IV
Social Stratification and Class Structure

CONCEPTS

THE CONCEPTS OF CLASS AND CLASS STATUS

THE term ‘class status’¹ will be applied to the typical probability that a given state of (a) provision with goods, (b) external conditions of life, and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration will be possessed by an individual or a group. These probabilities define class status in so far as they are dependent on the kind and extent of control or lack of it which the individual has over goods or services and existing possibilities of their exploitation for the attainment of income or receipts within a given economic order.

A ‘class’ is any group of persons occupying the same class status. The following types of classes may be distinguished: (a) A class is a ‘property class’ when class status for its members is primarily determined by the differentiation of property holdings; (b) a class is an ‘acquisition class’ when the class situation of its members is primarily determined by their opportunity for the exploitation of services on the market; (c) the ‘social class’ structure is composed of the plurality of class statuses between which an interchange of individuals on a personal basis or in the course of generations is readily possible and typically observable. On the basis of any of the three types of class status, associative relationships between those sharing the same class interests, namely, corporate class organizations may develop. This need not, however, necessarily happen. The concepts of class and class status as such designate only the fact of identity or similarity in the typical situation in which a given individual and many others find their interests defined. In principle control over different combinations of consumers goods, means of production, investments, capital funds or marketable abilities constitute class statuses which are different with each variation and combination. Only persons who are completely unskilled, without property and dependent on employment without regular occupation, are in a strictly identical class status. Transitions from one class status to another vary greatly in fluidity and in the ease with which an individual can enter the class. Hence the unity of ‘social’ classes is highly relative and variable.

The primary significance of a positively privileged property class lies in the following facts: (i) Its members may be able to monopolize the purchase of high-priced consumers goods, (ii) They may control the opportunities of pursuing a systematic monopoly policy in the sale of economic goods, (iii) They may monopolize opportunities for the accumulation of property through unconsumed surpluses, (iv) They may monopolize opportunities to accumulate capital by saving, hence, the possibility of investing property in loans and the related possibility of control over executive positions in business, (v) They may monopolize the privileges of socially advantageous kinds of education so far as these involve expenditures.

Positively privileged property classes typically live from property income. This may be derived from property rights in human beings, as with slaveowners, in land, in mining property, in fixed equipment such as plant and apparatus, in ships, and as creditors in loan relationships. Loans may consist of domestic animals, grain, or money. Finally they may live on income from securities.

Class interests which are negatively privileged with respect to property belong typically to one of the following types: (a) They are themselves objects of ownership, that is they are unfree. (b) They are ‘outcasts’ that is ‘proletarians’ in the sense meant in Antiquity, (c) They are debtor classes and, (d) the ‘poor.’

In between stand the ‘middle’ classes. This term includes groups who have all sorts of property, or of marketable abilities through training, who are in a position to draw their support from these sources. Some of them may be ‘acquisition’ classes. Entrepreneurs are in this category by virtue of essentially positive privileges; proletarians, by virtue of negative privileges. But many types such as peasants, craftsmen, and officials do not fall in this category. The differentiation of classes on the basis of property alone is not ‘dynamic,’ that is, it does not necessarily result in class struggles or class revolutions. It is not uncommon for very strongly privileged property classes such as slaveowners, to exist side by side with such far less privileged groups as peasants or even outcasts without any class struggle. There may even be ties of solidarity between privileged property classes and unfree elements. However, such conflicts as that between land owners and outcast elements or between creditors and debtors, the latter often being a question of urban patricians as opposed to either rural peasants or urban craftsmen, may lead to revolutionary conflict. Even this, however, need not necessarily aim at radical changes in economic organization. It may, on the contrary, be concerned in the first instance only with a redistribution of wealth. These may be called ‘property revolutions.’

A classic example of the lack of class antagonism has been the relation of the ‘poor white trash,’ originally those not owning slaves, to the planters in the Southern States of the United States. The ‘poor whites’ have often been much more hostile to the Negro than the planters who have frequently had a large element of patriarchal sentiment. The conflict of outcast against the property classes, of creditors and debtors, and of landowners and outcasts are best illustrated in the history of Antiquity.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ACQUISITION CLASSES

The primary significance of a positively privileged acquisition class is to be found in two directions, on the one hand it is generally possible to go far toward attaining a monopoly of the management of productive enterprises in favour of the members of the class and their business interests. On the other hand, such a class tends to insure the security of its economic position by exercising influence on the economic policy of political bodies and other groups.

The members of positively privileged acquisition classes are typically entrepreneurs. The following are the most important types: merchants, shipowners, industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs, bankers and financiers. Under certain circumstances two other types are also members of such classes, namely, members of the ‘liberal’ professions with a privileged position by virtue of their abilities or training, and workers with special skills commanding a monopolistic position, regardless of how far they are hereditary or the result of training.

Acquisition classes in a negatively privileged situation are workers of the various principal types. They may be roughly classified as skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled.

In this connexion as well as the above, independent peasants and craftsmen are to be treated as belonging to the ‘middle classes.’ This category often includes in addition officials, whether they are in public or private employment, the liberal professions, and workers with exceptional monopolistic assets or positions.

Examples of ‘social classes’ are (a) the ‘working’ class as a whole. It approaches this type the more completely mechanized the productive process becomes, (b) The ‘lower middle’ classes.² (c) The ‘intelligentsia’ without independent property and the persons whose social position is primarily dependent on technical training such as engineers, commercial and other officials, and civil servants. These groups may differ greatly among themselves, in particular according to costs of training, (d) The classes occupying a privileged position through property and education.

The unfinished concluding section of Karl Marx’s Kapital was evidently intended to deal with the problem of the class unity of the proletariat, which he held existed in spite of the high degree of qualitative differentiation. A decisive factor is the increase in the importance of semi-skilled workers who have been trained in a relatively short time directly on the machines themselves, at the expense of the older type of ‘skilled’ labour and also of unskilled. However, even this type of skill may often have a monopolistic aspect. Weavers are said to attain the highest level of productivity only after five years’ experience.

At an earlier period every worker could be said to have been primarily interested in becoming an independent small bourgeois, but the possibility of realizing this goal is becoming progressively smaller. From one generation to another the most readily available path to advancement both for skilled and semi-skilled workers is into the class of technically trained individuals. In the most highly privileged classes, at least over the period of more than one generation, it is coming more and more to be true that money is overwhelmingly decisive. Through the banks and corporate enterprises members of the lower middle class and the salaried groups have certain opportunities to rise into the privileged class.

Organized activity of class groups is favoured by the following circumstances: (a) the possibility of concentrating on opponents where the immediate conflict of interests is vital. Thus workers organize against management and not against security holders who are the ones who really draw income without working. Similarly peasants are not apt to organize against landlords, (b) The existence of a class status which is typically similar for large masses of people, (c) The technical possibility of being easily brought together. This is particularly true where large numbers work together in a small area, as in the modern factory, (d) Leadership directed to readily understandable goals. Such goals are very generally imposed or at least are interpreted by persons, such as intelligentsia, who do not belong to the class in question.

SOCIAL STRATA AND THEIR STATUS

The term of ‘social status’³ will be applied to a typically effective claim to positive or negative privilege with respect to social prestige so far as it rests on one or more of the following bases: (a) mode of living, (b) a formal process of education which may consist in empirical or rational training and the acquisition of the corresponding modes of life, or (c) on the prestige of birth, or of an occupation.

The primary practical manifestations of status with respect to social stratification are conubium, commensality, and often monopolistic appropriation of privileged economic opportunities and also prohibition of certain modes of acquisition. Finally, there are conventions or traditions of other types attached to a social status.

Stratificatory status may be based on class status directly or related to it in complex ways. It is not, however, determined by this alone. Property and managerial positions are not as such sufficient to lend their holder a certain social status, though they may well lead to its acquisition. Similarly, poverty is not as such a disqualification for high social status though again it may influence it.

Conversely, social status may partly or even wholly determine class status, without, however, being identical with it. The class status of an officer, a civil servant, and a student as determined by their income may be widely different while their social status remains the same, because they adhere to the same mode of life in all relevant respects as a result of their common education.

A social ‘stratum’ stand is a plurality of individuals who, within a larger group, enjoy a particular kind and level of prestige by virtue of their position and possibly also claim certain special monopolies.

The following are the most important sources of the development of distinct strata: (a) The most important is by the development of a peculiar style of life including, particularly, the type of occupation pursued, (b) The second basis is hereditary charisma arising from the successful claim to a position of prestige by virtue of birth, (c) The third is the appropriation of political or hierocratic authority as a monopoly by socially distinct groups.

