Chapter III
the Struggle for Independence
I. Economic and political aspects of the struggles—Monarchy and the Republic—The leaders: Miranda, Belgrano, Francia, Iturbide, King Pedro I., Artigas, San Martin, Bolivar—Bolivar the Liberator: his ideas and his deeds.
II. Revolutionary ideology—Influence of Rousseau—The Rights of Man—The example of the United States—English ideas in the constitutional projects of Miranda and Bolivar—European action: Canning.
I. Oppressed by theocracy and monopoly, by privileged castes and Peninsular functionaries, the Spanish and Portuguese colonies aspired towards independence. The English provinces of the North separated themselves from England for practical reasons; in the struggles of the South we see a double economic and political motive. In some vice-royalties, such as that of La Plata, the struggle was due chiefly to an opposition of interests; in other provinces, as in Venezuela, ideas of political reform were predominant.
Writers have attempted to explain the unanimity of the liberative movement by a "historical materialism" analogous to that of Karl Marx and Labriola; but the reality, richer and more complex, does not submit itself to this logical simplicity. The revolution was not merely an economic protest; it nourished concrete social ambitions. An equalising movement, it aimed at the destruction of privileges, of the arbitrary Spanish hierarchy, and finally, when its levelling instinct was aroused and irritated, the destruction of authority to the profit of anarchy. The Creoles, deprived of all political function, revolted; in matters of economics they condemned excessive taxation and monopoly; in matters of politics they attacked slavery, the Inquisition, and moral tutelage. Charles III. had recognised, in 1783, in spite of the counsels of his minister Aranda, the independence of the United States, which were to serve his own colonies as precedent, and he expelled the Jesuits from America, the defence of the Indians against the oppression of Spanish governors. The corruption of the courts, the sale of offices, and the tyranny of the viceroys, all added to the causes of discontent, disturbance, and poverty.
The Creoles opposed nationality to patriotism, the half-castes opposed democracy to the oligarchies. These were two phases of a great revolution. The first battle was over in 1830, and the conflict between the privileged class and the democracy commenced. It reached its culminating point about 1860, with the enfranchisement of the slaves, but it continued during the rest of the century and engendered an interminable civil discord.
The Spanish provinces, subjected to a political absolutism, transformed themselves into republics, a change of system that was not effected without a moral crisis. Even while fighting their battles the Creoles sought uneasily for a new mould into which to pour their liberalism. In the face of increasing disorder they had thoughts of a monarchy, of an oligarchic republic, of a permanent presidency: of various forms which might possess the necessary stability. Three phases may be distinguished in the movement of liberation: the colonial, the monarchical, and the republican.
During the first phase the colonists manifested their loyalty to the Peninsular monarchy.
The first colonial juntas, in 1809 and 1810, desired the Spanish suzerainty to be preserved. They invoked the feudal tie which bound them to the monarch, the imprisoned Ferdinand VII. The French were triumphant in the Peninsula, but they swore fidelity to the absent king. Vassalage having been destroyed by the foreign invasion, the colonies, in accordance with the law of las partidas, acquired the right of self-government; they were reserved for the king. The juntas disguised their radical ambitions under legal forms. Their effort towards traditionalism was perhaps sincere on some occasions, but the current of revolution, which was gathering itself together in the womb of history, destroyed these provisional vistas. Thus the cabildo of Buenos-Ayres declared that "no obligations would be recognised other than those due to his person" (the King's). Spaniards and Americans joined in taking an oath of fidelity to Ferdinand VII. The captain-general of Venezuela, deprived of his functions in 1810, was replaced by a "Supreme Junta," preserving the rights of the sovereign, and the oath of fidelity to the monarch was observed. In 1809 the Junta of La Paz, which emancipated the Creoles, and the revolt of Quito, recognised the same royal tutelage. The Chilian regulations of 1811 enacted that the executive power should govern in the name of the king. In 1821 Iturbide proclaimed his submission to the king upon founding the empire of Mexico.
It was an ephemeral loyalty, given to a king who had abdicated, who had suffered exile, and who, after the liberal Cortes of Cadiz, re-established a despotic government. These immense colonies did not revolt merely in order to restore an incapable prince to his throne. While newly-created generals were winning battles political autonomy was becoming a fact. The Creoles, who had directed the revolutionary movement, concealed their bold ambitions from a populace that was passive, a slave to routine, and largely royalist.
GABINO BARREDA.
Great Mexican Educationalist
GENERAL JOSÉ ANTONIO PAEZ.
President of Venezuela (1831-1935 and 1838-1842)
The American élite were monarchists. In liberating a continent their generals and statesmen professed to endow the new nations with the stability of a monarchy. Iturbide was Emperor of Mexico. The lieutenants of Bolivar offered the latter a crown; Paez persistently held the imperial ambition before him. Belgrano, in 1816, at the Congress of Tucuman, stated that the best form of government for the Argentine was "a tempered monarchy"; and many deputies in that Assembly demanded the restoration of the throne of the Incas and of its traditional seat at Cuzco: in short, the creation of an American dynasty.
