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The Politics of Boundaries: The Politics of Boundaries

The Politics of Boundaries
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table of contents
  1. Map-Making
  2. The European Frontiers of 1918
  3. Boundary-Making in Asia
  4. Nationality in Theory and Practice
  5. Culture Not the Basis of Nationality
  6. Nation and State
  7. The Nature of the State
  8. The Birth of Nations
  9. The Positive Theory of Nation-Making
  10. The Case of Techecho-Slovakia
  11. Not Unity but Independence
  12. Political Engineering
  13. Notes

Chapter I: The Politics of Boundaries and Tendencies in International Relations, Vol. I.

N. M. Roy Chowdhury & Co. 1938.

The Politics of Boundaries

Benoy Kumar Sarkar

Map-Making

One of the most profound vital urges in human life has ever consisted in the effort to make boundaries. The making and remaking of the frontiers is perhaps the greatest single item that has been pushing the world's history on monumental scale since mankind began to live in groups.

The landmarks in this cosmic evolution are constituted by wars and treaties and the manufacture of maps. Mapmaking is an order of creation in which the soul of man has had a continuous source of inspiration and delight since the Pharaohs lived and fought.

The nineteenth century phase of this creative endeavour in the field of frontiers has enriched the vocabulary of the world with a new term embodying, as it seems to do, a new ideology. Since Kosciusko, Kossuth, Mazzini, and Bismarck, the boundary-makers and creators of "historical geography"—i.e. the manufacturers of maps, have learned to use the word "nation." The "nationality" principle, whatever it may mean, has become current coin in the human phraseology.

The European Frontiers of 1918

The war of 1914-1918 was fought not only over the question of dominion in Asia and Africa, but so far as Europe is concerned, also over the problem of "nationalities." The map-makers of Versailles are credited with having manufactured "nationality-states," Tchecho-Slovakia, Poland and so forth in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

Nor has Eastern Europe remained an exception to the sway of this great élan de la vie. The Russian revolution with its Bolshevistic creed of self-determination (November, 1917) has given a fillip to the play of centrifugal forces among the Fins, Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians on the Baltic and the Little Russians (Ruthenians) or Ukrainians of the Dnieper Valley that had been held together like a house of cards in a promiscuous medley by the Czar of all the Russias.

Boundary-Making in Asia

The nationality-problem in boundary-making represents no longer a mere European phase of the world-development. The events and movements that have been taking place on the Chinese theatre of human operations raise issues more fundamental than seem to have been consciously grasped and formulated in the political creed of Young China. These are none other than considerations as to the attributes of a sovereign state, or from a slightly different angle of vision, the essentials of a nationality.

What are the territorial (geographico-economic) limits of a nation? What is the human (demographic or anthropographic) basis of the state? These are the problems that are being unconsciously attacked by the leaders of the Chinese revolutions, counter-revolutions, and civil wars.

The same questions are abroad all over Asia. The nationality-problem or map-making remains the moot-problem for the brain of entire Young Asia. It has been called up by the partition of Asian-Turkey accomplished by the Great War consisting, as it did, in the alleged liberations of Arabia and Mesopotamia. The problem is still perhaps dormant in Persia and Afghanistan. But longstanding discontents in Egypt, India and South-Eastern Asia constitute so many different sparks from the same fire.

Nationality in Theory and Practice

Nationality is a very young phenomenon both as a concept and as a fact. Consequently a good deal of vague thinking is still associated with it not only in the East but also in the West.

Nationality as interpreted by the political philosophers of the nineteenth century is not the same as the nationalities actually realized in modern times. The theoretical ideal embodies itself in such formulae as "One language, one state," or "One race, one state," or, more vaguely, "One culture, one state." As a matter of fact, however, neither in the nineteenth century nor ever on earth since the days of Memphis and Nineveh has this metaphysical concept been realized in practice.

History knows only "states". Diplomats and politicians also know only states. But patriots, philosophers and poets talk of nations.