The development of hereditary strata is usually a form of the hereditary appropriation of privileges by an organized group or by individual qualified persons. Every well-established case of appropriation of opportunities and abilities, especially of exercising imperative powers, has a tendency to lead to the development of distinct strata. Conversely, the development of strata has a tendency in turn to lead to the monopolistic appropriation of governing powers and of the corresponding economic advantages.

Acquisition classes are favoured by an economic system oriented to market situations, whereas social strata develop and subsist most readily where economic organization is of a monopolistic and liturgical character and where the economic needs of corporate groups are met on a feudal or patrimonial basis. The type of class which is most closely related to a stratum is the ‘social’ class, while the ‘acquisition’ class is the farthest removed. Property classes often constitute the nucleus of a stratum.

Every society where strata play a prominent part is controlled to a large extent by conventional rules of conduct. It thus creates economically irrational conditions of consumption and hinders the development of free markets by monopolistic appropriation and by restricting free disposal of the individual’s own economic ability. This will have to be discussed further elsewhere.⁴

1 Marxian theory may, in this connexion, legitimately be classified as belonging to the Historical School.

2 A notable example of failure to understand this is to be found in H. M. Robertson, The Rise of Economic Individualism, which has the sub-title ‘A Criticism of Max Weber and His School.’ See the editor’s critical review ‘H. M. Robertson on Max Weber and His School.’ Journal of Political Economy, vol. xliii, 1935.

3 See The Protestant Ethic, but also various other parts of the Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, especially the section Konfuzianismus und Puritanismus in vol. i.

4 Most critics of Weber seem entirely unaware of this fact. To them the ‘spirit of capitalism’ is purely and simply acquisitiveness. Cf. Robertson, op. cit.

5 Cf. the editor’s article already referred to, ‘The Professions and Social Structure,’ Social Forces, May 1940.

6 Vol. i and ii.

7 A number of these strains have been discussed above. The list is by no means exhaustive, even of those to the understanding of which Weber contributed.

8 See especially Politik als Beruf, op. cit. p. 449. ‘Nicht das Blühen des Sommers liegt vor uns, sondern zunächst eine Polarnacht von Eisiger Finsternis und Härte, mag äusserlich jetzt siegen welche Gruppe auch immer.’

1 Vol. iv (1913, pp. 253 ff.); reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 403-450.

2 The German term is Verstehen. As Weber uses it this is a technical term with a distinctly narrower meaning than either the German or the English in everyday usage. Its primary reference in this work is to the observation and theoretical interpretation of the subjective ‘states of mind’ of actors. But it also extends to the grasp of the meaning of logical and other systems of symbols, a meaning which is usually thought of as in some sense ‘intended’ by a mind or intelligent being of some sort The most important point about this concept seems to the editor to be the fact that in so far as phenomena are ‘understood’ in this technical sense, the relevant facts are stated and analysed within a certain frame of reference, that of ‘action.’ For present purposes the most important feature of this frame of reference is its use of ‘subjective categories.’ The essential thing is the operational applicability of such categories, not the common sense empirical question of whether the actor is conscious of the meanings imputed to him or in the ordinary sense ‘intended’ a given course of action. For a further discussion of these problems, see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, especially chaps, ii and xix.

3 In this series of definitions Weber employs several important terms which need discussion. In addition to Verstehen, which has already been commented upon, there are four important ones: Deuten, Sinn, Handeln, and Verhalten. Deuten has generally been translated as ‘interpret.’ As used by Weber in this context it refers to the interpretation of subjective states of mind and the meanings which can be imputed as intended by an actor.

4 Weber’s text is organized in a somewhat unusual manner. He lays down certain fundamental definitions and then proceeds to comment upon them. The definitions themselves are in the original printed in large type, the subsidiary comments in smaller type. For the purposes of this translation it has not seemed best to make a distinction in type form, but the reader should be aware that the numbered paragraphs which follow a definition or group of them are in the nature of comments, rather than the continuous development of a general line of argument. This fact accounts for what is sometimes a relatively fragmentary character of the development and for the abrupt transition from one subject to another. Weber apparently did not intend this material to be ‘read’ in the ordinary sense, but rather to serve as a reference work for the clarification and systematization of theoretical concepts and their implications. While the comments under most of the definitions are relatively brief, under the definitions of Sociology and of Social Action, Weber wrote what is essentially a methodological essay. This makes sec. 1 out of proportion to the other sections of this and the following chapters. It has, however, seemed best to retain Weber’s own plan for the subdivision of the material.—ED.

5 Weber means by ‘pure type’ what he himself generally called and what has come to be known in the literature about his methodology as the ‘ideal type.’ The reader may be referred for general orientation to Weber’s own Essay (to which he himself refers below), Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis; to two works of Dr. Alexander von Schelting, ‘Die logische Theorie der historischen Kulturwissenschaften von Max Weber’ (Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft, vol. xlix), and Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre; and to the editor’s Structure of Social Action, chap. xvi. A somewhat different interpretation is given in Theodore Abel, Systematic Sociology in Germany, chap, iv.—ED.

6 This is an imperfect rendering of the German term Evidenz, for which, unfortunately, there is no good English equivalent. It has hence been rendered in a number of different ways, varying with the particular context in which it occurs. The primary meaning refers to the basis on which a scientist or thinker becomes satisfied of the certainty or acceptability of a proposition. As Weber himself points out, there are two primary aspects of this. On the one hand a conclusion can be ‘seen’ to follow from given premises by virtue of logical, mathematical, or possibly other modes of meaningful relation. In this sense one ‘sees’ the solution of an arithmetical problem or the correctness of the proof of a geometrical theorem. The other aspect is concerned with empirical observation. If an act of observation is competently performed, in a similar sense one ‘sees’ the truth of the relevant descriptive proposition. The term Evidenz does not refer to the process of observing, but to the quality of its result, by virtue of which the observer feels justified in affirming a given statement. Hence ‘certainty’ has seemed a suitable translation in some contexts, ‘clarity’ in others, ‘accuracy’ in still others. The term ‘intuition’ is not usable because it refers to the process rather than to the result.—ED.

7 A term now much used in psychological literature, especially that of Psychoanalysis. It is roughly equivalent to ‘emotion’ but more precise.—ED.

8 The German term is sinnfremd. This should not be translated by ‘meaningless’ but interpreted in the technical context of Weber’s use of Verstehen and Sinndeutung. The essential criterion is the impossibility of placing the object in question in a complex of relations on the meaningful level.—ED.

9 Unverstehbar.

10 Surely this passage states too narrow a conception of the scope of meaningful interpretation. It is certainly not only in terms such as those of the rational means-end schema, that it is possible to make action understandable in terms of subjective categories. This probably can actually be called a source of rationalistic bias in Weber’s work. In practice he does not adhere at all rigorously to this methodological position. For certain possibilities in this broader field, see the editor’s Structure of Social Action, chaps, vi and xi.—ED.

11 A gulf of the North Sea which broke through the Netherlands coast, flooding an area.—ED.

12 Weber here uses the term aktuelles Verstehen, which he contrasts with erklärendes Verstehen. The latter he also refers to as motivationsmaessig. ‘Aktuell’ in this context has been translated as ‘observational.’ It is clear from Weber’s discussion that the primary criterion is the possibility of deriving the meaning of an act or symbolic expression from immediate observation without reference to any broader context. In erklärendes Verstehen, on the other hand, the particular act must be placed in a broader context of meaning involving facts which cannot be derived from immediate observation of a particular act or expression.—ED.

13 The German term is Sinnzusammenhang. It refers to a plurality of elements which form a coherent whole on the level of meaning. There are several possible modes of meaningful relation between such elements, such as logical consistency, the esthetic harmony of a style, or the appropriateness of means to an end. In any case, however, a Sinnzusammenhang must be distinguished from a system of elements which are causally interdependent. There seems to be no single English term or phrase which is always adequate. According to variations in the context, ‘context of meaning,’ ‘complex of meaning,’ and sometimes ‘meaningful system’ have been employed.—ED.

14 On the significance of this type of explanation for causal relationship. See para. 6, pp. 96 ff. below in the present section.

15 The German is gemeinter Sinn. Weber departs from ordinary usage not only in broadening the meaning of this conception. As he states at the end of the present methodological discussion, he does not restrict the use of this concept to cases where a clear self-conscious awareness of such meaning can be reasonably attributed to every individual actor. Essentially, what Weber is doing is to formulate an operational concept. The question is not whether in a sense obvious to the ordinary person such an intended meaning ‘really exists,’ but whether the concept is capable of providing a logical framework within which scientifically important observations can be made. The test of validity of the observations is not whether their object is immediately clear to common sense, but whether the results of these technical observations can be satisfactorily organized and related to those of others in a systematic body of knowledge.—ED.

16 The scientific functions of such construction have been discussed in the author’s article in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, vol. xix, pp. 64 ff.