Bolivar wished to see Colombia and Spanish America constitutional monarchies with foreign princes. Ministers were to exercise a policy "of vigilance or defence, of mediation or influence, of protection or tutelage" on the part of the great European states in respect of the Colombian nation. Other partisans of the monarchy were Flores, Sucre, Monteagudo, Garcia del Rio, Riva-Agüero, and the Argentine director Posadas, who wished to establish that form of government "on solid and permanent foundations" in the provinces of La Plata; Dean Funes, the Colombians Nariño, Mosquera, Briceno Mendez, and others. The founders of South American independence understood that only a strong government could save the new nations from demagogy, anarchy, warfare between military chiefs, and untimely provincial ambitions. They wanted autonomy without licence, monarchy without despotism, and political solidity without Spanish suzerainty.
Despite this conviction on the part of the revolutionaries, South America saw the birth of the Republic. Alberdi wrote that its origin was involuntary, and that it was the result of European indifference and Yankee egoism; more than involuntary, it was spontaneous. The demagogues and the crowd accepted it as the negation of monarchy. The latter symbolised the Gothic despotism, the old humiliating domination, the persistence of castes and municipal privilege. In the popular mind, naturally of a simplifying tendency, monarchy was slavery; anarchy and the republic were liberty; there was no distinction between the King of Spain and other princes, between the absolutism of Ferdinand VII. and the constitutional monarchy of England. A universal hatred condemned all kings. The republic was not so much an organisation or a political system as a negation, and indissolubly bound up with it were the cardinal ideas of country, equality, and liberty.
Monarchy offered America stability and independence; it would have prevented civil war and avoided half a century of anarchy. It was the sole American tradition. The battles of the Revolution gave the hegemony to ambitious generals; against these a central government, above the quarrels of parties, would have defended liberal institutions. A constitutional prince would have given these divided nations unity and continuity, under the pressure of which ambitions, parties, and classes would finally have found their places. The social elevation of half-castes and mulattos would have been less violent under such a system.
Finally, the American monarchy would have entered into the group of Occidental nations, and the Monroe doctrine would not have isolated her politically from the Europe that sent her men, money, and ideas.
But would it have been possible to found respectable and lasting dynasties in America? The fall of two empires, Mexico and Brazil, tells us that republicanism is obscurely implicated with the destinies of the country. The new States had no nobles to surround a prince, nor could they have supported the luxury of a court.
The equalitarian instinct condemned all hierarchies in America, and there were no princes to become creators of nationality as in modern Europe. The viceroys and semi-feudal barons exercised an ephemeral empire and were not Americans; the colonies were used to frequent changes of authority. To these reasons in favour of a republic we must add the danger that foreign monarchies might have involved the continent in the diplomatic complications of Europe. Perhaps even the Holy Alliance would have led the colonies back to Spain, as a prodigal child is led back to its parents.
Bolivar expounded the defects of a foreign monarchy. To the imported king he would have preferred the irremovable president and the English senate, and if in the face of advancing anarchy he glanced at the question of European princes he soon understood that it could never prove a radical solution of the problems of the New World. "There is no power more difficult to maintain than that of a new prince" he told the Bolivians. There were in America "neither great nobles nor great prelates, and without these two props no monarchy is permanent." To the Liberator kings symbolised tyranny; he connected independence with republicanism, and believed that nature itself would oppose the monarchical system in America. In 1829, in a letter to Vergera, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, he expressed his arguments against the monarchy with great precision: "No foreign prince," he wrote, "would accept as his patrimony a principality which was anarchical and without guarantees; the national debts and the poverty of the country leave no means to entertain a prince and a court, even miserably; the lower classes would take alarm, fearing the effects of aristocracy and inequality; the generals and the ambitious of every stamp could never support the idea of seeing themselves deprived of the supreme command; the new nobility indispensable to a monarchy would issue from the mass of the people, with every species of jealousy on the one hand and of pride on the other. No one would patiently endure such a miserable aristocracy, steeped in ignorance and poverty and full of ridiculous pretensions." The creator of five nations, Bolivar was profoundly conscious of the new social body, a disturbed and disorganised mass. He understood that the ambition of his lieutenants and the equalitarian tendency of the mob would oppose an American monarchy or a foreign principality. Iturbide and Maximilian, two emperors dethroned and shot, have justified his objections.
England, who might have founded constitutional monarchies in America, in spite of the Holy Alliance, pursued a commercial rather than a political policy. In 1829 Lord Aberdeen announced that his Government would not permit the establishment of a French or English prince, nor a prince of any other European dynasty, in Colombia. He would accept only a Spanish prince, or the monarchy of Bolivar himself.[1] The Conde de Aranda proposed to the King of Spain that America should be divided into nations governed by the Infantas, but his plan was not followed up. Once the independence of America was a fact, and the despotism of Ferdinand VII. re-established, no Spanish prince could be acceptable either to Argentina or Colombia. In the face of European indifference the tentative efforts of the monarchists spent themselves in America, and the continent acquired its definitive individuality. In opposition to the monarchies by divine right of the Old World a liberal world came to birth; incoherent and incipient nationalities adopted equalitarian constitutions, which were, in the distant future, to flood their deserted territories with immense moral and material forces.
