological development. In the context of foreign relations, the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was more tangible and mired in a number of proxy wars, conflicts in which each of the warring parties is supported and funded by two larger parties who have a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict. The Vietnam War,36 in which the democratically elected Vietnamese government fought the insurgent Viet Cong, who had the support of the Soviet Union, and the conflict in Afghanistan, where the United States supported Afghanis as they fought to keep the communist forces of the Soviet Union from taking over their country, are two examples of Cold War–era proxy wars.
The 1990s brought an end to the Cold War, with the United States emerging as the hegemon, but that came with its own challenges. In the era immediately following the Cold War, newly independent former Soviet states looked to the United States for monetary, political, and military support. This is the burden of the hegemon; when you are the victor in a conflict you may be seen as the only stable, strong power, and with that status comes a sense of obligation to help less powerful, less stable states.
The security dilemma is the byproduct of a system in which states are motivated to act in their own interest. As states implement security policies that aim to either expand or solidify their position in the system, other states may perceive those actions as provocations. The state or states implementing those policies face a security dilemma, where those changes in their policies related to their own safety and security, because they appear aggressive to other states, may lead those other states to preemptively respond in the interests of their own security, potentially ratcheting up tensions between two or more states.
This highlights the implications of a system based on a fundamental mistrust of all actors that views any action as a signal. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is a direct long-term example of the consequences of two states existing in the midst of a security dilemma. States that see the actions of another state as an offensive provocation seek to respond in as proportional a manner as possible, but in some cases, as in the hypothetical situation of nuclear war, the response can have consequences that negatively—and in the case of nuclear war, catastrophically—impact the entire international community.
The lack of institutions in the international system that can hold states accountable for their actions or provide consistent, altruistic help to states in need perpetuates the mentality of states that see themselves as lone actors within the international system. In the contemporary international community, realists view states as having a go-it-alone attitude in order to best safeguard their own interests.
A more recent offshoot of the realist school of thought, neorealism (also known as structural realism), speaks to states that take a middle path to international relations.37 Like classical realists, neorealists see the state as the main actor in an anarchic system. Unlike classical realists, they contend that it is the structure of the system rather than the people who lead the state that drives the system forward. States that implement policies that align with neorealist ideas attempt to work through international institutions, such as multinational security pacts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to get what they want.
Neorealism that advocates for transparency in order to avoid conflict and maintain the status quo is known as defensive realism.38 In the minds of defensive realists, the constant distrust between states, and the resultant policies, create an environment of instability that drives states into conflict with one another. As such, these theorists believe that it is to the benefit of all states to maintain the status quo, that is, to maintain the current balance between the states in the system as it exists at that moment. Defensive realists see conflict as a destabilizing force that upsets the status quo and should be avoided. They encourage states to make transparent policy choices meant to give clear signals to other states that they see themselves as a part of and clearly support the anarchy inherent in the system and that they will not do anything to challenge it.
Offensive realism takes the opposite view. According to offensive realism, overt actions states take in order to grow and project their power lead to interstate conflict.39 These theorists argue that there is an inherent benefit in conflict and in taking self-serving action. States, they say, are intrinsically motivated to seek out power and will do so only by establishing a sense of supremacy over other states, particularly those with characteristics similar to their own. According to offensive realists, states use aggressive actions—whether military, economic, social, or political—to secure their place in the system.
1.6 The Liberal and Social Worldview
Learning Outcomes
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
- Explain the liberal worldview, including fundamental concepts and possible limitations or critiques.
- Discuss complex interdependence.
- Explain the constructivist worldview, including fundamental concepts and possible limitations or critiques.
Liberalism as a worldview differs from liberalism as a political ideology. Ideology is the lens through which an individual makes choices and, if that individual is in a place of governmental power, through which they view policy options with regard to whether they align with their values. Worldviews, such as the ones listed in this chapter, serve as the basis for how states see the political environment around them and their place in it.