17 Simmel, in his Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, gives a number of examples.

18 The above passage is an exceedingly compact statement of Weber’s theory of the logical conditions of proof of causal relationship. He developed this most fully in his essay Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, op. cit. It is also discussed in certain of the other essays which have been collected in the volume, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. The best and fullest secondary discussion is to be found in Von Schelting’s book, Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. There is a briefer discussion in chap, xvi of the editor’s Structure of Social Action.—ED.

19 See Edvard Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Stuttgart, 1901, vol. iii, pp. 420, 444 ff.

20 The expression sinnhafte Adäquanz is one of the most difficult of Weber’s technical terms to translate. In most places the cumbrous phrase ‘adequacy on the level of meaning’ has had to be employed. It should be clear from the progress of the discussion that what Weber refers to is a satisfying level of knowledge for the particular purposes of the subjective state of mind of the actor or actors. He is, however, careful to point out that causal adequacy involves in addition to this a satisfactory correspondence between the results of observations from the subjective point of view and from the objective; that is, observations of the overt course of action which can be described without reference to the state of mind of the actor. For a discussion of the methodological problem involved here, see Structure of Social Action, chaps, ii and v.—ED.

21 This is the first occurrence in Weber’s text of the term Chance which he uses very frequently. It is here translated by ‘probability,’ because he uses it as interchangeable with Wahrscheinlichkeit. As the term ‘probability’ is used in a technical mathematical and statistical sense, however, it implies the possibility of numerical statement. In most of the cases where Weber uses Chance this is out of the question. It is, however, possible to speak in terms of higher and lower degrees of probability. To avoid confusion with the technical mathematical concept, the term ‘likelihood’ will often be used in the translation. It is by means of this concept that Weber, in a highly ingenious way, has bridged the gap between the interpretation of meaning and the inevitably more complex facts of overt action. —ED.

22 By a negative normative pattern, Weber means one which prohibits certain possible modes of action.—ED.

23 A classical example is Schäffle’s brilliant work, Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers.

24 One of the most illuminating treatments of physiological problems from such a functional point of view, which is readily understandable to the layman, is W. B. Cannon: The Wisdom of the Body, second edition, 1938. The point of reference on this physiological level is not primarily survival value to the species in the sense of the Darwinian theory of evolution, but rather the maintenance of the individual organism as a ‘going concern’ in carrying through its typical life cycle. What is the life cycle, is to the physiologist essentially a matter of empirical observation.—ED.

25 The term ‘reification’ as used by Professor Morris Cohen in his book, Reason and Nature, seems to fit Weber’s meaning exactly. A concept or system of concepts, which critical analysis can show to be abstract, is ‘reified’ when it is used naively as though it provided an adequate total description of the concrete phenomenon in question. The fallacy of ‘reification’ is virtually another name for what Professor Whitehead has called ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.’ See his Science and the Modern World.—ED.

26 Compare the famous dictum of a well-known physiologist: ‘sec. 10. The spleen. Of the spleen, gentlemen, we know nothing. So much for the spleen.’ Actually, of course, he ‘knew’ a good deal about the spleen—its position, size, shape, etc.; but he could say nothing about its function, and it was his inability to do this that he called ‘ignorance.’

27 The present state of anthropological research, which has advanced enormously since Weber wrote, would seem to throw considerable doubt on the validity of this statement. In making it, Weber apparently does not adequately take account of the fundamental fact that no non-human species has even a primitive form of language; whereas no human group is known without a ‘fully-developed’ one. The ability to use language is on the one hand a fundamental index of the state of development of the individual himself, so far as it is relevant to the theory of action. On the other hand, language is perhaps the most crucially important source of evidence for subjective phenomena. What has seemed to so many ‘civilized’ men to be the strangeness and incomprehensibility of the behaviour and thought of primitive peoples, is apparently primarily a matter of the former’s failure to submit the latter to an adequately thorough and rigorous investigation. It can be said with considerable confidence that a competently trained anthropological field worker is in a position to obtain a level of insight into the states of mind of a people whom he has carefully studied, which is quite comparable, if not superior, to that of the historian of a civilization at all widely different from his own.—ED.

28 See, for example, for an account of the state of knowledge of the termites, the study of Karl Escherich, Die Ameise, 1906.

29 See sec. 2.

30 Since the term ‘charisma’ was, in its sociological usage, introduced by Weber himself from a different field, no attempt has been made to find an English equivalent and it will be used directly throughout. Weber took it from the corresponding Greek which was used in the literature of early Christianity and means ‘the gift of grace.’ For further discussion of the concept, see below, chap, iii, especially secs. 2 and 10.—ED.

31 This is what Rickert means by Wertbezogenheit.

32 It is desirable at this point to call attention to Weber’s usage of the term ‘law’ in a scientific sense. In conformity with his strong emphasis upon the role of ideal types among possible kinds of generalized concepts in the social sciences, by ‘law,’ or a German expression he frequently uses, generelle Erfahrungsregel, he usually means what is perhaps most conveniently called a ‘type generalization.’ It is not an empirical generalization in the ordinary sense in that it does not adequately describe any particular concrete course of events but is abstract in the same sense as the ideal type. Where it is possible on the basis of ideal type analysis to construct not merely a structural form, but, under certain conditions, a course of events which can be predicted if certain conditions are given, it is possible to formulate such generalizations. These generalizations are, however, not methodologically equivalent to most of the laws of physics, especially of analytical mechanics. The latter do not generally formulate a concrete course of events, but rather a uniform relationship between the values of two or more variables. Weber does not even consider the possibility of formulating laws of this latter type, essentially because he does not develop social theory explicitly in the direction of setting up a system of inter-dependent variables, but confines it to the ideal type level.—ED.

33 This is one of the most important problems with which Weber was concerned in his methodological studies. He insisted on the very great importance of the cultural significance of a problem for the values of the time in determining the direction of interest of the investigator. He formulated this relation in his important concept of the Wertbeziehung of social science concepts. But he went so far as to deny the legitimacy of the formulation of a generalized theoretical system as an aim of theoretical analysis in social science. This denial seems to rest on a failure on Weber’s part to carry his criticism of certain aspects of German idealistic social thought through to its logical conclusion. For Weber’s position, see Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, op.cit., and Von Schelting, Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. For a criticism of Weber’s position, see Structure of Social Action, chap. xvi.—ED.

34 The difficulty of maintaining the position Weber here takes has been discussed in the Introduction. See pp. 12 ff.—ED.

35 On all these questions see the author’s article in Archiv für Sozial Wissenschaft, vol. xix, op. cit. Reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 176-214.

36 The definition of social action has been given above. See p. 88.

37 37 See sec. 2.

38 The two terms zweckrational and wertrational are of central significance to Weber’s theory, but at the same time present one of the most difficult problems to the translator. Perhaps the keynote of the distinction lies in the absoluteness with which the values involved in Wertrationalität are held. The sole important consideration to the actor becomes the realization of the value. In so far as it involves ends, rational considerations, such as those of efficiency, are involved in the choice of means. But there is no question either of rational weighing of this end against others, nor is there a question of ‘counting the cost’ in the sense of taking account of possible results other than the attainment of the absolute end. In the case of Zweckrationalitat, on the other hand, Weber conceives action as motivated by a plurality of relatively independent ends, none of which is absolute. Hence, rationality involves on the one hand the weighing of the relative importance of their realization, on the other hand, consideration of whether undesirable consequences would outweigh the benefits to be derived from the projected course of action. It has not seemed possible to find English terms which would express this distinction succinctly. Hence the attempt has been made to express the ideas as clearly as possible without specific terms.

It should also be pointed out that, as Weber’s analysis proceeds, there is a tendency of the meaning of these terms to shift, so that Wertrationalität comes to refer to a system of ultimate ends, regardless of the degree of their absoluteness, while Zweckrationalität refers primarily to considerations respecting the choice of means and ends which are in turn means to further ends, such as money. What seems to have happened is that Weber shifted from a classification of ideal types of action to one of elements in the structure of action. In the latter context ‘expediency’ is often an adequate rendering of Zweckrationalität. This process has been analysed in the editor’s Structure of Social Action, chap. xvi.

The other two terms affektuell and traditional do not present any difficulty of translation. The term affectual has come into English psychological usage from the German largely through the influence of psychoanalysis

39 See above, pp. 101-3.

40 Compare above, paras. 6 and 7 under I.

41 For a further elaboration of this subject, see secs. 9 and 13 below.

42 In the above classification as well as in some of those which follow, the terminology is not standardized either in German or in English. Hence, just as there is a certain arbitrariness in Weber’s definitions, the same is true of any corresponding set of definitions in English. It should be kept in mind that all of them are modes of orientation of action to patterns which contain a normative element. ‘Usage’ has seemed to be the most appropriate translation of Brauch since, according to Weber’s own definition, the principal criterion is that ‘it is done to conform with the pattern.’ There would also seem to be good precedent for the translation of Sitte by ‘custom.’ The contrast with fashion, which Weber takes up in his first comment, is essentially the same in both languages. The term Interessenlage presents greater difficulty. It involves two components: the motivation in terms of self-interest and orientation to the opportunities presented by the situation. It has not seemed possible to use any single term to convey this meaning in English and hence, a more roundabout expression has had to be resorted to.—ED.