From Mexico to Chili the same revolutionary fervour engendered the partial movements of 1808 to 1811. Conspirators similar to the Italian carbonari, lodges in which men spoke of liberty in the midst of ingenuous rites, and university students who had read the Encyclopædists, were preparing the great crusade. The year 1809 was the first of the Revolution. On the 1st of January there was a popular rising in Buenos-Ayres; on the 16th of July a revolt at La Paz; on the 2nd of August a meeting took place at Quito. In 1806 an English expedition attacked Buenos-Ayres. At a venture, on his way home from Africa, an officer who entertained ambitions in the direction of new territory and new sources of wealth—Sir Home Popham—invaded the capital of the viceroyalty of La Plata. This city was defended not by the legitimate Spanish authority, but by a noble caudillo, who was soon to be a popular viceroy: Santiago de Liniers, the hero of the "Reconquest." In this struggle against the imperialist invader the Argentine people found the first revelation of nationality. First they freed themselves from the English; then from the Spaniards. On the 25th of May, 1810, the cabildo abierto (the municipality and the people), who had united on the 22nd, demanded the dismissal of the viceroy, and elected a governmental and revolutionary junta, patriotic but undecided. As early as 1808, in Montevideo, a junta formed in the heat of a violent popular commotion had turned against the viceroy of Buenos-Ayres.
Spain implacably condemned these precursors of the Independence. She exiled or strangled the rebels, Zela in Peru; Dr. Espejo in Ecuador; Gual y España in Venezuela; two indomitable priests, Hidalgo and Morelos, in Mexico; Father Camilo Henriquez and Dr. Martinez de Rosas in Chili; Tiradentes in Brazil; Nariño in Colombia; all, between 1780 and 1810, struggled against the governors and viceroys, and in their liberal enthusiasm were precursors of the audacious wars of the future. The most notable of these was a Byronic individual, the Venezuelan Francisco de Miranda. He was born in Caracas in 1756. He had a brilliant career in Europe, knew ministers and monarchs, was the favourite of Catherine of Russia, fought beside Dumouriez in the armies of the French Revolution, went to the United States with the legion which Spain sent thither to fight in the cause of American independence, obtained the sanction of Pitt to lead revolutionary expeditions against the Spanish authorities in Venezuela, and was concerned in all the liberative movements of his time, whether in Caracas or Buenos-Ayres. He formed an alliance between the destinies of the continent and the ambition of England, the gold of the London bankers, and the interests of English merchants, and so contributed, even more than by his abortive enterprises, to the cause of American liberty.
The cycle of the Precursors closed and that of the Liberators opened. The Spanish reaction had not vanquished the revolutionary principle. The first caudillos were dead; they were replaced by fresh leaders: the Directors, energetic and impassioned: Belgrano and San Martin in the Argentine, Dr. Francia in Paraguay, Artigas in Uruguay, Iturbide in Mexico, General Morazan in Central America, King Pedro I. in Brazil, and Bolivar, the liberator of five republics.
GENERAL FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA (VENEZUELA).
Who prepared for the liberation of his country.
Belgrano, an economic reformer, a supporter of commercial liberty, a founder of schools, was the leader of the Argentine emancipation. He fought in Paraguay, where he suggested autonomy; in Uruguay, in the Argentine Sierra, and on the frontiers of Upper Peru. He was not a fortunate leader; he won the battle of Tucuman, but he was defeated by the royalists in other battles: Vilcapugio and Ayohuma. He retired, then returned to the struggle; took part in the civil wars against the dissident leaders, defended the constitutional monarchy at the Congress of Tucuman, and from 1808 to 1820 personified the uncertain progress of the Argentine revolution.
San Martin was his superior as a successful fighter, and in the scope of his action as liberator; he was a continental figure. A great general, able to organise armies and lead them to victory, his mind was methodical and conservative; he disliked abstractions, and was concrete and positive in his plans. He delivered Chili and contributed to the independence of Peru. While others were drawing up political programmes he was winning battles. He recalls Washington by the disinterested nobility of his character; he refused power after liberating two nations, and condemned himself to exile, being surrounded by ambitious generals who quarrelled for the supreme power. In action he was simple and orderly, and progressive; he defeated the Spaniards at San Lorenzo in 1813, giving proof of admirable warlike qualities; he then led the army of the North which fought in Upper Peru, and became the intendant of an Argentine province, Cuyo, in 1814. There he formed an army, and proposed to cross the Andes to the aid of the Chilian patriots. According to a French military critic, M. Charles Malo, "the passage of the Andes was in no way surpassed by the more famous passage of the Alps by the French." The summits of the Cordilleras are over twelve thousand feet high; and it was across them that the army of San Martin, decimated and heroic, victorious over cold and fatigue, made its way into Chili. From that time forward the Argentine leader was an American general. At the foot of the Cordilleras, on the flanks of Chacabuco, he gained a decisive battle over the Spaniards (1817). He dislodged them from the summits which they occupied and entered Santiago in triumph, and was there proclaimed supreme director of Chili. He accepted the command of the armies, and was thereafter victorious at Maipo (1818), where his artillery put the royalists to flight. Chilian independence once assured, he aspired to fresh victories in Peru. American autonomy was his unfaltering ambition.