In contrast to the realist school of thought, those who adhere to liberalism see investment in the system as a whole, by working within institutions and their constraints to carve out a secure space, as the best way for a state to ensure its protection. Like other theories, liberalism sees states as the primary actors in the international system,40 but liberalism contends that their domestic rules and institutions constrain their actions. As such, states must consider constantly changing factors, both internal and external, when deciding on a course of action. Above all, liberalism views states as motivated by what they see as being in the best interest of the international system.
One branch of liberalism, institutionalism, sees international institutions in which states take part as essential to the functioning of the international system.41 In creating international institutions, whose mere existence seems counter to the expectations of a system described as anarchic, states look to each other to form a web of allies that they can count on for support in times of need. Collective security,42 wherein states form alliances to strengthen the security of each member within the alliance, entrenches the idea that no one state can act independently in all instances and emerge victorious. These arrangements are especially beneficial for states with limited resources to put toward their own protection. NATO is one real-world example of an institution designed to promote collective security.
Figure 1.12 Flags of many countries fly outside NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. (credit: “170517-D-SW162-3038” by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/DoD Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. James K. McCann/Flickr, CC BY 2.0)
Smaller states such as North Macedonia and Bulgaria have limited abilities to divert their country’s GDP for investment in modern military armaments. In joining NATO, these smaller countries agree to allow more formidable powers, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, to install military personnel and weapons in their countries and to use them as a base of military operations in exchange for the promise that the more formidable military power will provide the smaller country with protection should the need arise. In the case of a joint military engagement, the smaller country contributes personnel and financial resources. With the promise of support from more powerful countries, smaller states can deter other states from taking actions against them. All states within the pact, however large or small, are obligated to take part in joint actions, and because all the states in the pact see an attack on one member as an attack on all members, smaller states are assured of protection. Thus, NATO is a true example of liberal international theory in practice. (For more on NATO, see Chapter 15: International Law and International Organizations.)
Complex interdependence43 attempts to cut a middle path between liberal and realist theories. Acknowledging the intricacies of the international system, where all parts of the system—states, individuals, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and nonstate actors—have competing interests, complex interdependence posits that networks of actors form to meet common goals. Complex interdependence has three principal tenets:
- There are many pathways actors can take to achieve their desired ends. These pathways are differentiated based on the abilities of each of the actors.
- All issues are of relatively equal importance to states.
- States see the use of force as relatively more costly than any gain it might achieve and so may be inclined to chart paths of cooperation and the use of more stable institutional solutions.44
Consider the relationship between the United States and China45 as a real-world modern example of complex interdependence in action. The economic linkages between the US and China cannot be overstated. Those linkages keep the two countries locked in a long-standing, deeply complicated relationship. The United States relies heavily on the highly developed, highly efficient Chinese manufacturing sector, and the Chinese financial system buys up American government debt to back Chinese currencies. The international community relies on China to keep North Korea in line. However, these interdependencies do not stop China from choosing to engage in cyberwarfare against the United States, nor do they prevent the United States from filing complaints against China for human rights violations, as the United States diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Summer Olympic Games46 in Beijing illustrates. That China and the United States are a part of similar international organizations, such as the United Nations, where both countries hold veto power on the Security Council, does not prevent either country from using military might and prowess to signal its strength to the other country.
The international system is both fragile and highly changeable. The anarchic nature of the system means that there is no centralized enforcement mechanism that can coerce states to act in a generally accepted manner. So, what keeps state actions within the boundaries of appropriate behavior? How do states even know what behavior is appropriate?
Constructivism47 posits that shared conceptions of the world, how the world works, what constitutes power, and who holds that power result in shared norms—expected patterns of behavior that align with the expectations and behavior patterns of others. For constructivists, these shared conceptions and resultant norms are the glue that holds the international system together. At its core, constructivism is about the interaction of many different actors within the system, each aiming to hold the others in line. According to constructivists, the perceptions states share about the world and the consequences that it is generally accepted a state might suffer should other states view it in a negative light are what keeps state actions within the boundaries of appropriate behavior.