Much of the present-day muddle in political thinking is due to the ignoring of this great discrepancy between the speculation of modern theorists and the practice evolved in actual history. The political mind of the whole world is consciously or unconsciously "sicklied o'er" with the abstract idealism of Fichte, Hegel, Mazzini and John Stuart Mill. It has fought shy of the effort to square the theory with the facts of concrete political experience. Rather, the old dogma of the race-state or the language-state has acquired a fresh lease of life under the Reconstruction of Versailles.

And yet the so-called "nation-states" that one sees on the new map of Europe1 are not nation-states at all in the sense in which one is taught to understand the term nation. Jugoslavia, Tchecho-Slovakia, Poland, each of these states is polyglot and multi-racial, in other words, an old Austria-Hungary in miniature.

Whether these "nations" serve in the long run to "Balkanize" Europe at every nook and corner or turn out to be so many nuclei of "Helvetica" remains yet to be seen. Not the least disturbing factor in the political milieu is furnished by the fact that twenty million German men and women, about a third of the entire German-speaking population, has been distributed right and left among a dozen or so old and new states of Europe to give birth to a "German irredenta" in every so-called nation-state.

Culture Not the Basis of Nationality

The great need of the hour is the emancipation of the theory of nationality, on the one hand, from the mystical associations forced upon it by the ardour of patriots and idealists, and, on the other, from the clean-cut logicality or comprehensiveness injected into it by political thinkers and philosophers. A realistic philosophy of the state is to be sought, first, in order to counteract the "romantic" conception of nationalism as a cult, with which the world is familiar through "Young Germany" and "Young Italy"; and, secondly, to explain the territorial boundaries and demographic extent of the states that have been and are. Such a philosophy is in high request for the solution of problems that have appeared both in the East and in the West.

In the first place, the attempt to associate "culture," "culture-ideals" and so forth with nationality can only make "confusion worse confounded." By the objective test and statistically considered, life's "ideals" have been the same the world over and almost all the ages through. In spite of the diversities of manifestation these ideals can be grouped under a single slogan, viz., the advancement of the happiness of human beings.

Moreover, with the progress of exact sciences and technology the physical barriers are being daily set at naught. The tunnels, canals and bridges, understood both literally and metaphorically, are compelling the cultural institutions of the world to tend towards a closer and closer uniformity in the different quarters of the globe. The boundaries of nationality, i.e., the physical and racial limits of the state have therefore to be determined and interpreted on altogether new foundations.

In the second place, there has hardly ever been nor is there today an ethnic or cultural unit that can function as a self-sufficient economic entity. The ever-increasing commercial intercourse of nations (the "Weltwirtschaft" or "world-economy") has been rendering such a system of self-sufficient units less and less probable.

Then there are the considerations of military, naval and aerial defence which belong to the problem of the so-called "scientific frontiers." The formation of composite or heterogeneous political organisms has thereby become almost a practical necessity. The more or less simple, i.e., homogeneous character of insular states, e.g. Great Britain, is but an exception that proves the rule. It is mainly from the stand-point of military and strategic necessity that one can understand why millions of Germans have been given away in subjection to neighbors on all sides.

Nation and State

The problem of nationality remains then up till to-day a problem of the state. While ascertaining the foundations of nations one should therefore have to grapple with the question, "what is the basis of the state?"

This question, apparently simple, has. to be looked in the face and the modern mind has to proceed to answer it in an absolutely secular spirit, i.e., unburdened of the traditional sanctity attached to the dignity of political phenomena. Are there no characteristics that are, pragmatically speaking, common to the Pharaonic nationalities, the empires of the Assurs, the Maurya, Gupta, Tang, Mogul and Manchu imperial systems, and the states. of Europe from the epochs of "insolent Greece and haughty Rome" down to the Sovietic manufacture of maps and the Versailles reconstruction of frontiers as well as the colonial empires among the subject races of the world? There are, and these constitute the soul of the state, or for that matter, the nation, denuded of its multifarious trappings.