The Peruvian viceroyalty was the centre of the Spanish power, the treasury and arsenal of the royalists. Bolivar, in Colombia, and San Martin, in Chili, understood that all their victories would remain futile if they did not defeat Spain in the richest and most impregnable of her domains. Lord Cochrane, an English privateer, who had seen service in the Mediterranean, formed a squadron in Chilian waters for the purpose of dominating the Pacific (1819). He defeated the Spanish fleet at Callao, and declared a blockade of the Peruvian ports as far as Guayaquil. During this time San Martin was making ready, with his Argentine and Chilian troops, for his expedition of liberation. The Peruvian revolutionaries were awaiting him. He landed at Pisco (1820) with his army, and proclaimed the independence of Peru at Lima, which the Spaniards had deserted, on the 21st of July, 1821. Appointed Protector of the Republic which he had founded, he promulgated a provisional Constitution. Then from the North came another Liberator, Bolivar, to discuss with San Martin, in that mysterious interview at Guayaquil, the destinies of the Spanish New World.
SAN MARTIN.
General of Argentine, Liberator of Chile, and Protector of Peru.
San Martin, stoical and silent, yielded to the impetuosity of Bolivar, abandoned Peru to him, the theatre of his future deeds of prowess, renounced his position (1822), and left America. His ambition, like his genius, was circumscribed; he preferred military glory to dictatorships; he believed in the benefits of foreign monarchies: he could organise armies, but he was powerless before anarchy.
Bolivar is the greatest of the American liberators. He surpasses some in ambition, others in heroism, and all in multiform activity, in prophetic insight, and in power. He was, amid the glorious generals and rival caudillos, the hero of Carlyle, "source of light, of intimate and native originality, virility, nobility, and heroism, in contact with whom every soul feels that it is in its element." All powers yielded to him. "Often," writes General Santander, "I go to him full of rancour, and only to see him disarms me, and I go away full of admiration." The people, with an infallible instinct, understood his heroic mission and worshipped him; the clergy praised him, and the glory of Bolivar was sung in the Catholic churches. He was statesman and warrior; he could criticise Olmedo's ode on the battle of Junin, decide the make-up of a journal, draw a plan of battle, organise legions, draft statutes, give diplomatic advice, and direct great campaigns; his genius was as rich and as various as that of Napoleon. Five nations, which he had snatched from the rule of Spain, seemed to him a narrow theatre for his magnificent career; he conceived a vast plan of Continental federation. At Panama he assembled the ambassadors of ten republics, and was already dreaming of an amphictyonic league of nations which should influence the destinies of the world.
Simon Bolivar was born at Caracas on the 24th of July, 1783, of a noble family of Vascongadas. In his youth he travelled through Europe in company with his tutor, Simon Rodriguez: an austere mentor. He studied the Latin classics, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Holbach, and the Encyclopædists. Before his tutor, at Rome, on the Monte Sacro, he swore, like Hannibal of old, to consecrate his life to the liberation of his native country. He was nervous, impetuous, sensual—traits of the American Creole of the South; active and persevering in his undertakings, as an heir to the tenacity of the Biscayan should be; generous to a fault, and valiant to the verge of folly. He had the bearing and the features of a typical caudillo; the forehead high, the back straight; a luminous glance that impressed both friends and enemies, a resolute air, and eloquent gestures. His was a nature shaped for action, unhesitating and immediate; he had the face and the genius of an Imperator. At Caracas, after his long years of travel, he kept his Roman oath. From 1813 to 1830 he fought against the Spaniards and against his own generals, indefatigable in his task of liberation. Two terrible Iberian warriors, Boves and Morillo, carried "war to the death" into Venezuela. Bolivar opposed them, aided by Bermudez Piar, Mariño, and Paez, lieutenants alternately for and against him during his warlike career. In the Antilles he made ready for many expeditions. He was appointed supreme leader, provisional president, and director of the country; his generals doubted him, were jealous of his fame, and conspired against his authority, but Bolivar continued the war in the midst of the anarchy of Colombia.
He routed the Spaniards at Boyaca in 1819, and at Carabobo in 1821, and entered Caracas victorious. Colombia liberated, he turned to Quito. One of his lieutenants, Sucre, a man heroic and noble as the heroes of antiquity, won fresh battles at Bombona and Pinchincha (1822). Peru appealed to the Liberator, to "Bolivar, the hero of America."
