Unit 2: Political Violence^[1]

by Masahiro Omae, Ph.D. and Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D.

Reused from “Chapter 12: Political Violence” by Masahiro Omae, Ph.D. and Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D. in Introduction To Comparative Government and Politics https://introcp.com/ under CC-BY-NC license

2.1: What is Political Violence?

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify what is political violence
• Explain how political violence differs from criminal violence
• Understand the differences between different forms of political violence
• Differentiate between the two categories of political violence

Political violence is a difficult term to define. The main question that arises is “when is violence considered political?” Before we can answer that, we first must define the concept of violence. Kalyvas (2006) states that “[a]t the basic level, violence is the deliberate infliction of harm on people”. Although some scholars have rightly considered non-physical aspects, such as social or economic oppression, as a form of oppression (i.e., “structural” violence), we will primarily focus on the physical variety in this chapter. So, while harm can come in many types, political violence exclusively focuses on physical violence. Physical violence includes the use of physical force to exert power. Examples include the use of weapons by criminal gangs to mark their territory, kidnappings, mass shootings, and torture. And while many of these examples can also be considered as political violence, the simple act of violence itself does not make it political. There is another step that makes violence become political.

Political violence occurs when the use of physical harm is motivated by political intentions. For example, when violence is used to destroy a social order, but also to preserve a social order, we can consider this political violence. Thus, political violence can be used by those seeking to challenge the socio-political status quo. And it could involve those who want to defend that same status quo.

Differentiating when an act of violence is simply criminal or should be considered political violence can be tricky. For example, many scholars contend that the actions taken by the drug cartels in the Gulf of Mexico should be described as political violence. The cartels often target law enforcement, kidnap the loved ones of government officials and threaten the government itself. Thus, by targeting the official capacity of the government, some say that the Mexican drug trafficking groups are politically violent. However, we have to ask what are the intentions of these narco groups? Their primary interests are financial, the continued flow of narcotics from Central and South America to the U.S. border. They are overwhelmingly not interested in challenging the socio-political order. They have little interest in regime change, or in elections. The drug cartels tend to get involved only when their interests are threatened. As long as the Mexican government stays out of their way, they will respond in kind.

What are some forms of political violence? Are interstate wars, or wars between two or more countries, considered political violence? The answer generally is no. Even though our definition above does not necessarily preclude international wars, the vast majority of political violence transpires within a state. Intrastate political violence is defined as political violence that wholly or largely occurs within a state or country. While individuals are being subjugated to political violence in the context of an international war, such a war still is a contestation between two or more sovereign entities where individuals are “participating” as a member of a sovereign state (see the definition and more details on state in chapter XX). So, we need to think about who is using violence against who when we are trying to classify different forms of political violence. Generally speaking, at least one of the parties involved in a case of political violence is a nonstate actor. A non-state actor is any political actor that is not associated with a government. It is further defined as “an individual or organization that has significant political influence but is not allied to any particular country or state” (Lexico, n.d.).

Non-state actors include a wide range of organizations and individuals. Many non-state actors are charities or have peaceful intentions. This includes non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and trade unions. They can also include individual political actors as well (a deeper discussion of non-state actors occurs in Chapter 12). Non-state actors that engage in political violence traditionally involve insurgents, guerilla groups and terrorists. Each one of the groups will be discussed at length in this chapter. Finally, political violence can include a wide range of activities: terrorism, assassinations, coups, battles, riots, explosions, and protests.

(Source: Author's Creation using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project; Terms of Use & Attribution Policy)

A more difficult differentiation occurs when non-state actors have a transnational presence. Transnationalism is defined as “events, activities, ideas, trends, processes and phenomena that appear across national boundaries and cultural regions” (Juergensmeyer, 2013). Thus, transnational political violence is defined as political violence that occurs across different countries or crosses state borders. By their nature, insurgents and guerilla groups tend not to be transnational, as their focus is on overthrowing a government within a specific country or succeeding in the secession of a region or province. Secession is defined as the act of formal withdrawal or separation from a political entity, usually a state. The goals of secessionist movements are often the creation of a new state or leaving to join another state.

This is not the case with terrorism, however. Since the 1990s, terrorism has become transnational, with the rise of groups such as al-Qaeda and their affiliates and offspring. Transnational actors blur the line between comparative politics and international relations. As countries have allied to combat transnational terrorist activity, their responses could be understood through international relations theory. In addition, international governmental organizations, such as the United Nations have also worked with individual member-states on counterterrorism strategies. Still, terrorism is often researched by comparative scholars as the targets of their political violence are civilians. Given that these attacks happen within a country, comparative methodology can help in analyzing and/or assessing terrorist acts and their responses.

