Ballad 2 [1]
She acknowledges the excesses of a good deal of erudition, which she fears is useless even to learning and injurious to living
Let us pretend I am happy,
melancholy Thought, for a while;
perhaps you can persuade me, though
i know the contrary is true:
for since on mere apprehension
they say all suffering depends,
if you imagine good fortune
you will not be so downcast.
Let my understanding at times
allow me to rest a while
and let my wits not always be
opposed to my own advantage.
All people have opinions and
judgments so multitudinous,
that when one states this is black
the other proves it is white
Some find attractive precisely
what others deem an annoyance;
an alleviation for one
is bothersome for another.
One who is sad criticizes
the happy man as frivolous;
and one who is happy derides
the sad man and his suffering.
The two philosophers of Greece [2]
offered perfect proofs of this truth:
for what caused laughter in one man
occasioned tears in the other.
The contradiction has been famed
for centuries beyond number,
yet which of the two was correct
has so far not been determined;
instead into their two factions
all people have been recruited,
temperament dictating which
band each person will adhere to.
One says that the inconstant world
is worthy only of laughter;
another, that its misfortunes
are only to be lamented.
A proof is found for everything,
a reason on which to base it;
and nothing has a good reason
since there is reason for so much.
All people are equal judges;
being both equal and varied,
there is no one who can decide
which argument is true and right.
Since no one can adjudicate,
why do you think, mistakenly,
that God entrusted you alone
with the decisions in this case?
Oh why, inhuman and severe,
and acting against yourself, in
the choice between bitter and sweet
do you wish to choose the bitter?
If my understanding is my
own, why must I always find it
so slow and dull about relief,
so sharp and keen about distress?
discursive reason is a sword
quite effective at both ends:
with the point of the blade it kills;
the pommel on the hilt protects.
If you, aware of the danger,
wish to wield the point of the sword,
how can the steel blade be to blame
for the evil acts of your hand?
Knowing how to create subtle,
specious reasons is not knowledge;
true knowledge consists only in
choosing salutary virtue.
Scrutinizing all misfortunes
and examining bad omens
achieves nothing but the growth of
the bad through anticipations.
In future deliberations
our attention, grown more subtle,
will imagine threatened attacks
as more alarming than the risks.
How blithesome is the ignorance
of one who, unlearned but wise,
deems his affliction, his nescience
all he does not know, as sacred!
The most daring flights of genius
do not always soar assured when
they seek a throne in the fire
and find a grave in copious tears.[3]
For knowledge is also a vice:
if it is not constantly curbed,
and if this is not acknowledged,
the greater the havoc it wreaks;
and if the flight is not brought down,
fed and fattened on subtleties
it will forget the essential
for the sake of the rare and strange.
If a skilled hand does not prevent
the growth of a thickly leafed tree,
its proliferating branches
will steal the substance of the fruit.
If the bulk of ballast does not
impede the speed of a swift ship,
that flight creates the headlong fall
from a most precipitous height.
It is futile amenity:
what does the flowering field care
if Autumn finds no fruit as long
as May can display its blossoms?
What benefit to intellect
to gestate so many offspring,
if that multitude is followed
by ill-fated miscarriages?
And perforce this great misfortune
must be followed by mischance:
the one who gestates will be left
if not dead, then gravely injured.
Our intellect is like fire:
deeply ungrateful to matter,
flame consumes more matter the
brighter the fire appears.
So rebellious a vassal to
its own legitimate Lord,
that fire transforms the weapon of
its defense into offenses.
This appalling, daunting practice,
this harsh and onerous toil
God gave to the children of men
for the sake of their discipline.
What mad ambition carries us,
having forgotten who we are?
If we live for so short a time,
why do we wish to know so much?
Oh, if there were only a school
or seminary where they taught
classes in how not to know
as they teach classes in knowing.
How happily the man would live
who with languid circumspection
would simply laugh at the menace
of the influence of the stars!
Let us learn about not knowing,
Oh Thought, for we then discover
that for all I add to discourse
I usurp as much from my years.
- First published in Castalian Inundation (1689) [Editor]. Back
- Heraclitus of Ephesus (ca. 540—ca. 480 B.C.E.) and Democritus of Abdera (ca. 460—470 B.C.E.), pre-Socratic philosophers who claimed that life was a cause, respectively, for weeping or for laughter. Back
- An allusion to Phaeton. The son of Helios, the sun god, Phaeton drove his father’s chariot through the air, losing control of the horses and plunging to his death. Back