For constructivists, how the world works and how it is perceived are not static. According to constructivism, the commonly accepted view of the world determines who has the most power to convey norms and to influence changes in norms and in ideas about how the international system should work. How the world is and how it works influence how actors choose to act, and this creates the norms and perceptions that will shape the world to come—what can be thought of as “the new normal.”
One useful way to better understand the constructivist view is to use levels of analysis. At the individual level, leaders might try to use their own personal power and charm to shape the perceptions of other actors in the system. In order to change the behavior of other states to benefit their own purposes, leaders of states who are focused on projecting their own strength, such as Vladimir Putin or Kim Jong Un, seek to carefully craft what other leaders think of them.
According to constructivists, states work to establish norms by modeling behavior and pressuring other states to emulate that behavior. For example, changes in a country’s domestic law become part of that country’s national identity; if a state chooses to enact a social safety net program, such as providing open access to education for all children, it can then pressure other states to enact a similar policy. States that enact similar policies sow relationships that can serve as a foundation on which other interactions or agreements can be built.
At the systemic level, constructivism again prioritizes the importance of norms and the tendency of political actors to seek to align with those norms. The way states identify and place value judgments on “democratic” countries or “rogue states” can motivate an individual state to change its behavior. International organizations can establish specific rules or expectations of state behavior, placing further pressure on states to align their behavior with the rest of the world—especially if being in the out group means that a state has fewer resources to support their own economic, political, or social standing.
Consider recent developments in the relationships among China, Russia, and the United States. China and Russia are becoming allies as relations between the United States and these two countries grow more strained. Constructivists contend that how a state views itself—its national identity—affects its goals and how it views and interacts with other states. For decades the United States has been the preeminent power in international relations, setting the tone for interactions. That may be changing. When Russia and China announced a sweeping—if informal—agreement declaring their friendship and opening the door for mutual cooperation, it appeared that the efforts of the United States to keep China neutral on the issue of Russia’s aggressive stance toward Ukraine had failed. Though Russia and China are both powerful autocracies, as economist and former National Security Council official Andrew Weiss notes, they have not always viewed each other as strong allies: “The Russians for the longest time were condescending in their view of China as an uninteresting rural society. Now China looks at Russia and says, ‘What are you good for?’”48 Foreign affairs analyst Robin Wright contends that their new alliance “challenges the United States as a global power, NATO as a cornerstone of international security, and liberal democracy as a model for the world.”49 In changing their views of each other and joining together to form an alliance, Russia and China seek to change the way they are viewed in the world, and in fact perhaps the way the world order itself has worked for decades.
Where Can I Engage?
International relations and international politics are always changing, so having the most up-to-date information and analysis possible is vital to understanding what is happening in the world. Podcasts provide a useful resource for up-to-date discussions of international politics. Some good podcasts to explore include:
Pod Save the World (Crooked Media)
The Lawfare Podcast (The Lawfare Institute)
IS: Off the Page (International Security)
States must rely on norms to communicate expected behaviors. Norms can be repeated behaviors, such as the use of fiat currency—government-issued, physical currency, the value of which is not linked to some other commodity (such as the gold standard)—in modern economies. They can also be actions required by international law, such as the role the United Nations Security Council plays in dealing with matters of international conflict or the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which prohibits state control over international waters beginning five miles outside of a state’s continental shelf.50 Norms provide states with a starting point from which to weigh possible courses of action and determine how best to respond to any situation that may come up during the course of normal state relations.
If members of the international community consider a state’s actions to be in conflict with existing norms, they may not consider that state to be a reliable ally. Once a state loses its standing as a positively regarded member of the international system, it can affect the way other states enter into agreements, whether they be economic or political. In an increasingly interdependent world, a state that is no longer able to enter into beneficial agreements with other states will have difficulty employing its resources in the most efficient way.
Reused from Chapter 14 of Rom, Mark, Hidaka, Masaki, & Bzostek Walker, Rachel. (2022). Introduction to Political Science. OpenStax. https://openstax.org/details/books/introduction-political-science under CC-BY 4.0 license which can be accessed for free at https://openstax.org ↑
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