Given the above discussion, we can present several categories of political violence. The first category involves state-sponsored political violence. This form of political violence occurs when a government uses violence, either against its own citizens, referred to as internal sponsored political violence; or against foreign citizens, usually in neighboring countries, referred to as external sponsored political violence. The second category involves non-state sponsored political violence. Forms of non-state sponsored political violence involves insurgencies, civil wars, revolutions, and terrorism. Each one of these categories, both state-sponsored and nonstate sponsored forms will be discussed at length below.

2.2: State-Sponsored Political Violence

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Differentiate between internal and external state-sponsored political violence
• Understand different repressive policies (domestic terrorism)
• Evaluate different models of state-sponsored terrorism

A major characteristic of a state is their ‘monopoly on the use of violence’. By this we mean that only the state and its institutions, such as the police or the military, have the authority to use violence, when necessary. The last part has been italicized for a reason. If the government of a country enjoys this monopoly, then the leaders, elected or not, are also responsible for when violence is used. Rules and regulations must exist for states when violence is employed by authorities. For example, all police authorities worldwide are expected to undergo formal training, background checks. In addition, most law enforcement officers are expected to be actively licensed, with periodic reviews of their performance. Unfortunately, those with the ability to wield such power, often through small arms and/or other weaponry, have too often abused this authority. We see many instances of protestors on global TV stations being beaten in the streets, or images of villages being looted or burned. When this occurs, it often leads the people of that country to believe that their government has transgressed their responsibility. At this stage, we can say that this state has engaged in state-sponsored political violence.

State-sponsored political violence can be characterized as “official government support for policies of violence, repression, and intimidation” (Martin, 2020, pg. 66). Officially, a government can sanction violence against people or organizations that are deemed to be a threat to the state. Who exactly gets to decide who is a threat, and in turn define them as an enemy is left to debate. Many times, state-sponsored political violence is often referred to as government terrorism, or state-sponsored terrorism. The word terrorism itself is often used to describe many different violent actions. Political leaders often use the word to describe actions taken by their political opposition. Similarly, people also apply the word terrorism to unpopular decisions made by leaders that have had harmful repercussions.

However, in political science terrorism has a specific meaning. Terrorism is defined as a violent act that generally targets noncombatants for political purposes. Some go even further and define terrorism as violence carried out by nonstate actors that targets noncombatants for political reasons. We tend to disagree and believe that such actions carried out by governments can rightfully also be labeled as terrorism. This is because terrorism is better understood as a tactic. The goal in terrorism is to use violence to disruption and fear among the general population as away to put pressure on government leaders. Terrorists hope that this pressure will lead to changes in government policy that they find favorable. Let’s look at how different governments approach the use of political violence.

In democratic regimes, these decisions are often left up to the executive branches of a government. For example, in parliamentary systems, the Prime Minister’s cabinet will often make that call, often in consultation with the country’s intelligence agencies. In presidential systems, this decision often falls to the President, who usually consults with a national defense council. These councils often include the country’s defense minister, national security advisor and other relevant officials, such as the foreign minister. Either way, the decisions to determine who is a threat are eventually scrutinized by opposing politicians, or directly by the public. A good example is when opposition parties call for a vote of no confidence in parliamentary systems for example. Through voting mechanisms, the public can concur with their elected leaders and re-elect them, or dissent and choose to vote for opposing candidates and/or parties.

In authoritarian regimes, a similar process plays out, but with some important differences. The decision on who is an enemy is still made at the executive level. However, whether it is a Prime Minister or a President, or a Premier making that call is irrelevant. In authoritarian systems there is also little to no recourse for those who may disagree. Often, the opposition party, if one exists, is ignored, and the public often lacks the formal voting mechanisms to remove a leader they disagree with. This can explain why the propensity for political violence may be greater in authoritarian regimes. As there are less checks on those who have a monopoly on the use of power, abuse of that authority is more likely.

2.2.1: Internal State-Sponsored Political Violence (Government Terrorism)

When a government finally determines who is a threat and designates someone, some group, or some organization as an enemy, the next step is figuring out where this threat/enemy is located. If it is determined to be within the borders of the country, then the threat is considered to be an internal threat. If it is determined to be outside the borders of the country, then the threat is considered an external threat. This distinction clearly matters as the state will have more autonomy to use violence against internal threats vis-a-vis external threats. The concept of sovereignty applies. Remember from Chapter One, sovereignty is fundamental governmental power, where the government has the power to coerce those to do things they may not want to do. Also remember from Chapter Three, sovereignty also involves the ability to manage the country’s affairs independently from outside powers and internal resistance. If a state does not have the ability to manage its own affairs and issues, it will not be able to maintain its power over what happens. If a country enjoys widespread sovereignty, then the government will have more room from which to address internal threats. States have little to no sovereignty beyond their borders, though can project power in the defense of their interests.