The Colombian caudillo did not ignore the perils of the undertaking; the Spanish troops were good fighters; they had been victorious, and were not without resources in the Sierra; and the Peruvian and Colombian allies were inferior to them in experience and cohesion. "This matter of the war in Peru demands an enormous effort and inexhaustible resources," he wrote to Sucre. Impelled by his genius, he accepted the offer of the Peruvians, for he did not forget that "the loss of Peru would necessarily involve that of the whole of the south of Colombia." The Congress of Lima invested him with "the supreme military authority throughout the territory of the Republic." Two great battles, Junin and Ayacucho (1824), assured the independence of America. At Junin Bolivar led a cavalry charge which decided the day, which was followed by a hand-to-hand fight, not a single musket-shot being heard above the ring and clash of the sabres. Sucre was the hero of Ayacucho: it was he who devised the admirable plan of battle. The patriots were 6,000, the Spaniards 9,000. The Spanish artillery was superior to that of the allies. The enemy opened fire, descending the hillsides; the two lines of battle drew together. Night brought a truce; the officers of the two armies chatted in friendly groups before the coming conflict. On the morning of the 9th of December a charge of cavalry under General Cordova scattered the Spanish battalions: whereupon the royalist reserve came into action. The left wing of the allies wavered, but was reinforced, and the victory was complete. The Spanish army capitulated, its generals surrendered, and Peru was abandoned by its ancient rulers. Bolivar praised the heroism of Sucre, "the father of Ayacucho, the saviour of the sons of the sun," and Lima lauded the Liberator to the skies, proclaimed him the father and saviour of Peru, and elected him permanent President. After these victories the capture of Potosi by the troops of Sucre and the reduction of the fortress of Callao, where the penates of Spain were guarded, terminated Bolivar's magnificent career. His last years were melancholy, like a tropical twilight. Paez and Santander revolted against him; he was given the supreme power and deprived of it; he was offered a crown, and was the victim of conspiracy. The Liberator died, abandoned, a tragic figure, at Santa Marta, on the deserted Colombian coast, like Napoleon at St. Helena, at the age of forty-seven, on the 17th of December, 1830.
Statesman and general, Bolivar was even greater in the assembly than on the field of battle. Equal to Sucre and San Martin as tactician, as politician he was the greatest of all the caudillos. He was the thinker of the Revolution; he drafted statutes, analysed the social condition of the democracies he liberated, and foretold the future with the precision of a seer. The enemy of ideologists, like the great First Consul, an idealist and a romantic, a lover of syntheses in the region of ideas and of politics, he never forgot the rude environment of his deeds. His Latin dreams were tempered by a Saxon realism. A disciple of Rousseau, he wished "the will of the people to be the only power existing on the face of the earth"; but in the face of an anarchical democracy he sought uneasily for a moral power. In 1823 he thought that the sovereignty of the people was not illimitable: "justice is its basis, and perfect utility sets a term to it." A republican—"since Napoleon has been a monarch," he said, he who so admired Napoleon, "his glory seems to me a gleam from Hell"—he wished, despite the servile admiration of his friends, to be neither a Napoleon nor an Iturbide. He disdained all imperial pomp; he wished to be merely the soldier of the Independence. He made a profound analysis of the failings of a future monarchy in the old Spanish colonies. At the Conference of Guayaquil (1822) San Martin represented the monarchical tendency, Bolivar the republican principle. Their opposition was irreconcilable, said Mitre, the Argentine historian, for one was working for the Argentine hegemony and the other for the Colombian: the first respected the individuality of the separate peoples and would only accept intervention in exceptional cases; the second wished to unite the various peoples according to a "plan of absorption and monocracy."[2] This antagonism called for a superior point of agreement, a synthesis, for the Colombian doctrine brought with it as a reaction the premature formation of unstable democracies, and the Argentine theory favoured indifference, egoism, and the isolation of nations united by race, tradition, and history.
The genius, aristocratic pride, and ambition of Bolivar impelled him towards autocracy. He exercised a dictatorship and believed in the benefits of a permanent presidency. "In republics," he stated, "the executive power should be of the strongest, for all conspire against it; while in monarchies the legislative power should be supreme, for all conspire in favour of the monarch. Hence the necessity of giving a republican magistrate more authority than a constitutional prince." He did not forget the dangers of an autocratic presidency; but he feared anarchy, "the ferocious hydra of discordant anarchy," which grew like a noxious vegetation, stifling his triumphant work. He regarded with amazement the contradictions of American life: disorder leads to dictatorship, and the latter is the enemy of democracy. "The permanence of power in a single individual," writes the Liberator, "has often marked the end of democratic governments." Yet "indefinite liberty, absolute democracy, are snares in which all republican hopes come to grief." Liberty without licence, authority without tyranny: such was the ideal of Bolivar. In vain did he struggle single-handed amid ambitious generals and a disordered people; before he died he understood the vanity of his efforts. "Those who have served the cause of the Revolution," he cried, "have ploughed the sand.... If it were possible that a portion of the world should return to its primitive chaos, such would be the last phase of America." He denounced the moral poverty of these new republics with the severity of a Hebrew prophet. "There is no faith in America, neither in men nor in nations. Their treaties are waste paper; their constitutions are paper and ink; their elections are battles; liberty is anarchy, and life a torment."
This pessimism, the credo of his maturity, was born of his implacable analysis of American failings. Bolivar understood the original traits and the vices of the new continent. "We are," he said, "a small human family; we possess a world of our own, surrounded by vast oceans; new in almost every art and science, although, in a certain sense, old in the usages of civil society. The present state of America recalls the fall of the Roman Empire, when each part formed a distinct political system, in conformity with its interests, its situation, or its corporations." "We shall not see, nor the generation following us," he wrote in 1822, "the triumph of the America we are founding: I regard America as in the chrysalis. There will be a metamorphosis in the physical life of its inhabitants; there will finally be a new caste, of all the races, which will result in the homogeneity of the people."