43 The term ‘convention’ in Weber’s usage is narrower than Brauch. The difference consists in the fact that a normative pattern to which action is oriented is conventional only in so far as it is regarded as part of a legitimate order, whereas the question of moral obligation to conformity which legitimacy implies is not involved in ‘usage.’ The distinction is closely related to that of W. G. Sumner between ‘mores’ and ‘folkways.’ It has seemed best to retain the English term closest to Weber’s own.—ED.

44 The German term which has been translated as ‘validity’ is Geltung. The primary use of this term is in a legal context and hence the validity in question is not empirical or logical validity, but legal. A legal rule is ‘valid’ in so far as it is judged binding upon those who recognize the legitimacy of the legal order.—ED.

45 On the concepts of usage and custom, the relevant parts of vol. ii of Ihering’s Zweck im Recht are still worth reading. Compare also, K. Oertmann, Rechtesregelung und Verkehrssitte (1914); and more recently, E. Weigelin, Sitte, Recht und Moral, 1919, which agrees with the author’s position as opposed to that of Stammler.

46 It is, in a sense, the empirical reference of this statement which constitutes the central theme of Weber’s series of studies in the Sociology of Religion. In so far as he finds it possible to attribute importance to ‘ideas’ in the determination of action, the most important differences between systems of ideas are not so much those in the degree of rationalization as in the direction which the process of rationalization in each case has taken. This series of studies was left uncompleted at his death, but all the material which was in a condition fit for publication has been assembled in the three volumes of the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie.—ED.

47 It has not been possible to identify this reference of Weber’s. It refers most probably to a projected conclusion of the whole work which was never written.—ED.

48 The term Gelten has already been dealt with. From the very use of the term in this context it is clear that by ‘order’ (Ordnung) Weber here means a normative system. The pattern for the concept of ‘order’ is not, as in the law of gravitation, the ‘order of nature,’ but the order involved in a system of law.

49 When this was written (probably about 1913), duelling was still a relatively common practice in Germany and, in certain circles, was regarded as a definite obligation of honour in the face of some kinds of provocation. It was, however, at the same time an explicitly punishable offence under the criminal law.—ED.

50 Those familiar with the literature of this subject will recall the part played by the concept of ‘order’ in the brilliant book of Rudolf Stammler, which was cited in the prefatory note, a book which, though like all his works it is very able, is nevertheless fundamentally misleading and confuses the issues in a catastrophic fashion. The reader may compare the author’s critical discussion of it, which was also cited in the same place, a discussion which, because of the author’s annoyance at Stammler’s confusion, was unfortunately written in somewhat too acrimonious a tone.

Stammler fails to distinguish the normative meaning of ‘validity’ from the empirical. He further fails to recognize that social action is oriented to other things beside systems of order. Above all, however, in a way which is wholly indefensible from a logical point of view, he treats order as a ‘form’ of social action and then attempts to bring it into a type of relation to ‘content,’ which is analogous to that of form and content in the theory of knowledge. Other errors in his argument will be left aside. But actually, action which is, for instance, primarily economic, is oriented to knowledge of the relative scarcity of certain available means to want satisfaction, in relation to the actor’s state of needs and to the present and probable action of others, in so far as the latter affects the same resources. But at the same time, of course, the actor in his choice of economic procedures naturally orients himself in addition to the conventional and legal rules which he recognizes as valid, or of which he knows that a violation on his part would call forth a given reaction of other persons. Stammler succeeds in introducing a state of hopeless confusion into this very simple empirical situation, particularly in that he maintains that a causal relationship between an order and actual empirical action involves a contradiction in terms. It is true, of course, that there is no causal relationship between the normative validity of an order in the legal sense and any empirical process. In that context there is only the question of whether the order as correctly interpreted in the legal sense ‘applies’ to the empirical situation. The question is whether in a normative sense it should be treated as valid and, if so, what the content of its normative prescriptions for this situation should be. But for sociological purposes, as distinguished from legal, it is only the probability of orientation to the subjective belief in the validity of an order which constitutes the valid order itself. It is undeniable that, in the ordinary sense of the word ‘causal,’ there is a causal relationship between this probability and the relevant course of economic action.

51 The reader may readily become confused as to the basis of the following classification, as compared with that presented in sec. 7. The first classification is one of motives for maintaining a legitimate order in force, whereas the second is one of motives for attributing legitimacy to the order. This explains the inclusion of self-interested motives in the first classification, but not in the second. It is quite possible, for instance, for irreligious persons to support the doctrine of the divine right of kings, because they feel that the breakdown of an order which depends on this would have undesirable consequences. This is not, however, a possible motive on which to base a direct sense of personal moral obligation to conform with the order.—ED.

52 The antithesis innerlich-äusserlich as applied to elements of motivation does not have any direct English counterpart. The aspect of innerlich, however, which is most important in the present context seems to be adequately expressed by the term ‘disinterested.’ The essential point is that the object of such motivation is valued for its own sake or as a direct expression of ultimate values rather than as a means to some ‘ulterior’ end.—ED.

53 Wertrational.

54 On the concept of convention, see beside Ihering, op. cit., and Weigelin, op. cit, F. Tönnies, Die Sitte.

55 Reichs-Zivil-Prozess-Ordn ung.

56 Sec secs. 157 and 242 of the German Civil Code. Bürgerliches Gesetz-Buch on the concept of ‘common law obligations,’ that is, obligations arising out of community standards of acceptable behaviour which come to be sanctioned by law. See the paper of Max Rümelin in Schwäbische Heimatsgabe für Theodor Häring.

57 An extended discussion of this subject is included in the German edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, part ii, chap, vii, pp. 386-512. It is not, however, included in the present translation.—ED.

58 Wertrational.

59 The term ‘authority’ is used to translate Herrschaft. It is not adequate for all purposes, but a discussion of the difficulties will be deferred to the point at which the concept becomes of primary importance. Sec below, sec. 16, p. 152. Weber dealt with this range of problems systematically in two different places, one of which is chapter iii of the present volume. The material of that chapter, however, is expanded and copiously illustrated in part iii of the German edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which is not included in the present translation. This part, like many other parts of the work, was left uncompleted at Weber’s death.—ED.

60 Sec chap. iii.

61 This subject will be dealt with separately below. See sees. 13 and 16 and chap. iii.

62 Kampf.

63 Chancen. This usage of the term is to be distinguished from that translated as probability or likelihood.—ED.

64 See chaps, ii and iii.

65 The two types of relationship which Weber distinguishes in this section he himself calls Vergemeinschaftung and Vergesellschaftung. His own usage here is an adaptation of the well-known terms of Tönnies, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and has been directly influenced by Tönnies’ work. Though there has been much discussion of them in English, it is safe to say that no satisfactory equivalent of Tönnies’ terms have been found. In particular, ‘community’ and cither ‘society’ or ‘association’ are unsatisfactory, since these terms have quite different connotations in English. In the context, however, in which Weber uses his slightly altered terms, that of action within a social relationship, the adjective forms ‘communal’ and ‘associative’ do not seem to be objectionable. Their exact meanings should become clear from Weber’s definitions and comments.—ED.

66 This terminology is similar to the distinction made by Ferdinand Tönnies in his pioneering work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft; but for his purposes, Tönnies has given this distinction a rather more specific meaning than would be convenient for purposes of the present discussion.

67 Zweckverein.

68 Gesinnungsverein.

69 Weber’s emphasis on the importance of these communal elements even within functionally specific formal organizations like industrial plants has been strongly confirmed by the findings of research since this was written. One important study which shows the importance of informal social organization on this level among the workers of an industrial plant is reported in Roethlisberger and Dickson, Management and the Worker.—ED.

70 For definition. Sec chap, ii, p. 181 ff.

71 Rechtsgenosse.

72 This is a reference to the Betriebsräte which were formed in German industrial plants during the Revolution of 1918-19 and were recognized in the Weimar Constitution as entitled to representation in the Federal Economic Council. The standard work in English is W. C. Guillebaud: The German Works Councils.—ED.

73 Ministerieden.

74 Weber here refers to Nahrungsspielraum. The concept refers to the scope of economic resources and opportunities on which the standard of living of an individual or a group is dependent. By contrast with this, Erwerbsspielraum is a similar scope of resources and economic opportunities seen from the point of view of their possible role as sources of profit. The basic distinction implied in this contrast is of central importance to Weber’s analysis later on (sec chapter ii, sec. iorT.)-—ED.