The Nature of the State

In the first place, the state is not a "natural" organism as has been taught in the school rooms for nearly a whole century. It is a voluntary association, an artificial corporation, an institution consciously created or "manufactured" like, say, the Standard Oil Company of New York or the University of Oxford.

The state is one of the many products of man's creative will and intelligence. Metaphorically speaking, its genesis, expansion, contraction and dissolution may represent indeed the different reactions of the mystical élan vital of a social group to the stimuli of its milieu. But still one can make it as well as unmake it. It is a mechanical conglomeration of domestic units, clan-communities, socio-economic trusts, groupements professionnels, partnerships, etc.

No innate motive force impels a race, language, religion or Kultur to embody itself in a statal organization such as would be its own characteristic expression. The disappearance of the state is therefore not tantamount to the disappearance of the people. The state may come and the state may go but the people go on for ever, and may live on to create new partnerships or states according to the needs of the hour. The same culture may flourish under different states, while the same state may be associated with different culture-systems.

Secondly, once this elementary fact is grasped we are inevitably led to the corollary that the sole origin and rationale of the state or the nation have to be sought in the will of the people to agree to its formation. The agreement, however, may be tacit or express. It may be self-determined as in a free corporation, or forced as in a subject race or irredenta.

But as in the relations between capital and labour the agreement between the employer and the employed is supposed by "legal fiction" to be free and voluntary on both sides whereas in actuality the economic conditions of the labourer inevitably prevent him from functioning as a free person, so by a sort of legal fiction one has to regard the subject races of the world or the "minorities" or irredentas as voluntarily agreeing to accept the powers that be.

In any case an idea of contract or compact2 is psychologically involved in every state or nation although it may not always happen to be present as a historical fact, and although it may often be difficult to trace contractual relations in the crude anthropological beginnings of states.

Thirdly, the state may be formally run in the name of the One, or it may be so camouflaged as to seem to be the institution of the Many. But in the last analysis it is the Few that make and boss the state even in "communist" republics.

Fourthly, the might of the sword is the only guarantee of the existence of the nation or state. A people may create the state with borrowed culture like the ancient Romans, the Turks and the modern Japanese, but the sword must be its own.

The sword-less state or nation is a contradiction in terms. An unarmed region is a buffer like Siam or Afghanistan, a "sphere of influence" like China, a "mandated" territory, a protectorate, a dependency, and what not. It can figure on the map only as the land of dehumanized slaves not to be counted in the category of human beings.

Finally, the boundaries, extent and human compositions of states depend, therefore, on blood and iron, i.e., on wars and on the deliberate treaties of peace, Zollvereins, traffic-walls, etc. Every treaty is, from the nature of the case, provisional, and so are the boundaries of nations. Not until challenged by some neighbour the frontiers remain what they are.

These are in almost every instance but temporary arrangements brought about by "scraps of paper," and each state or nation has to be on the look out to keeping its own gun-powder dry. The boundaries of states or nations have in any event no natural and necessary connection with the frontiers of culture, language, religion or race.

Even the more powerful geographical barriers may be overruled by mechanical inventions, should the collective will of the people care to do so. There is thus no mystical absoluteness or inalienability to the limits of the state. The "scientific frontiers" may advance or recede with every generation according to the dynamics of inter-social existence. The only architect of the world's historical geography from epoch to epoch is the shakti-yoga or energism of man.

The Birth of Nations

From an inductive study of the nationalities old and new, oriental and occidental, one is then in a position to define the objective foundations of the state. The first formative force is the will or consent of the people, the plebiscite, silent or declared. The second agency that operates in the birth of nations is the force of arms, the power of offence and defense in open war.