While scholars were constructing Utopias, imitating, in their provisional statutes, the federal constitution of the United States, and legislating for an ideal democracy, Bolivar was studying the social conditions of America. "We are not Europeans," he wrote, "nor Indians either; but a kind of half-way species between the aborigines and the Spaniards; American by birth, European by right, we find ourselves forced to dispute our titles of possession with the natives, and to maintain ourselves in the country which saw our birth in spite of the opposition of invaders: so that our case is all the more extraordinary and complicated." "Let us be careful not to forget that our race is neither European nor North American; but rather a composite of America and Africa, than an emanation from Europe, since Spain herself ceased to be European by virtue of her African [Arab] blood, her institutions, and her character."
The Liberator proposed political institutions suited to a continent which in its territory and race and history was original. He was in favour of a tutelary authority: "The American States need the care of paternal governments which will heal the wounds and sores of despotism and war." He loathed federalism and the division of power: "Let us abandon the federal forms of government: they are not suited to us. Such a form of society is a regularised anarchy, or rather a law which implicitly prescribes the necessity of dissociating and ruining the State in all its members.... Let us abandon the Triumvirate of the Executive Power, by concentrating it in the person of a President, and conferring on him a sufficient authority to enable him to maintain himself and contend against the inconveniences inherent in our recent situation." He taught valuable lessons in public wisdom: "To form a stable Government we must have the basis of a national spirit which has for its object a uniform inclination towards two capital points: to moderate the general will and limit the public authority. The blood of our fellow-citizens presents many diversities: let us mix it in order to unify it; our constitution has divided its powers: let us confound them in order to unite them.... We ought to induce immigration of the peoples of North America and Europe, in order that they may settle here and bring us their arts and sciences. These advantages, an independent government, free schools, and intermarriage with Europeans and Anglo-Americans, will totally change the character of the country, and will render it well-informed and prosperous.... We lack mechanics and agriculturists, and it is these that the country has need of to ensure advancement and progress." In Bolivar's writings are to be found the best programmes of political and social reform for America; he was the first sociologist of these romantic democracies.
Carabobo and Junin were his great military triumphs; the letter from Jamaica (1815), the constitutional project of Angostura (1819), the statute of Bolivia (1825), and the Congress of Panama (1826) were his most admirable political creations. To unite the American nations in a permanent assembly; to oppose Anglo-Saxon power by Latin force, the necessary factor of Continental equilibrium; to labour in favour of unity and synthesis: such was the aim of the abortive Assembly of Panama. The letter from Jamaica was a prophecy which the docile reality was to accomplish during the century. "From the nature of the different regions of the country, from the wealth, population, and character of the Mexicans," said the Liberator, "I imagine that they will attempt in the beginning to establish a representative Republic in which the Executive will have very wide attributes and will be concentred in a single person, who, if he governs with wisdom and justice, will attain almost naturally to irremovable authority." "If the preponderant party is military or aristocratic, it will be in favour of a monarchy, which will probably be limited and constitutional in the first place, but will very soon become absolute." The presidency of Porfirio Diaz, the empire of Iturbide and Maximilian, supported by the monarchist party, and even the dictatorship of Juarez, and the powers which the Mexican constitutions have conferred on the head of the State, all confirmed the predictions of Bolivar. "The States of the Isthmus of Panama as far as Guatemala will form a federation." This federation existed until 1842, and to-day the Central American republics are slowly returning to it. Panama was for the Liberator the emporium of the world. "Its canals will shorten the distances of the world, will strengthen the ordinary ties between Europe, America, and Asia, and will bring to this happy region the tribute of the four quarters of the globe. There alone, perhaps, the capital of the world might be set, as Constantine pretended to make of Byzantium the capital of the ancient world."
"New Granada will unite itself to Venezuela in order to form a Central Republic, whose capital will be Maracaibo, or a new city, which, under the name of Las Casas (in honour of that hero of philanthropy), will spring up on the confines of the two countries, on the superb harbour of Bahia-Honda." Bolivar kept Venezuela and New Granada united until 1830; then new leaders, such as General Mosquera, wished to establish the federation which even to-day is still the object of the politicians of Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia. "At Buenos-Ayres there will be a central government, in which the military power will be supreme as a consequence of intestine divisions and external war." This is a prophecy of Argentine history up to the advent of Rosas, the struggles of the caudillos, and the anarchy of 1820. "This constitution will necessarily degenerate into an oligarchy or a monocracy." And a plutocratic group did actually rule in Buenos-Ayres, and over all rose the monocracy of Rosas. "Chili is called by the nature of her situation, by the simple customs of her virtuous inhabitants, and the example of her neighbours, the proud Republicans of Araucania, to enjoy the benefits of the just and mild laws of a republic. If any republic lasts long in America I incline to think it will be the Chilian.... Chili will not alter her laws, manners, or practices; she will maintain the uniformity of her political and religious opinions." The long stability of the Araucanian nation, the homogeneity of its population, the lasting nature of its political charter, the conservative character of its institutions, the slow and steady development of Chili until the war of the Pacific and the revolution of 1891, fully realised the prophecies of Bolivar. "Peru includes two elements inimical to all just and liberal government—gold and slavery. The first corrupts everything; the second is corrupt in itself. The soul of a serf rarely succeeds in taking liberty sanely. It rushes furiously into tumult, or lives humiliated in chains. Although these rules are applicable to all America, I believe they apply with most reason to Lima. There the rich will not tolerate the democracy, and the slaves and the liberated slaves will not tolerate the aristocracy; the first will prefer the tyranny of a single person, in order to avoid popular persecutions and to establish a rule that will at least be pacific." The evolution of Peru proved the profound truth of this statement. The oligarchy accepted military dictators, who upheld property and preserved peace. As early as 1815, when America was still a Spanish domain, Bolivar, watching the spectacle of social forces in conflict, announced not merely the immediate struggles, but the secular development of ten nations. He was a great prophet. To-day, a century later, the continent is fulfilling his predictions as though they were a fate strangely laid upon it.