When violence is officially sanctioned against a perceived internal threat or enemy, it can come in many forms. In democratic countries, this often involves use of force to arrest or detain those who act against the state. It may also involve the use of lethal means, particularly if the democratically elected government believes the threat could be an existential threat, or a threat to the existence of the state itself. An example could include a group that espouses an apocalyptic ideology, and may lack any political goals, other than seeing the destruction of their home government. Still, in a democratic society, the public will tend not to tolerate large scale measures. It is one thing to punish an extremist group, it’s another thing for wider security measures that could affect society writ large.

Still, the use of violence in a democratic society can occur without formal sponsorship by its government. Political violence can be used by vigilante groups, paramilitaries, and other armed groups. In many countries, these groups may not have the explicit support of the state, but implicit support instead. Often, they are administratively separate from official government structures. Such groups will wage unofficial campaigns of violence and suppression against perceived internal enemies. They may or may not work with a state’s security apparatus when targeting others. In addition, as these organizations are not part of a government’s official institutions, governments may claim that they exert no control or influence over the group’s actions.

In authoritarian countries, repression through violence may be official state policy. This is often referred to as overt repression as policy. Countries such as the Soviet Union under Stalin, or Nazi Germany, or in more recent times, Cambodia when ruled by the Khmer Rouge and Afghanistan in the 1990s before the U.S. invasion toppled them, all had adopted explicit repressive policies of violence towards people and segments of their population. Hundreds of thousands of people were exiled to work camps in Siberia during Stalin’s reign. Millions of people were killed in Nazi death camps, simply for being born in the wrong group. The Khmer Rouge is responsible for one of the worst mass killings of the late 20th century. Up to two million Cambodians were massacred in their attempt to transform the country into an agrarian utopian society. Finally, Taliban rule of Afghanistan in the 1990s was cruel and vicious, often targeting minority groups, such as the Hazaras.

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In addition to overt repression, where violence is the official state policy, there is also covert repression as policy. Often actions undertaken by secret police services, or domestic intelligence agencies are considered covert. Use of violence against individuals or groups is often done secretively with society unaware that these violent actions are taking place. There are plenty of examples of authoritarian regimes using their domestic law enforcement services to quell opposition or stifle any dissent. Intelligence agencies such as in Syria or Iraq, referred to as the Mukhabarat in Arabic, are often integrated parts of a country’s military structure. By surveilling the population, they can alert the military or law enforcement of any potential threats to the authoritarian regime’s rule. Covert repression can also include nonviolent means as well. The former country of East Germany had the Stasi, or the State Security Service is a good example. The Stasi became infamous for their network of informants they developed in East German society. They used this network to terrify the population and use that fear to target those who might oppose the regime.

Keep in mind that such violence is much less tolerated today than it was in the past. Before the end of the Cold War, the concept of sovereignty was paramount when it came to the internal affairs of a state. However, since the 1990s, there has been a significant shift in the view of sovereignty. Following numerous humanitarian crises, scholars, policymakers and IGO officials have advocated for a new approach: responsibility to protect (R2P). If a state refuses to protect its own citizens, then other states are expected to intervene in the state where abuses are occurring. R2P goes as far as to suggest using military force to protect another country’s citizens from persecution, especially if authorized by the UN Security Council.

2.2.2: External State-Sponsored Political Violence (State-Sponsored Terrorism)

When a country decides that the threat is external, the state can also take action. This action can be in the form of state-sponsored terrorism, which is defined as government support for terrorist actions in other states. However, these actions are going to be much more constrained than internal actions. Martin (2007) differentiates between two models of state-sponsored terrorism. The first is the patronage model of state-sponsored terrorism, which is when a state actively participates and encourages terrorist actions in other countries. The second is the assistance model of state-sponsored terrorism, which is when a state tacitly supports and encourages terrorist actions in other countries.

