Selections from On Human Nature (1650) and Leviathan (1651)

From On Human Nature, Chapter 9

Laughter

There is a passion that hath no name; but the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance which we call laughter, which is always joy: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consists in wit, or, as they call it, in the jest, experience confutes: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lie no wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same thing is no more ridiculous when it grows stale or unusual, whatsoever it be that moves laughter, it must be new and unexpected. Men laugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from everything they do well, at their own actions performed never so little beyond their own expectations, as also at their own jests: and in this case, it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceeds from a sudden conception of some ability in himself that laughs. Also, men laugh at the infirmities of others, by comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and illustrated. Also, men laugh at jests, the wit whereof always consists in the elegant discovering and conveying to our minds some absurdity of another: and in this case the passion of laughter proceeds from the sudden imagination of our own odds and eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our own good opinion, by comparison with another man’s infirmity or absurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of whose dishonor we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonor. It is no wonder therefore that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is triumphed over. Laughter without offense, must be at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons, and when all the company may laugh together: for laughing to one’s-self puts all the rest into jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides, it is vain glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of another, sufficient matter for his triumph.

From Leviathan, Part 1, Chapter 8.

Intellectual Virtue Defined

Virtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consists in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by virtues INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a Good Wit; though the same word Wit, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Wit, Natural, Or Acquired

These Virtues are of two sorts; Natural, and Acquired. By natural, I mean not, that which a man hath from his birth: for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean, that wit, which is gotten by use only, and experience; without method, culture, or instruction. This NATURALL WIT, consists principally in two things; Celerity of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steady Direction to some approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination, makes that defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULLNESS, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion

And this difference of quickness, is caused by the difference of men’s passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some men’s thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in his succession of men’s thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a Good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and business; wherein times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Virtue is called DISCRETION.

The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a virtue: but the later which is judgement, and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this virtue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not only by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without steadiness, and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness; such as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by everything that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seems to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epic, or Dramatic; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other pieces, both judgement and fancy are required: But the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the extravagancy; but ought not to displease by indiscretion.

In a good history, the judgement must be eminent; because the goodness consists in the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the stile.

In orations of Praise, and in invectives, the Fancy is predominant; because the design is not truth, but to honor or dishonor; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In hortatives, and pleadings, as truth, or disguise serves best to the design in hand; so is the judgement, or the fancy most required.

In demonstration, in council, and all rigorous search of truth, judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy. But for metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceit; to admit them into council, or reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the judgement shall approve of the time, place, and persons. An anatomist, or a physician may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself before good company. And 'tis the want of discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and equivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary fancy: but in a sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no jingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is only in the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion. Judgement therefore without fancy is wit, but fancy without judgement not.

Prudence

When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design; or what design they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easy, or usual, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and depends on much experience, and memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of men, as there is in their fancies and judgements; because the experience of men equal in age, is not much unequal, as to the quantity; but lies in different occasions; everyone having his private designs. To govern well a family, and a kingdom, are not different degrees of prudence; but different sorts of business; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more prudent in affaires of his own house, then a privy counsellor in the affairs of another man.

Craft

To prudence, if you add the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear, or want; you have that crooked wisdom, which is called CRAFT; which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latins call versutia, (translated into English, shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted craft, called versutia, from versura, which signifies taking money at usury, for the present payment of interest.

Acquired Wit

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is none but reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produces the sciences. But of reason and science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of wits, are in the passions: and the difference of passions, proceeds partly from the different constitution of the body and partly from different education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other henses, than in their fancies, and discretions. It proceeds therefore from the passions; which are different, not only from the difference of men’s complexions; but also from their difference of customs and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of wit, are principally, the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honor. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of power. For riches, knowledge and honor are but several sorts of power.

From Leviathan, Part 1, Chapter 10.

Power

The POWER of a Man, to take it universally, is his present means, to obtain some future apparent good. And is either original, or instrumental.

Natural Power is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind: as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of god, which men call good luck. For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste.

The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for they are strengths united.

Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procures friends, and servants: without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.

Reputation of power, is power; because it draws with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is reputation of love of a man’s country, (called popularity,) for the same reason.

Also, what quality soever makes a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good success is power; because it makes reputation of wisdom, or good fortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is increase of power; because it gains love.

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths, where it has privileges: for in such privileges consists their power.

Eloquence is power; because it is seeming prudence.

Form is power; because being a promise of good, it recommends men to the favor of women and strangers.

The sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war; because they confer to defense, and victory, are power; and though the true mother of them, be science, namely the mathematics; yet, because they are brought into the light, by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed (the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother,) as his issue.

Worth

The value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called honoring, and dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate, is to honor him; at a low rate, is to dishonor him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man sets on himself.

Dignity

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this value of him by the commonwealth, is understood, by offices of command, judicature, public employment; or by names and titles, introduced for distinction of such value.

To Honor and Dishonor

To pray to another, for aid of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honor.

To obey, is to honor; because no man obeys them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to dishonor.

To give great gifts to a man, is to honor him; because 'tis buying of protection, and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts, is to dishonor; because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps. To be sedulous in promoting another’s good; also to flatter, is to honor; as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect, is to dishonor.

To give way, or place to another, in any commodity, is to honor; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to dishonor.

To show any sign of love, or fear of another, is to honor; for both to love, and to fear, is to value. To contemn, or less to love or fear then he expects, is to dishonor; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnify, or call happy, is to honor; because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity, is to dishonor.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to honor him; as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonor.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honor him; sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to dishonor.

To hearken to a man’s counsel, or discourse of what kind soever, is to honor; as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to dishonor.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signs of honor, or which the law or custom makes so, is to honor; because in approving the honor done by others, he acknowledges the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to dishonor.

To agree with in opinion, is to honor; as being a sign of approving his judgement, and wisdom. To dissent, is dishonor; and an upbraiding of error; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to honor; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate one’s enemy, is to dishonor.

To honor those another honors, is to honor him; as a sign of approbation of his judgement. To honor his enemies, is to dishonor him.

To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honor; as a sign of opinion of his wisdom, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to dishonor.

And therefore to be honored, loved, or feared of many is honorable; as arguments of power. To be honored of few or none, dishonorable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) honorable; as a sign of the favor of god. Ill fortune, and losses, dishonorable. Riches, are honorable; for they are power. Poverty, dishonorable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honorable; for they proceed from the conscience of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are dishonorable.

Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honorable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. and irresolution, dishonorable; as a sign of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity.

All Actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much experience, science, discretion, or wit, are honorable; for all these are powers. Actions, or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or folly, dishonorable.

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else, is honorable; because employment is a sign of power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonorable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise; but of the later, like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand and other trash.

To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good, is honorable; as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity, is dishonorable.

To be descended from conspicuous parents, is honorable; because they the more easily attain the aids, and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage, is dishonorable.

Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honorable; as signs of magnanimity: for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonorable.

Nor does it alter the case of honor, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power,) be just or unjust: for honor consists only in the opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonored, but greatly honored the gods, when they introduced them in their poems, committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: insomuch as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his frauds and thefts: of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented music at noon, and before night, stolen away the cattle of Apollo from his herdsmen.