At Angostura the Liberator placed before the Colombians a draft of a constitution. The bases of this constitution were republican government, the sovereignty of the people, the division of powers, civil liberty, and the abolition of slavery and of privilege. In this remarkable essay we find the theories of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Bentham, the realism of England and the democratic enthusiasm of France. The legislative power is to be composed of two chambers: the first popularly elected, and the Senate hereditary, according to the English tradition, formed by the Liberators who would found the nobility of America. The president is a kind of constitutional king; his ministers, who are to be responsible, will govern. The judiciary will acquire stability and independence. A new authority, the Moral Power, completes the political structure. This Moral Power of the Liberator's Republic is an imitation of the Athenian Areopagus and the Roman censors: it is to be responsible for education and ensure respect for morality and the law; "it chastises vice by opprobrium and infamy, and rewards the public virtues by honour and glory." Bolivar had a tendency towards moral and intellectual despotism: this tribunal was to compel good behaviour. Later the Liberator condemned the teachings of Bentham in the Universities of Colombia, and accepted Catholicism as an instrument of the Government. Article 2 of the Angostura draft states that "ingratitude, disrespect, and disloyalty toward parents, husbands, the aged, the magistrates, and citizens recognised and proclaimed as virtuous; the breaking of the given word, in no matter what connection; insensibility before public misfortunes or those affecting friends or immediate relations, are recommended especially to the vigilance of this moral power." This was paternal tyranny, exercised over the feelings, the conduct, and the passions.
Bolivar created a republic—Upper Peru, which was to call itself Bolivia in memory of its founder. He gave it the constitution he wished, but in vain, to apply to Peru and Colombia. He developed there the ideas expounded in the Angostura draft, and thereby defined his ideal of a republic; it was, in fact, a monarchy in which the power was hereditary. The president must be irremovable and irresponsible, "for in systems without hierarchy there must be—more than in others—a fixed point upon which magistrates and citizens, men and things, may revolve." Against anarchy, a fixed magistracy; against tyranny, independent powers; the judiciary elected by Congress among the citizens nominated by the electoral colleges; the legislature composed of three chambers: tribunes, senators, and censors. The first exercise their functions for four years, the second for eight, and the last are permanent, "and exercise a moral and political control"; they constitute the "moral power." With this system the Liberator avoided political anarchy and the destructive ambition of the caudillos, constituting two stable forces in the midst of shifting democracies—the censors and the permanent president. He adapted unity and permanence—characteristics of the constitutional monarchy—to republicanism. The generals quickly realised that this constitution was a menace to them, and rose against it in Bolivia, in Peru, and in Colombia.
The founders of the Independence were surrounded by brilliant leaders, such as O'Higgins, the Carreras, Güemes, La Mar, Santander, Santa-Cruz, and Sucre, admirable as hero and statesman; but above them, dominating them all like an oak in the midst of saplings, according to the classic image, towered Bolivar, Liberator of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.
BOLIVAR.
The Liberator of Venezuela, New Granada, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.
He was the genius of the South American Revolution. He felt himself dominated by "the dæmon of war." Like all great tormented spirits since Socrates, he obeyed, in his impetuous campaigns, an interior divinity. In his acts and his speeches, in his dignity and his faith, there was a notable grandeur. He worked for eternity, accumulating dreams and Utopias, dominating the hostile earth and censorious man; he was the Superman of Nietzsche, the representative man of Emerson. He belonged to the ideal family of Napoleon and Cæsar; a sublime creator of nations; greater than San Martin, greater than Washington.
II. From France, as emissaries of the ideal, came the doctrines of the Revolution. In the Encyclopædia we find the intellectual origin of the South American upheavals. The patricians in the archaic colonial cities smiled upon Voltaire; they adopted the essential ideals of Rousseau, the social contract, the sovereignty of the people, and the optimism which conceded supreme rights to the human spirit untainted by culture. Bolivar had read the Contrat Social in a volume that had formed part of the library of Napoleon; by will he left this book to an intimate friend. The great, sounding promises—democracy, sovereignty, human rights, equality, liberalism—stirred the patriotic tribunes like fragments of a new gospel. The masonic lodges worked in silence against the power of Spain and Portugal, and upheld the humanitarian ideas of French philosophy. In the lodge of Lautaro, San Martin and Alvear received their initiation as revolutionaries. In Mexico the lodge of York was transformed into a Jacobin club. In 1794 Antonio Nariño, the forerunner of Colombian independence, translated the Rights of Man. The Venezuelan Miranda fought in the revolutionary armies of France; the Peruvian Pablo de Olavide, the friend of Voltaire, took part in the Convention; Raynal, Condorcet, and Mably had American disciples. Montesquieu was read in the universities as an antidote to the absolutism of the viceroys; Beccaria, Filangeri, and Adam Smith were among the prophets. Not only did French thought predominate, but the Revolution, the Terror, the Jacobin madness, the eloquence of the Girondins, the dictatorship of the First Consul, and the Empire, even, all exercised an immense influence upon the rising democracies of America. Iturbide, Emperor of Mexico, imitated Napoleon; in Buenos-Ayres there was a Directoire, as in Paris; there were consuls in Paraguay, and Rivadavia was a Girondist lost among the gauchos.