75 Vertretungsgewalt.

76 The term Verband, which is one of the most important in Weber’s scheme, has, in the technical sense defined in this paragraph, been translated as ‘corporate group.’ ‘Association’ has not been used because it does not imply the formal difierentiation between a head or chief and ordinary members. A ‘corporation’ is, from this point of view, one specific kind of corporate group. The term Leiter is not readily translatable. ‘Chief’ has most frequently been used because it seems to have less objectionable connotations than any alternative. Thus we speak of the ‘chief of the medical staff of a hospital and use the term in other similar connexions.

77 Weber here uses the term ‘liturgies’ not in the current religious sense but in that of the institution characteristic of the classical Greek city state. This consisted in the provision of entertainments or services for the public ostensibly as a voluntary gift of an individual, but which were in fact obligatory on persons occupying a given status or office. Weber later uses this term in a technical sense which is defined in chapter ii, sec. 12.—ED.

78 See also, sec. 14 below.

79 The concept objective possibility* (objective Möglichkeit) plays an important technical role in Weber’s methodological studies. According to his usage, a thing is ‘objectively possible’ if it ‘makes sense’ to conceive it as an empirically existing entity. It is a question of conforming with the formal, logical conditions. The question whether a phenomenon which is in this sense ‘objectively possible’ will actually be found with any significant degree of probability or approximation, is a logically distinct question.—ED.

80 Compare the concept of Gebietskörperschaft as used by Gierke and Preuss.

81 Betrieb is a word which in German has a number of different meanings in different contexts. It is only in the present technical use that it will be translated by ‘organization.’ It should, however, be recognized that the term ‘organization’ is here also used in a technical sense which conforms with Weber’s explicit definition. The distinction of Verein and Anstalt is one of far-reaching sociological importance, which has not become established in English usage. The terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘compulsory’ association seem to be as adequate as any available terms. They should, however, not be interpreted on a commonsense basis but referred to Weber’s explicit definitions.—ED.

82 ‘Church’ (Kirche) also is here used in a technical sense. We speak of the ‘Baptist Church,’ but in Weber’s technical terms this is not a church but a sect. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, since it claims jurisdiction over all children of Catholic parents, is a church in the technical sense.—ED.

83 As has already been noted, the term Herrschaft has no satisfactory English equivalent. The term ‘imperative control,’ however, as used by N. S. Timasheff in his Introduction to the Sociology of Law is close to Weber’s meaning and has been borrowed for the most general purposes. In a majority of instances, however, Weber is concerned with legitime Herrschaft, and in these cases ‘authority’ is both an accurate and a far less awkward translation. Macht, as Weber uses it, seems to be quite adequately rendered by ‘power.’—ED.

84 In this case imperative control is confined to the legitimate type, but it is not possible in English to speak here of an ‘authoritarian’ group. The citizens of any state, no matter how ‘democratic,’ are ‘imperatively controlled’ because they are subject to law.—ED.

85 On the bases of legitimacy. See below, chap. iii.

86 The German is Devisenpolitik. Translation in this context is made more difficult by the fact that the German language does not distinguish between ‘politics’ and ‘policy,’ Politik, having both meanings. The remarks which Weber makes about various kinds of policy would have been unnecessary, had he written originally in English.—ED.

87 This reference is presumably to the section entitled Religionssoziologie which is published as part ii, chap, iv of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, but is not included in the present translation. In it Weber attempted a systematic typological analysis of the social aspects of religious phenomena. This chapter should not be confused with the three volumes of the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie which consist of a series of comparative empirical studies of particular religious systems in terms of their bearing on the development of modern capitalism. In the section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which he refers to Weber has attempted a more connected and complete typological analysis than is to be found in the comparative study.—ED.

1 In the economic sense.—ED.

2 At this point in the German text there is an error in the numbering of the paragraphs, the number 2 being repeated. It has seemed best to correct this, and the following comments are numbered 3 to 8 incl. instead of 2 to 7. This will, of course, have to be taken account of in any comparison with the original.—ED.

3 Robert Liefmann has rightly laid emphasis on the subjective character of the concept; that is, the fact that it is the subjectively understandable orientation of action which makes it economic action. He is not, however, correct in attributing the contrary view to all other authorities.

4 The German word Technik which Weber uses here covers both the meanings of the English word ‘technique’ and of ‘technology.’ Since the distinction is not explicitly made in Weber’s terminology, it will have to be introduced according to the context in the translation.

5 A similar position is taken by Von Gottl in vol. ii of the Grundriss der Sozialökonomik. An able and extended statement is to be found in the discussion of Robert Liefmaim in his Grundzüge der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, pp. 336 if. He does not, however, in content contribute anything which goes beyond Von Gottl’s position. The attempt to reduce all means in the last analysis to the ‘irksomcness of labour’ will not stand criticism.

6 On all this, compare Von Gottl, op. cit.

7 The term Verfügungsgewalt, of which Weber makes a great deal of use, is of legal origin, implying legally sanctioned powers of control and disposal. This, of course, has no place in a purely economic conceptual scheme but is essential to a sociological treatment of economic systems. It is another way of saying that concretely economic action depends on a system of property relations.—ED.

8 Compare Böhm-Bawerk, Rechte und Verhältnisse vom Standpunkt der volkjswirtschajtlichen Güterlehre.

9 This is one of the many differences between China and the Western World which Weber related to the difference of orientation to economic activities, growing out of the religious differences of the two civilizations. See his study Konjuzianismus und Taoismus, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. 1.—ED.

10 See below, sec. 16.

11 See below, sec. 11.

12 It is a striking fact that, particularly in primitive society, a very large proportion of economically significant exchange is formally treated as an exchange of gifts. A return gift of suitable value is definitely obligatory but the specific characteristic of purely economically rational exchange, namely bargaining, is not only absent but is specifically prohibited.—ED.

13 See below, sec. 15.

14 Compare the Tell-el-amarna documents.

15 See below, sec. II.

16 On these concepts, see secs. 8 and 11.

17 See page 168.

18 The type case Weber has in mind is the relation of the state to the modern system of property and contract. Whether or not private citizens will engage in any given activity is not determined by the law. The latter is restricted to the enforcement of certain formal rules governing whoever does engage in such activities.—ED.

19 On this, see the Sociology of Law.

20 This distinction Weber expresses in German as that between materiale Geltung and formale Geltung. Though Geltung has been translated in the more general context of obligatoriness of an order as ‘validity,’ it seems best in the present context to follow the terminology used in current economic discussions in English. The term ‘formal value’ is, however, used in preference to ‘legal,’ as it is possible for it to rest on a conventional rather than on a legal basis.—ED.

21 At the beginning of this chapter Weber stated that he had found it possible to formulate its concepts without recourse to the controversial concept of ‘value’ (Wert) in the technical economic sense. The term he employs here is not Wert but Geltung. While in a legal context it is best translated as ‘validity,’ to do so here would be pedantic as value is far more in accord with ordinary economic usage. The apparent inconsistency with Weber’s previous statement is thus not Weber’s but one for which the translator must be held responsible.—ED.

22 This is a term which is not in general use in German economics, but which Weber took over, as he notes below, from G. F. Knapp. There seems to be no suitable English term and its use has hence been retained.—ED.

23 Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, 1912.

24 Op. cit.

25 See K. Schurtz, Grundriss einer Entstehungsgeschichte des Geldes.

26 The above statement formulates only the simplest and best-known elements of every analysis of money and does not need to be further commented upon. The sociology of the ‘market* will not be developed here. On the formal concepts, see secs. 8 and 10.

A very fragmentary beginning of such a study, which Weber unquestionably intended to carry much farther, is included in the German edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, part ii, chap. 5, but not in the present translation.—ED.

27 These will be discussed below.

28 This will be discussed in chap, vi on Local Communities.

What Weber meant by this reference cannot be identified with certainty. It seems probable that after completing chap, iv, which was left incomplete, he intended to add at least one, possibly more, other chapters to part i. The most systematic treatment of the material, which is, however, very fragmentary, is to be found in part ii, chap, ii, of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. This chapter is not included in the translation.—ED.

29 The concept Haushalt, as distinguished from Erwerb, is central to Weber’s analysis in this context. He means by it essentially what Aristotle meant by the ‘management of a household’ (Jowett’s translation). It is a question of rational allocation of resources in providing for a given set of needs. The concept of budget and budgetary management seems to be the closest English equivalent in common use.—ED.

30 Corresponding to the distinction of Haushalt and Erwerb, Weber distinguishes Vermögen and Kapital. They are, of course, classes of property distinguished, however, in terms of their function in the management of an economic unit. There is no English equivalent of Vermögen in this sense, and it has seemed necessary to employ the more general term ‘resources.’ Where there is danger of confusion, it will be amplified as ‘budgetary resources.’—ED.