A good example of the patronage model of state-sponsored terrorism is Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah is both a militant organization and a political party in Lebanon. Hezbollah directly translates as ‘party of God’ and politically represents Shi’a Muslim interests in Lebanon’s parliament. Founded during the devastating Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the organization is active. They engage in combating other militias in Lebanon, have directly confronted Israel, both through fighting Israelis in southern Lebanon before Israeli forces pulled out in 2000 and with their rocket attacks on the country, and in supporting the Bashir al-Asad regime during the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah is designated as a terrorist organization by the US and other Western countries and Iran has been accused of supporting Hezbollah with weaponry, training and funding (Robinson, 2021).

For the assistance model of state-sponsored terrorism, a great example includes Pakistan’s tacit support for Lashkar-e-Taiba. Lashkar-e-Taiba roughly translates as ‘army of the righteous/pure’. They are a Pakistani-based terrorist organization that is most famous for a 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, where operatives targeted the country’s financial district, a famous hotel landmark, and a Jewish cultural center. Pakistan has since banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, and prosecuted former members, however, the government tacitly supported the organization in the 1990s and still operates within Pakistan through a number of offshoot groups (Macander, 2021).

2.3: Non-State Political Violence

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the different types of non-state political violence
• Understand the differences between civil wars, insurgencies, and guerilla warfare
• Apply explanations of terrorism
• Evaluate what is a revolution

As we stated earlier, a non-state actor is a political actor not associated with a government. Non-State actors come in many different types, from transnational corporations to nongovernmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, to international drug trafficking rings. Yet there are quite a few non-state actors who engage in political violence, from guerillas to insurgents to terrorists. Generally speaking, non-state political violence is by the type of action, rather than the type of actor. This is because the non-state actors can all engage in different types of political violence. For example, terrorists can participate in insurgencies and/or civil wars, whereas guerillas can engage in terrorist actions.

2.3.1: Insurgencies/Civil Wars

In the simplest term, a civil war (simple) is an armed conflict between two or more groups where one of the combatants is the government. Does this mean then that an armed engagement between a street gang and a police unit constitutes a civil war? The answer would be no. Even though the media may use terms such as war or civil war to describe such violence, political scientists would not refer to it as either war or a civil war. Remember, political violence is defined as the use of physical harm is motivated by political intentions. Given this, political violence scholars have narrowed the definition of the term.

According to Sambanis (2004), to meet the definition of civil war (political science), a conflict must be between a rebel group and the government who are politically and militarily organized with stated political objectives that take place in the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of at least 500,000. In addition to these general requirements, there are additional critical characteristics in distinguishing civil wars from the rest of armed engagement. The violence cannot be one-sided (see the section below on terrorism), and there needs to be sustained violence.

What then distinguishes civil war from other types of violence (e.g., riots, terrorism, and coup d’état)? First, civil wars are notated for the level of destruction. Wars within a country are often devastating. The US civil war killed over 600,000 people. Its scars are still felt in the US till this day. Given this, most scholars have adopted a numerical threshold of 1,000 deaths when defining political violence as the Correlates of War project as the one of the main deciding factors in determining whether an armed conflict should be classified as a war. While the use of numerical threshold can be useful in determining whether a violent episode is a civil war or not, strict application of that threshold can exclude cases that otherwise meet the definition of civil war.

Given the power dynamics involved in civil wars, the weaker side (typically the rebels) often rely on certain techniques when challenging the government. This reliance on insurgency tactics is what characterizes a civil war. An insurgency is an act of uprising or revolt against a government and/or the state. It is closely related to the concept of a rebellion, which we will define below. Insurgents claim that they represent the will of the people against a government that no longer represents them. For many insurgents then, their ultimate goal is the overthrow of the government, which in that case makes them revolutionaries (discussed more below). For other insurgents, their state goal may be secession, or if secession is not an attainable goal, then some level of political autonomy.

Insurgents use particular tactics because of the power imbalance that they face against the state. Even in a situation where the state is facing extinction as a functioning political entity, the state still often has the overwhelming firepower. This follows what we discussed earlier, where part of the definition of a state is that it monopolizes the legitimate use of violence. As such, the challenging side needs to be creative and innovative when challenging the government since the insurgent’s probability of success is much lower, especially in head-to-head combat.

Guerilla warfare is similar to insurgency, and often the phrases are interchangeable. Like terrorism and insurgency, guerilla warfare is also better understood as a tactic, where small, lightly armed bands engage in guerrilla warfare from a rural base that targets the state. Guerilla warfare differs from insurgency in that these fighters usually do not engage in mass mobilization practices. Insurgents claim to represent the will of people. Guerillas do not. They tend to represent the interests of certain groups, and not necessarily the entire population. Of course, these definitions overlap and using the terms interchangeably happens in all settings.