To the aid of French theory came the example of North America; Washington and the federal system served the Iberian statesmen as models. Belgrano exalted the first President of the United States as a hero "worthy of the admiration of our own age and of the generations to come—an example of moderation and true patriotism." He translated the Farewell Address, which was his favourite reading. Bolivar wished to be the Washington of South America. One of the forerunners of Brazilian independence, José Joaquin de Maia, had known Jefferson in Paris, and informed him that "the Brazilians considered the North American Revolution as the expression of their desires, and they counted on the assistance of the United States." The first South American constitutions betrayed this double influence; they adopted the policy of federalism, copying the political organisation of the United States, and were inspired by French ideas. They destroyed the privileges of the nobility, and established equality of caste. This was the case with the first Venezuelan constitution, despite the efforts of Miranda and Bolivar—opponents of federation. The Chilian constitution of 1822 and the Peruvian constitution of 1823 conferred a conservative function upon the Senate, as in the North American Republic; and the first Chilian statutes established federation. In Mexico and in Central America the federal principle dominated the constitutions of 1824 and 1826. The Argentine constitution of 1819 was a copy "for the united provinces of South America of the Declaration of Independence of the United States."
To French doctrines and the example of the United States we must add the influence of English ideas. Miranda and Bolivar admired the political constitution of Great Britain, and were inspired by it. Bolivar, in 1818, recommended the study of this constitution: "You will find therein," he said, "the division of powers, the only means of creating free and independent spirits, and the liberty of the press—that incomparable antidote to political abuses." His enthusiasm for Voltaire and Rousseau was tempered by a study of English methods. In his Angostura draft he recommended a permanent Senate, a reproduction of the House of Lords. The British Executive—the sovereign surrounded by responsible ministers—seemed to him "the most perfect model, whether for a kingdom, or an aristocracy, or a democracy." The Colombian Constitution of Cucuta (1821), in which the political ideas of the Liberator were predominant, merited the eulogy of the Marquis of Lansdowne. "It has for its basis," said the English minister, "the two most just and solid principles"—property and education. Miranda laid before Pitt a constitutional essay inspired by British ideas, with a House of Commons, an Upper Chamber composed of hereditary Inca caciques and censors; in which curious project we find American traditions mingled with political forms borrowed from the English.
Spain also contributed to the development of the revolutionary ideas. She united the populations of America under her crushing authority; she combined in a single body all the disinherited castes which were later to struggle for independence.
"The despotic rigour of authority," wrote Bauza, "unites all these heterogeneous elements with a rigid tie, and forms a race of them."[3] The Napoleonic invasion provoked a reaction in the peninsula: the juntas—provisional representations of nationality—took the place of the captured king. The central junta proclaimed in 1808 that "the American provinces are not colonies, but integral portions of the monarchy, equal in their rights to the rest of the Spanish provinces." In 1810 the Regency informed the American colonies: "Your fate depends upon neither ministers nor viceroys nor governors: it is in your own hands." The constitution of the Cortes of Cadiz (1812), at which the deputies of the colonies were present, declared "that the Spanish Union cannot be the patrimony of a person nor a family—that sovereignty resides essentially in the nation—and that the right of making law belongs to the Cortes and the king." In these documents, independence, national sovereignty, the idea of the native country, and the functions of the assemblies came overseas from the metropolis. The struggles against privateers, against the English invasions of Buenos-Ayres and the Dutch invasions of Brazil, and the influence of the territory itself, created the sentiment of nationality in America. French, English, and Spanish ideas fertilised this vague aspiration. Before imposing themselves upon the universities and assemblies these ideas became current in the journals and the meetings of the cabildo and revealed to the Creole oligarchy its desire for independence.
From 1808 to 1825 all things conspired to help the cause of American liberty; revolutions in Europe, ministers in England, the independence of the United States, the excesses of Spanish absolutism, the constitutional doctrines of Cadiz, the romantic faith of the Liberators, the political ambition of the oligarchies, the ideas of Rousseau and the Encyclopædists, the decadence of Spain, and the hatred which all the classes and castes in America entertained for the Inquisitors and the viceroys. So many forces united engendered a sorry and divided world. The genesis of the southern republics is rude and heroic as a chanson de geste. Then history degenerates until it becomes a comedy of mean and petty interests—a revolutionary orgy. Such was the evolution of South America during the nineteenth century.
[1] Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, Berlin, 1907, vol. i, p. 465.
[2] Historia de San Martin, Buenos-Ayres, 1903, vol. i. p. 3.
[3] Historia de la Dominacion española en el Uruguay, vol. ii. p. 647.