31 In common usage the term Erwerben would perhaps best be translated as ‘acquisition.’ This has not, however, been used as Weber is here using the term in a technical sense as the antithesis of Haushalten. ‘Profit-Making’ brings out this specific meaning much more clearly.—ED.

32 Since Weber wrote, there has been an extensive discussion of the problem of whether rational allocation of resources was possible in a completely socialistic economy in which there were no independent, competitively determined prices. The principal weight of technical opinion seems at present to take the opposite position from that which Weber defends here. A recent discussion of the problem will be found in the book on the Economic Theory of Socialism, edited by B. E. Lippincott. This book includes a bibliography on the subject.—ED.

33 This exposition only repeats generally known things in a somewhat more precise form. For the technical aspects of capital accounting, compare the standard textbooks of accountancy, which are, in part, excellent. E.g. those of Leitner, Schär, etc.

34 Erwerb.

35 The well-known articles of Rodbertus are in spite of their errors and incompleteness still important. They should be compared with the excellent discussion of Karl Bücher.

36 Naturalwirtschaft.

37 In Weber’s technical sense.

38 On this, see the contribution of Alfred Weber to the present series, English edition translated by Carl Joachim Friedrich, Theory of the Location of Industries, Chicago, III., University of Chicago Press, 1929.—ED.

39 This much must be conceded to Franz Oppenheimer.

40 Sozialpolitik.

41 In chap. v, the process by which calculation gradually penetrates into the earlier form of family communism will be taken up. (Editor’s note—What Weber here refers to is not included in the present translation. As the work was finally edited after his death, there is no chap. v, but the reference is probably in part to the material in part ii, chap. ii, pp. 194 ff. of the German text. The full treatment he intended was probably never written.)

42 In this respect Otto Neurath appears to be right. While the above was in press the essay of Ludwig von Mises, dealing with these problems, appeared. Unfortunately it was impossible to comment upon it. See the Archiv für Sozialwissenchaft, vol. xlvii.

43 See chap. i, sec. 16, p. 152.

44 ‘Effective’ in the sense of being backed by the requisite purchasing power. Weber says kaufkräftiger Begehr.—ED.

45 Weber seems to have said in this passage in a somewhat involved way what has come to be generally accepted among the more critical economic theorists. A simpler way of stating the same point is provided by the doctrine of maximum satisfaction. This states the conditions under which, to use Weber’s phrase, formal and substantive rationality would coincide. It is generally conceded that among these conditions is the absence of certain types of inequality of wealth. One of the best statements of the problem is that of Frank H. Knight in his essay The Ethics of Competition, which is reprinted in the book of that title. The problem of the relations of formal and substantive rationality has for Weber, however, wider ramifications.—ED.

46 In the most general sense as employed below (see sec. 24) Beruf may be translated as occupation. In the present context, however, Weber has a more specific meaning in mind, that of an occupational role which embodies an especially strong element of ethical valuation. It is this type of attitude toward an occupational role which Weber found exemplified in the Protestant ethic, especially in the use of the term ‘calling,’ in Puritan literature. It has hence seemed to be the most appropriate translation in this passage.—ED.

47 The following remarks apply to both secs. 13 and 14.

49 The expression which has been translated as ‘guild socialism’ is ‘Betriebsrats’—Sozialismus. This was the movement in Germany which looked upon the Works Councils as the entering wedge for a completely socialistic organization of the national economy. This is sufficiently similar to the movement known in England as ‘Guild Socialism’ to justify this translation.—ED.

50 Compare in the most general terms, chap, i, sec. 10, and also the discussion of the appropriation of economic advantages, sec. 19 ff. of the present chapter.

51 What this refers to is not entirely clear. It is certainly not any part of the present translation. Weber’s most extensive treatment of China is in the first volume of the Religions-soziologie. There are also various scattered references in the untranslated portions of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, the most extensive of which is pp. 707 ff. Very likely he intended a more extensive treatment which remained unwritten.—ED.

52 For this and the following section, see especially the authoritative discussion of Karl Bucher in his article ‘Gewerbe’ in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften and in his book, Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft. These are fundamentally important works. Both the terminology and the classification here presented have departed from Bücher’s only where it seemed necessary for reasons of convenience. There is little reason to cite other references for the following exposition does not pretend to achieve new results, but only to provide a scheme of analysis useful for the purposes of this work.

53 Betrieb and Unternehmung. In a good deal of his discussion, Weber uses the term Betrieb in a context where this distinction is not important. Thus he speaks of an Erwerbsbetrieb; hence Betrieb has often been translated as ‘enterprise.* But where the distinction is important in the context, ‘organization’ is used.—ED.

54 See above note. In most cases it has seemed best to translate Erwerbsbetrieb with ‘enterprise,’ as to speak of a profit-making organization as distinguished from an enterprise would unduly complicate the terminology without bringing out sufficiently important empirical distinctions.—ED.

55 As has already been noted, it does not seem necessary to introduce this terminological complication into the translation.—ED.

56 Hausindustrie. This is often translated as ‘domestic industry.’ As Weber points out, however, this term designates the unit of technical organization, namely the household, and not of business enterprise. For this reason such authorities as Professor E. F. Gay prefer the term ‘putting out industry.’—ED.

57 Weber himself takes over the Greek word, and since the closest English equivalent, ‘workshop,’ is too indefinite, it seems best to retain his own term.—ED.

58 The corresponding German terms are: Hauswirtschaft, Dorfwhirtschaft, Stadtwirtschaft, Territorialwirtschaft, and Volkswirtschaft.—ED.

59 Anlagen.

60 Arbeitsmittel.

61 What Weber apparently has in mind is the type of ‘trust’ which controls all stages of the process of production from raw material to the finished product. Thus many of our steel enterprises have not only blast furnaces and rolling mills, but coal mines, coke ovens, railways and ships, and iron ore mines. The most notable example in Germany in Weber’s time was the Stinnes combine.—ED.

62 See above, chap. i, sec. 15.

63 The term ‘demiurgic’ is taken over directly from Weber, who introduced it in this technical sense. It is not, apparently, current in the German literature.—ED.

64 The term oikos is, of course, taken over from the Greek. As Weber notes below, however, it was introduced into economic discussion by Rodbertus and has been used in the German literature ever since.—ED.

65 On the sociological concept of appropriation, see above, chap. i, sec. 10.

66 Erbuntertänigkeit.

67 Greek, ‘áπoøpá’; Russian, ‘obrok’; German, ‘Hals’ or ‘Leibzips.’

68 See Von Tugan-Baranowski’s book on the Russian factory.

69 What Bücher calls Lohnwerk.

70 Stör.

71 Genossenschaftlich.

72 The term Paria is used by Weber in a technical sense to designate a group occupying the same territorial area as others, but separated from them by ritual barriers which severely limit social intercourse between the groups. It has been common for such groups to have specialized occupations, particularly occupations which are despised in the larger society.—ED.

73 What is ordinarily called a ‘producers’ co-operative association’ would be included in this type, but Weber conceives the type itself more broadly. In certain respects, for instance, the medieval manor and other types of village community could be considered as examples.—ED.

74 Bergbaufreikeit.

75 That is without rights of inheritance or alienation. See above chap. i, sec. 10.

76 These points are so obvious that there is no need of comment.

77 Attention should becalled again to WeberÙs peculiar use of the term ØirrationalÙ. He means that the maximum of formal rationality in his specific sense can be attained only in a structure which is in conflict with certain important values or ideas of welfare.ÔED.

78 See chap, iv, with particular reference to occupation as a basis of social prestige and class status.

All of this chapter, which is to be found in the German edition, is included in the present translation. It is, however, a mere fragment which Weber intended to develop on a scale comparable with the others. Hence most of the material to which this note refers was probably never written down.—ED.

80 Following this, in the German text, occur the words oder eine Fabrik. Since the inclusion of the factory as a form with liturgical organization of occupations is directly contradictory to Weber’s explicit definition above, this must be either an error on Weber’s part, or a misprint. That it is a correct expression of his meaning seems so improbable that the phrase has been omitted in translation.—ED.

81 This is usually called Stör in German.—ED.

82 Lohnwerk.

83 Karl Bücher has used die term Preiswerk for die case where all the means of production arc owned by the worker.

84 This usage is apparently inconsistent with Weber’s explicit definition of the factory.—ED.

85 Nebenberuf.

86 The part of the present translation most relevant to this subject is the discussion of ‘the financing and economic support of administrative staffs in systems of authority’ It runs through various parts of chap. iii. More detailed discussion of certain aspects of the subject is to be found in part iii of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, which is not included in the present translation. In this, as in other respects, however, this part of the work is seriously incomplete.—ED.