What causes civil wars? Earlier literature on the onset of civil wars focused on grievances. The grievance explanation says that political violence along communal lines is jointly a product of deep-seated grievances about the status of the group and the situationally motivated political interests that various political actors desire to pursue (Gurr, 1993). Grievances often revolve around economic, social, and political rights, as well as demand for political autonomy. These grievances contribute to the likelihood of communal mobilization, which can lead to political violence.

This is especially more likely when a group historically has some level of political autonomy and then loses it. Resentment about the restriction on one's political access appears to drive rebellion amongst various communal groups. Rebellion is an act of violently challenging the government or existing ruler in order to bring attention to the status quo with which the challengers are dissatisfied. In this context, the sentiments of grievance can help leaders of the disadvantaged communal group. They can point to this instance as a basis in legitimizing their cause and propelling the movement. Given this, as the level of grievances increases within a group, the easier it becomes for leaders to recruit potential rebels. In turn, this can lead to rebellion and civil war.

The grievance explanation has been challenged by a number of scholars. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) prefer to look at opportunity factors for rebellion instead of motivational factors. They see rebellion as an industry that generates profit from exercising control over resources. They argue that “the incidents of rebellion are not explained by motive, but by the atypical circumstances that generate profitable opportunity” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). More specifically, factors associated with the cost of and the availability of financing the rebellion, relative military advantage of the potential rebel group, and the patter of demographic dispersion are all considered robust indicators of whether rebellion is an attractive option for opportunistic actors. In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that rebellion is most likely when participants have low incomes. In their model, they incorporate measures of per capita income, the rate of male secondary school enrollment, and the economic growth rate. The basic idea is that if joining the rebel movement appears to be more profitable for the individuals, then it incentivizes the desire to participate, which in turn determines if a rebellion remains viable.

Finally, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that civil war is understood through favorable environments. They disagree with theories that place emphasis on the necessity of strong, widespread popular support based on factors associated with grievances. Instead, they argue that an insurgency can be viable and sustained under certain conditions: mountainous terrain, contiguous cross border sanctuaries, and an easily recruited population. These conditions favor insurgents given the asymmetric distribution of power between the rebels and government forces.

2.3.2: Non-State Terrorism

Again, terrorism is defined as a violent act that generally targets noncombatants for political purposes. Many non-scientific analyses of various terrorism cases often cite religion, ethnoracial factors, extreme political ideology as the primary motivation for extreme groups to resort to violence. Many make a causal link between these factors and the outcome of a terrorist act by political extreme groups. However, it is evident that mere membership in a particular religious or ethnic group is not always causing one to commit these violent acts. So when and why do political extreme groups commit violence?

In the literature on the origins of terrorism, there are two dominant schools of theoretical explanation: psychological and rational choice explanations. The psychological explanation of terrorism relies on the idea that the violence itself is the desired outcome as opposed to being the means to the end. Post (1990) claims that “individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.” While Post recognizes that this is a rather extreme claim, the psychological explanation posits that an act of violence is rationalized by the core ideology of a terrorist group where the participants are psychologically compelled to commit acts of violence.

Conversely, scholars like Crenshaw (1990) rely on the rational choice explanation of terrorism where the use of terrorism is believed to be the result of a willful strategy based on a careful political calculation. In this framework, terrorism is understood as an expression of political strategy where the act of violence is amongst many alternatives from which an extreme group may choose. Simply put, when the expected benefit of a terrorist act outweighs the const of such behavior and produces the highest expected utility, then such an act becomes the most strategically sound option for a group. This analytical approach follows the conventional explanations for terrorism that a relatively weak group relies on a policy choice to make it hard for the state to ignore their claims.

For example, if the US armed forces were to go head to head with an existing terrorist groups, it is clear that the U.S. would easily defeat them. As a result, it makes no sense for a terrorist group to fight the US conventionally. Instead, it is preferable to strike the US where it is most vulnerable - targeting noncombatant targets, such as civilians. When looking back at the September 11th, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, we see that al-Qaeda’s main target was the

World Trade Center, the financial nerve center of the country. Military targets, such as the Pentagon, were also hit, but the goal of the attacks were to punish the American people, and put pressure on the US government to change their foreign policy and international behavior. If we were to use the rational choice explanation of terrorism, then the 9/11 attacks were not committed by an irrational group of extremists, but as a group engaged in a willful strategy to accomplish a political outcome. Indeed, it would be counterproductive to label them as “irrational” as that could lead to an underestimation of another attack.