87 Teilpachtbauer. Apparently this institution is similar to the French metoyer system.

88 Gutswirtschaft.

89 It seems curious that in this classification Weber failed to mention the type of agricultural organization which has become predominant in the staple agricultural production of much of the United States and Canada. Of the European types this comes closest to large-scale peasant proprietorship, but is much more definitely oriented to the market for a single staple, such as wheat. Indeed, in many respects this type of farm is closely comparable to some kinds of small-scale industrial enterprise.—ED.

90 The German term Gewerbe may sometimes be translated as ‘handicraft,’but as generally used is somewhat broader. Industry here should be taken in the broadest sense to include any process of non-agricultural production.—ED.

91 Demiurgische Gewerbe.

92 The above proposition is one of the most important conclusions of Weber’s comparative study in the Sociology of Religion. An attempt to throw light on the problems raised by the materialistic interpretation of history was one of the principal reasons for his embarking on these studies.—ED.

93 See below, sec. 26.—ED.

94 See above, chap, i, sec. 2.

95 Investigations carried out since this was written have tended to show that the situation is not as simple as Weber seemed to think. There is, in most cases, not so direct a relation between the level of effort and effective earnings as he maintained. It also appears that other factors, notably the informal social relationships of the working group, play an important role. See especially Roetlisberger and Dickson, Management and the Worker.

96 See the author’s figures in the Verhandlungen des deutschen Juristentags, vol. xxiv.

97 Weber means the Revolution of 1918 in Germany.—ED.

98 Weber uses the term Alltag in a technical sense, which is contrasted with Charisma. The antithesis will play a leading role in chap. iii. In his use of the terms, however, an ambiguity appears of which he was probably not aware. In some contexts, Alltag means routine, as contrasted with things which are exceptional or extraordinary and hence temporary. Thus, the charismatic movement led by a prophet is, in the nature of the case, temporary, and if it is to survive at all must find a routine basis of organization. In other contexts, Alltag means the profane, as contrasted with the sacred. The theoretical significance of this ambiguity has been analysed in the Structure of Social Action, chap. xvii. Weber’s fullest discussions of the concepts of Charisma and Alltag and their relation are, apart from chap, iii of the present translation, to be found in the section on Religionssoziologie in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, part ii, chap, iv, and in part iii, especially chaps, ix and x. —ED.

99 Handel.

100 Preiswerk.

101 The primary example is, of course, that carried on for many centuries by the Roman State.—ED.

102 There are several different factors involved in the inability to predict future events with complete certainty. Perhaps the best known analysis of these factors is that of Professor F. H. Knight in his Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.—ED.

103 This reference is probably to an extended historical discussion of monetary policy which Weber included in his plans for Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft but never actually wrote.—ED.

104 Finanzierungsgeschäfte.

105 In a well known essay, Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur, weber attributed to this factor an important role in the economic decline and through this the cultural changes of the Roman Empire. This essay is reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 289-311.—ED.

106 The point of view here stated has, if the author’s memory is accurate, been previously put forward in the clearest form by J. Plenge in his Von der Diskontpolitik zur Herrschaft über den Geldmarkt. Before that a similar position seems to have been taken only in the authors article, ‘Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum’ (reprinted in Getammelte Aufsätze zur Social- und Wiruchaftsgeschichte.—ED.)

107 As has been noted in the introduction, this problem, the factors involved in the emergence of the specific forms of capitalistic organization characteristic of the modern Western World, was the dominant empirical interest of Weber’s sociological work as a whole. It is probable that he intended to sum up all that he had to say on the subject in this one monumental work. The state of incompleteness in which it was left at his death is, however, such that only a fragmentary impression of his total argument can be gained, even when the parts not included in this translation are taken into account—ED.

108 This is true if it employs modern methods of administration. It was not, however possible at all times, for instance, in China. There in earlier times it has generally not been possible because payments by and to the government were too small in relation to the total field of transactions. Even recently it appears that the Chinese Government has not been able to make silver into a restricted currency with a cash reserve since it was not sufficiently powerful to suppress the counterfeiting which would undoubtedly have ensued.

109 The speed at which this will occur and the different ways in which it affects different goods cannot be discussed here.

110 This terminology is based on that of Knapp. This is even more definitely true in what follows.

111 Regiminales Kurantgeld.

112 Hydrolomic—a term introduced by G. F. Knapp.—ED.

113 An example is the competition of the various coining authorities in the Middle Ages, determined by their fiscal interest in seignorage, to mint as much as possible of the monetary metals. As yet, there was no formal establishment of free coinage, but the actual situation was much as if there had been.

114 This account of the matter coincides closely with that of Knapp.

115 Sperrgeld.

116 See next paragraph.

117 This case is a phenomenon of everyday experience and has no special importance for present purposes.

118 Knapp has rightly maintained that this is the normal process in the case of obstructional changes in the standard.

119 Both this and what follows arc closely in agreement with Knapp. Both in its form and content, his book is one of the greatest masterpieces of German literary style and scientific acumen. It is unfortunate that most of the specialist critics have concentrated on the problems which he deliberately ignored, which, though relatively few, are in some cases, however, not unimportant.

120 It should be borne in mind that this was written in 1919 or 1920. The situation has clearly been radically changed by the developments since that time.—ED.

121 Specific measures will not in general be dealt with here.

122 Cases like the gold inflation of Sweden during the war, resulting from the export of war materials, are the result of such special circumstances that they need not be considered here. (Since this was written a somewhat similar tendency, or at least the possibility of it, has developed in the United States as a result of the forces which have concentrated the great bulk of the world’s monetary gold in that country.)—ED.

123 This is an application of Weber’s general theory of the relations of interests and ideas, which is much further developed in his writings on the Sociology of Religion. The most important point is that he refused to accept the common dilemma that a given act is motivated either by interests or by ideas. The influence of ideas is rather to be found in their function of defining the situations in which interests are pursued. Beside in Weber’s own works, this point is developed in the editor’s article ‘The Role of Ideas in Social Action,’ American Sociological Review, October 1938.—ED.

124 The special circumstances which are involved in bimetallism and restricted money have already been discussed and can reasonably be left aside here.

125 It is true that Knapp occasionally grants this.

126 lt should be kept in mind that this was written under the abnormal conditions of Germany in 1920.—ED.

127 Sec chap, i, sec. 12.

128 Mäzenatisch. This term is commonly used in German but not in the precise sense which Weber gives it here. There seems to be no equivalent single term in English, so the idea has been conveyed by a phrase.—ED.

129 Verpfründung.

130 Stände.

131 This is apparently a plan which Weber did not succeed in fulfilling, as there is no extended discussion of taxation in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.—ED.

132 As the court of a lord in feudalism.—ED.

133 Fronstaat.

134 The methodological problems touched here have been further discussed in various of the essays collected in the volume Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. The most essential point is that Weber held that no scientific analysis in the natural or the social field ever exhausts the concrete individuality of the empirical world. Scientific conceptual schemes and the causal explanations attained through their use are always in important respects abstract.—ED.

135 The title of this section is somewhat misleading. It actually does not contain what most people would expect under a treatment of the motivation of economic activity. Indeed, it carries this problem only to the point of establishing the structural basis of an interest in income, without attempting to analyze the underlying motivation any farther. Important contributions to various phases of this problem are to be found in other parts of Weber’s work. Beside the references already given, this is one of the central themes of the comparative studies in the Sociology of Religion. A systematic generalized statement was, however, never made in the later stages of Weber’s career, and his position must be pieced together from many different sources.—ED.

136 Triebfeder. Weber certainly cannot mean that the maximization of money income is the ultimate basis of all economic motivation in general. This would be radically in contradiction to his earlier analysis in chap, i, particularly sees. 6 and 7, and to much of what follows in chap. iii. What he means is rather that, in so far as action is economically oriented in a market economy, it must strive for the maximization of income. Thus this is not an ultimate ‘motive,’ but rather a generalized goal which is inherent in certain kinds of social structures, relatively independently of what the deeper motives may be.—ED.

137 In natural economies, according to the terminology adopted here, ‘income’ does not exist, but only ‘receipts’ which consists of goods and services in kind, but which cannot be valued and added in terms of the units of a means of exchange.

138 An ‘administrative staff.’ See chap, i, 12.

139 Viehrenten.

140 Anlagen.

141 The distinction here made between those types of economic interest having a dynamic and a static influence on economic activity respectively, is strikingly similar to that made by Pareto between ‘speculators’ and ‘rentiers,’ sec The Mind and Society, especially secs. 22, 34 ff.—ED.