The evidence is mixed in terms regarding the effectiveness of non-state terrorism. Terrorist action can lead to a specific change in government policy, but there have been few notable overall shifts in foreign policy. For example, al-Qaeda bombed several train stations in Madrid in 2004 as a reaction to the Spanish government involvement in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The attacks took place right before national elections and they influenced how Spanish citizens voted. Once the new government came in, they withdrew Spanish forces from coalition fighting in Iraq. However, the attacks in Madrid did not change the overall Iraq War. Other countries refused to change course.

(Source: Remains of one of the trains bombed in the 2004 Madrid train bombings by Ramon

Peco via Wikimedia Commons is licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Terrorist action can also lead to changes in government policy that were not intended by the group. For example, the 9/11 attackers did not intentionally desire to change airport policies in the US. However, as anyone who has traveled in the past twenty years knows, the attacks had a dramatic impact. Now, all travelers in the US have to endure more intrusive safety protocols, including x-rays, taking off one’s shoes, opening up carry-on bags, prohibition of liquids, etc. Prior to these attacks, most anyone could enter an airport, without as much intrusion. For example, people were able to go through security without a ticket and walk their loved ones to the gate. Similarly, they could wait at the gate when welcoming back their loved ones. These privileges no longer exist.

On other hand, sometimes the state purposes of a terrorist organization fail completely. A good example includes the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) call for the creation of a caliphate. A caliphate is essentially a state run by Islamic political authorities. A caliphate has not existed for quite a few centuries. ISIS leaders, who claimed to represent the interests of all Muslims worldwide, desired to build a caliphate in the areas of Syria and Iraq that they had conquered. A caliph is believes to be the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad, which is an important concept in the history of Islam. Yet despite the best efforts of ISIS, the caliphate did not last. Syrian, Russian, Kurdish and American forces largely defeated ISIS in 2019. Even though ISIS committed atrocious violence and killed many non-combatants, they ultimately failed to achieve their primary political goal.

So how do we protect ourselves from a potential terrorist attack? Most countries develop counterterrorism policies, especially those that have been targeted in the past or are actively targeted today. Counterterrorism policies are defined as government or military efforts to prevent or thwart terrorism. Examples of counterterrorism policies include the U.S. government’s efforts to cut off terrorist financing. This is accomplished by monitoring incoming and outgoing financial transactions, such as wire transfers and bank deposits. Other examples include extensive background checks for international student visas and retinal and fingerprint scans at border checkpoints. Another good example involves the EU’s efforts to deradicalize convicted terrorists. They have developed a Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). According to the European Commission, “The RAN is a network of frontline practitioners who work daily with both those vulnerable to radicalisation and those who have already been radicalised.” (European Commission, n.d.)

2.3.3: Revolution

The term revolution has been used in a variety of contexts. For example journalists will label news where a group of citizens politically (and often violently) protest and challenge the government in power as a revolution. An example includes current pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Certain media outlets have labeled these protests as a revolution. Even the participants of the protest have used the word revolution in their slogan, “Liberate Hong Kong, the Revolution of Our Times.” While journalists can use the word revolution, generally speaking describing the struggle as a revolution may not be appropriate. As mentioned in Chapter 2, political scientists need to clearly define the terms prior to making descriptive or causal inferences about the event of their interest. Otherwise, any potential politically violence action can be called a revolution.

(Source: Demonstration in support of 2019 Hong Kong Protests.by Andrew Mercer via Wikimedia Commons is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0)

According to Skocpol (1979), a revolution is defined as a public seizure of the state in order to overturn the existing government and regime. This definition has three important parts. First, there has to be public participation in the movement. This means that the public must play a critical role. This characteristic of a revolution differentiates it from other types of political violence such as a coup d’état. Recall from Chapter Three, that a coup d’état is an attempt by elites to overthrow the current government of a state through abrupt seizure of power and removal of the government’s leadership. While many political challenges and violence are initiated by political elites, a revolution must be supported by the general public.

Second, the main purpose of a revolution is the public seizure of the state. Other types of political violence may not require the seizure of the state. Some politically violent actors can achieve their goals with concessions from the state. For example, some insurgents may settle for an expansion of voting rights or meaningful protection of civil rights. Or, some terrorists may settle for a change in policy. A revolution in contrast will end with the rebel group in control of the state apparatus, taking full control over the function of the government.