142 Though it is not acceptable in a good many particular points, the treatment of ‘income’ in Robert Liefmann’s works is one of the most valuable available. Here, the economic problem cannot be explored further. The relations of economic dynamics and the social order will have to be discussed again and again as the analysis proceeds.

1 In this chapter Weber departs from his previous practice and, in addition to the usual division into numbered sections, has a system of somewhat more comprehensive subdivisions. These will be designated by capital letters.—ED.

2 Chap, i, p. 152. The translation problem raised by the term Herrschaft was commented upon at that point.—ED.

3 An ‘administrative staff.’ See chap, i, 12.

4 Ständische. There is no really acceptable English rendering of this term.—ED.

5 The specifically modern type of administration has intentionally been taken as a point of departure in order to make it possible later to contrast the others with it.

6 Behörde.

7 Weber does not explain this distinction. By a ‘technical rule’ he probably means a prescribed course of action which is dictated primarily on grounds touching efficiency of the performance of the immediate functions, while by ‘norms’ he probably means rules which limit conduct on grounds other than those of efficiency. Of course, in one sense all rules are norms in that they are prescriptions for conduct, conformity with which is problematical.—ED.

8 Bureau. It has seemed necessary to use the English word ‘Office’ in three different meanings, which are distinguished in Weber’s discussion by at least two terms. The first is Amt, which means ‘office’ in the sense of the institutionally defined status of a person. The second is the ‘work premises’ as in the expression Øhe spent the afternoon in his office.’ For this Weber uses Bureau as also for the third meaning which he has just defined, the ‘organized work process of a group.’ In this last sense an office is a particular type of ‘organization,’ or Betrieb in Weber’s sense. This use is established in English in such expressions as ‘the District Attorney’s Office has such and such functions.’ Which of the three meanings is involved in a given case will generally be clear from the context.—ED.

9 This characterization applies to the ‘monocratic’ as opposed to the ‘collegial’ type, which will be discussed below.

10 See below, chap. iv.

11 Kaplanokratie.

12 On elective officials, see below, sec. 14.

13 Pfründen. On this concept, see below, sec. 7.—ED.

14 See below, sec. 14.

15 See sec. 15.

16 Regierungs Präsident.

17 See chap. iv. As has already been remarked, chap, iv was left incomplete and the part which is available contains no discussion of this subject.—ED.

18 See sec. 10.

19 See sec. 8.

20 The parts of Weber’s work included in this translation contain only fragmentary discussions of military organization. It was a subject in which Weber was greatly interested and to which he attributed great importance for social phenomena generally. This factor is one on which, for the ancient world, he laid great stress in his important study, Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum. Though at various points in die rest of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft the subject comes up, it is probable that he intended to treat it systematically but that this was never done.—ED.

21 This will be further discussed in the Sociology of Law.

22 Herr.

23 Diener.

24 This does not seem to be a very happy formulation of the essential point. It is not necessary that the authority of a person in such a position, such as die head of a household, should be unlimited. It is rather that its extent is unspecified. It is generally limited by higher obligations, but the burden of proof rests upon the person on whom an obligation is laid that there is such a conflicting higher obligation.—ED.

25 The concept of ‘benefices’ will be taken up presently.

26 Genossen.

27 Ständische Herrschaft. The term Stand with its derivatives is perhaps the most troublesome single term in Weber’s text. It refers to a social group the members of which occupy a relatively well-defined common status, particularly with reference to social stratification, though this reference is not always important. In addition to common status, there is the further criterion that the members of a Stand have a common mode of life and usually more or less well-defined code of behaviour. There is no English term which even approaches adequacy in rendering this concept. Hence it has been necessary to attempt to describe what Weber meant in whatever terms the particular context has indicated. In the present case it is the appropriation of authority on the part of the members of the administrative staff, in such a way that their position becomes independent of the arbitrary will of their chief, which is decisive. This particular aspect is brought out by describing it as ‘decentralized authority.’ It should not, however, be forgotten that in describing it as he does, Weber implies that this group not only has a distinctive status in the organization of authority, but also in other respects.—ED.

28 See chap, ii, sec. 19.

29 Bodenregal.

30 Thiś will be further discussed below in chap. iv.

31 Der Deutsche Staat des Mifteldters.

32 This appears to refer to another of the unfinished parts of Weber’s projected work. No systematic discussion of the subject is included in his text. Certain phases of it arc, however, discussed in part iii, chaps, vii and viii of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which are not included in the present translation.—ED.

33 See chap, ii, sec. 31.

34 By Ständische Gewaltenteilung.

35 35 ‘Patrician’ is here used not in the Roman sense, but in that of the privileged commercial classes of the Free Cities of the German Empire, such as the Hanseatic cities.—ED.

36 The leader of the communistic experiment in Bavaria in 1919.—ED.

37 Bewährung.

38 Gottesgnadentum.

39 Weber uses the term Gemeinde, which is not directly translatable,—ED.

40 Something contrary to what was written, as Jesus said in opposition to the Scribes and Pharisees.—ED.

41 Weber used the antithesis of Charisma and Alltag in two senses. On the one hand, of the extraordinary and temporary as opposed to the everyday and routine; on the other hand, the sacred as opposed to the profane. See the editor’s Structure of Social Action, ch. xvii.—ED.

42 Weber here uses Welt in quotation marks, indicating that it refers to its meaning in what is primarily a religious context. It is the sphere of ‘worldly’ things and interests as distinguished from transcendental religious interests.—ED.

43 On the charismatic type of education, see chap. iv. (No discussion of this subject is included in the fragment of chap, iv which Weber completed.—ED.)

44 Geschlechtcrstaat.

45 Derived from κλתроς , meaning a ‘share.’ See the Sociology of Religion.

46 This last is particularly conspicuous at the present time (1920).

47 The economics of charismatic revolutions will have to be discussed separately. It is by no means the same in all cases.

48 Lehensfeudalismus and Pfründenjeuddismus.

49 Ständische Lebensführung.

51 In ancient China the granting of economic income in fiefs and of territorial authority were distinguished in name as well as in fact. The distinctions in name are not found in the European Middle Ages, but there were clear distinctions in class status and in numerous other particular points.

52 This was common in Western feudalism, but often was initiated by the administrative staff in the interest of their own power. The same was true of the alliance of princes in China in 630 B.C.

53 On the peculiarities of such groups and their immense importance for cultural development, see chap. iv (not in completed part.—ED.).

54 Siände-Corporationen.Notably ecclesiastical and professional (lawyers) and urban communes and guilds.

55 Cf. Weber’s study, Die Stadt, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, part II, chap, viii.—ED.

56 Gemeinschaften.

57 Honoratioren. There is no good English equivalent term. It refers to persons performing functions and exercising authority who do not depend on the position as a major source of income and generally enjoy an independent status in the social structure.—ED.

58 This and its historical analogies will be discussed further below.

59 See below, the chapter on the theory of revolutions. (This projected chapter was apparently never written and no systematic account of revolutions is available cither in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft or elsewhere in Weber’s published works.—ED.)

60 This will be further discussed in the Sociology of Law.

61 führerdemokratie.

62 As at so many other points, the development here referred to was apparently never completed. The fullest discussion of this point is to be found in the Sociology of Law.—ED.

63 Ständische Gewaltcnteilung.

64 See sec. 16.

65 Ständestaat.

66 See below, part x of this chapter, pp. 416 ff.

67 Behörde.

68 All further detail must be reserved to the specialized parts of this work.

69 Glaubensparteien.

70 There is no section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft under this title, and apparently none was ever written. More of the material appropriate to such a discussion is in part iii, Typen der Herrschaft, than in any other part of the work. There is, however, no extended discussion of parties.—ED.

71 Mäzenaten.

72 Honoratioren

73 See above chap, i, sec. 11.

74 Ständische Repräsentation.

75 The facts arc in many respects best presented in the brilliantly polemical attack on the system by W. Hasbach which has erroneously been called a ‘political description.’ The author in his own essay, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland, has been careful to emphasize that it is a polemical work which has arisen out of the particular situation of the time.

1 Weber uses the term ‘class’ (Klasse) in a special sense, which is defined in this paragraph and which, in particular, he contrasts with Stand. There seems no other alternative translation of Klasse, but it should be kept in mind that it is being used in a special sense.—ED.

2 Like the French ‘petite bourgeoisie,’ the German term Kleinbürgertum has a somewhat more specific meaning than the English ‘lower-middle class.’ It refers particularly to economically independent elements not employed in large-scale organizations. The typical example are the small shopkeeper and the proprietor of a small handicraft workshop.—ED.

3 Ständische Lage. The difficulties of translating the term Stand have already been commented upon (sec page 347, note 27).—ED.

4 This chapter breaks off at this point but is obviously incomplete. There is, however, no other part of Weber’s published work in which the subject is systematically developed, although aspects of it are treated in different connexions at many points.—ED.