Third, once the state is captured by the rebels, there will be a shift in the regime. This characteristic is critical when attempting to differentiate a revolution from all other types of political violence against the state. Without regime change, such actions are classified under other types of political violence (e.g., civil war). It is very important to be able to clearly identify whether a particular event constitutes a revolution or not when studying the onset, nature, and possible solution to political violence. While violent episodes may initially appear to be the same in terms of the cause, researchers are most likely to observe differences in the duration or the nature of violence between revolution and non-revolutions.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 is a great example of a revolution as described by Skocpol. It marked the end of centuries of imperial Russian rule, with the assassination of the Romanov family in 1918. The ensuing civil war saw the communists, or Bolsheviks, fight under Vladimir Lenin. Their red army fought against the white army, a loose association of loyalists, capitalists and other elements. The success of the communists in 1923 led to a dramatic reordering of Russian society. A largely agrarian society was collectively industrialized in the ensuing decades. New social norms were introduced. It was truly a revolution in every sense of the word.

(Source: February Revolution in Russia by Unknown Author via Wikimedia Commons is licensed under Public Domain).

The above discussion generally discusses a revolution accomplished through violent means. However, in some cases revolutions may occur without violence. Quite a few nonviolence movements have succeeded in achieving regime change. Nonviolence movements are defined as movements that engage in nonviolent practices to accomplish political goals. Tactics can include protests, boycotts, sit-ins, and civil disobedience. They are also referred to as nonviolent resistance or nonviolent protests. All three elements identified by Skocpol need to exist: public participation, public seizure of a state, and a shift in regimes. Where nonviolent revolutions differ is that the movement’s leaders convince the state’s military, or some portion thereof, that the state is better off under a new regime. It is not a coup per se, as a coup is led by military elites. In nonviolent revolutions, the military either refuses to intervene, and/or abandons the regime in power entirely. When that happens, the reigning military authority will work with the new regime to maintain peace and security.

A great example of a nonviolent revolution is the fall communist regimes in 1989. The Soviet Union installed loyal regimes in Eastern European countries in the aftermath of World War II. As part of the Warsaw Pact, countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany were satellite states, dependent on the Soviet Union for their legitimacy and survival. When popular uprisings would occur, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet forces rolled in, quelling any hopes of democracy. When popular uprisings occurred again in 1989, Soviet forces withdrew this time, allowing the puppet communist regimes to collapse. Eastern Europe quickly adopted democratic capitalist models. Little violence occurred, with the exception of the execution of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania.

(Source: Berlin 1989, Fall der Mauer, Chute du mur by Raphaël Thiémard from Belgique via

Wikimedia Commons is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0)

2.4: How Does Political Violence End? Post-Conflict Strategies

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Understand how political violence can end
• Analyze what are negotiated settlements
• Evaluate the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking

How does political violence end? Various arguments have made that the way in which political violence ends will determine if it happens again. Let’s use civil wars as an example. In general, civil wars that end in a negotiated settlement have a higher chance of experiencing a renewed war in relation to the wars that end in a decisive victory (Wagner 1993; Licklider 1995). This is due to the fact that a negotiated settlement leaves the organizational capacity of both sides intact, making a future resumption of a war possible (Wagner 1993). On the contrary, a decisive victory of one side implies that the losing side no longer has its capacity to harm while the victor retains the capacity to repress any future mobilization. Consequently, a renewed violence becomes unrealistic for the losing side, keeping the probability of war recurrence at low.

A good example involves the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in the country of Sri Lanka. The

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a Tamil militant organization that was based in northeastern Sri Lanka. Its aim was to secure an independent state of Tamil Eelam in the north and east in response to the state policies of successive Sri Lankan governments towards Tamils. The LTTE carried out its first major attack on July 23rd, 1983, which led to what is referred to as Black July, the common name used to refer to the anti-Tamil pogrom and riots in Sri Lanka. Black July is generally seen as the start of the Sri Lankan Civil War between the Tamil militants and the government of Sri Lanka.

For over 25 years, the war caused significant hardships for the population, environment and the economy of the country, with an initial estimated 80,000–100,000 people killed during its course. Sri Lanka is a nondemocracy, with a history of significant discrimination against nonBuddhist minority groups. Its authoritarian government was able to carry out quite repressive policies to defeat the separatist movement.

In late 2005 the conflict began to escalate until the government launched a number of major military offensives against the LTTE beginning in July 2006, driving the LTTE out of the entire Eastern province of the island. In 2007, the government shifted its offensive to the north of the country, the government took control of the entire area previously controlled by the Tamil Tigers, including their de facto capital Kilinochchi, main military base Mullaitivu and the entire A9 highway, leading the LTTE to finally admit defeat on 17 May 2009. Following the LTTE's defeat, pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance dropped its demand for a separate state, in favor of a federal solution

The Sri Lankan government was accused of massive war crimes violations against its own citizens.

Toft (2009) argues that civil wars that end in rebel victory are likely to produce enduring peace, but not in the way one expects. Rebel victories often end in political transformation, with the new regime often embracing democracy, though not always. Still, even if the rebel group adopts a democratic regime, it does not mean that they will abstain from repression. Remember, if a rebel group wins, then this means that their capacity to wage violence is still intact. While rebels often reward the citizens who supported them and their successful challenge, they may also subdue groups within the country that opposed them. As a result, this new government, even if democratic, is likely to pursue repressive policies following the end of the civil war. Ironically, it is these same repressive policies that may have motivated the original conflict in the first place. However, after a civil war ends, repression leads to peace

Another way that civil wars can end and lead to peace are through negotiated settlements. Negotiated settlements are defined as successful discussions between combatants where an agreement is reached to end political violence. Hartzell (1999) argues that the key to the enduring peace settlement requires the institutionalization of certain power-sharing mechanisms. When rebels, insurgents, guerillas or terrorists disarm, they worry not just about their own safety, but also regarding the needs of the groups they were fighting for. A negotiated settlement often involves the recentralization of power in certain areas. This is where a government reasserts its authority, such as policing or education. Former rebels are concerned that without their inclusion in the decision-making process, there will be a lack of proper political representation. This could also lead to less access to economic opportunities. For these folks to lay down their weapons, at minimum safeguards must be in place to protect their interests, at best they need to be part of the solution.

Walter (1999, 2002) argues that power-sharing through a negotiated settlement may not be enough. Just because two or more sides agreed to do something, does not mean that they will follow through with it. There has to be a way to make sure that these negotiated settlements can be enforced. The simplest way to do this is through a third-party guarantor. A third-party guarantor is defined as an external force that can enforce the provisions of a negotiated settlement. Walter shows that the implementation of power-sharing agreement in itself is not sufficient in producing an enduring peace. This is due to the fact that a durable negotiated settlement requires not only short-term security concerns, but also long-term political problems that the post-war environment may produce.

Peacekeeping forces are the best example of a third-party guarantor. Peacekeeping forces refer “to the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states” (Encyclopedia Princetoniensis, n.d.). Peacekeepers generally contribute to the durability of peace established through negotiated settlements. In a post-conflict environment, peacekeepers facilitate an environment where self-sustaining peace is possible. This is true even after the peacekeepers have departed. Peacekeepers can help prevent violence from reoccurring through monitoring the behavior of the former belligerents, and in some cases enforcement of the agreed upon provisions. They also help prevent mistakes and miscommunications that could lead to resumption of violence. Increased communication can dampen the effect of spoilers, or disaffected individuals who may disagree with a negotiated settlement and prefer political violence to peace. Finally, peacekeepers can also prevent potential abuse of former rebels.

Peacekeeping has been relatively successful since it began back in the 1940s. A conservative estimate suggests that peacekeepers reduced the risk of war recurring by over half! Likewise, it does not seem to make a difference whether the peacekeepers have been invited or imposed (Fortna, 2008). Consent-based (traditional) peacekeepers are peacekeepers that have been invited by the belligerents. Peace enforcement missions occur when consent is not required, or peacekeeping forces were not invited by the belligerents. This happens when an outside organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) imposes a security force in an area. This happened in Bosnia and in Kosovo during the Yugoslavia Wars of the 1990s. Finally, peacekeepers are important even when there are strong financial incentives to still fight, such as when lootable resources are involved. Lootable resources are defined as accessible natural resources, such as oil, minerals and precious metals that can confer wealth on those who own, mine or transport them.

Peacebuilding is also an important aspect of a post-conflict strategy. Peacebuilding is defined as the implementation of structures to promote sustainable peace. Peacebuilding efforts are relatively successful because it aims to restructure the political, economic as well as social institutions in a country. This often includes building stronger institutions, encouraging mass political participation, and promoting respect for societal diversity. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also suggest that a successful peacebuilding strategy needs to address several items. These include addressing local sources of hostility, understanding the local capacity for change, and determining the level of commitment from the international community. Finally, peacebuilding does not necessarily require the use of peacekeepers or a peace enforcement mission. However, the likelihood of success increases greatly when UN peacekeepers are present.

1. Reused from “Chapter 12: Political Violence” by Masahiro Omae, Ph.D. and Dino Bozonelos, Ph.D. in Introduction To Comparative Government and Politics https://introcp.com/ under CC-BY-NC license ↑