The state comes into existence, first, because certain men and women are determined to create it, and secondly because they are in a position to maintain it against all odds. In regard to offence and defence the nation-makers or manufacturers of states have to see to it that not only the military-naval-aerial equipments are adequate but also that financially, industrially and economically the staying-power of the people during war is up to the mark.

Historically speaking, nations are born in wars and wars only. Genetically, therefore, nationality is in essence a militaristic concept. If there be any spirituality associated with nationalism it is the spirituality of war or the categorical imperative of Kshatriyaism.

Nationality thus postulates, as a matter of course, the milieu of a conflict of rivals to brow-beat one another as in a Kautilyan mandala (sphere of states). The being of the nation depends on a condition of the matsya-nyaya (logic of the fish) and on a thorough-going "preparedness" of the vijigisu (the aspirant) against thousand and one eventualities.3

The Positive Theory of Nation-Making

If the state be a voluntary partnership as the historic experience of mankind proves it to be, considerations of race, language, religion, etc., are robbed of any special significance. For, the sole consideration would be the deliberate and conscious agreement of the members of the group, corporation, etc., whatever be the colour, creed or tongue. A state, conceived according to this non-mystical and positive theory, is postulated to be complex or heterogeneous and does not necessarily have to be intolerant of the rights and interests of the "minorities" since these might be safeguarded in the compact or agreement itself.

Nor is the question of the minimum human strength of a nation, i.e., the smallest amount of population necessary to create a state, a very weighty one according to the theory of the state as an artificial manufacture. The chief question is the preparedness or capacity of the state to meet in an effective manner the aggression of enemies. It may be three millions, thirteen millions, thirty millions or even three hundred millions. Nay, it may be so small as a band of pirates organized for robbery on the high seas or for carrying on guerilla warfare on land.

There is a state in posse, an embryonic nation, whenever and wherever the status quo of the powers that be is challenged by a group of armed human beings. To be extreme, the positive theory of nation-making would assert that even a single revolutionary militant, by his sheer existence happens to be the nucleus of a new state or nation.

The Case of Techecho-Slovakia

A verification of this aspect of the theory has been met with during the Great War in certain actions of the allies prompted as they were by considerations of military necessity. In August-September 1918 the twelve million Tchechs and Slovaks of Bohemia were recognized by Great Britain, France and the United States as an independent unit, although during that period the territory of these races existed solely in the hearts of the people and in the visions of about 100,000 "exiled" soldiers on the Volga and in Siberia.

As soon as rebels, no matter who or what they be, can create the interest of some powerful neighbour or neighbours the manufacture of a new state may be said to be already on the anvil. The traditional, mystical theory of nationalism would fail to account for such a phenomenon.

It would be impossible to maintain that Tchecho-slovakia, as constituted today, the "land of seven languages" and half a dozen minorities, is a nation-state in the idealistic Mazzinian sense. Tchecho-slovakia has been manufactured not because the Tchechs and the Slovaks, the two "senior partners" of the new political complex, have much in common with one another in "soul" affairs or with the German and other minorities but because the Central Powers had somehow—by hook or by crook—to be crushed by their sworn enemies and because certain states had to be created against mutilated Germany and Austria.

The birth of Tchecho-slovakia agrees, therefore, quite well with the new theory of nationalism and nation-making that is adumbrated here. This as well as the other new states of Europe embody fresh illustrations of the principle that it is only through foreign intrigue and diplomatic assistance that subject races, whether united in language, race, religion, etc., or not, can throw off the yoke of hated aliens. Unity or no unity, a nation can be born, should it suit the "conjuncture of circumstances."4

Not Unity but Independence.

Nationality, then, is not the concrete expression of a cult or culture or race or language, or of the Hegelian "spirit" or "genius" of a people. It is the physical (territorial and human) embodiment of political freedom, maintained by military and economic strength. The problem of nation-making is nothing but the problem of establishing a sovereign will in territorial terms, i.e., giving sovereignty "a local habitation and a name."

Not unity, but independence is the distinctive feature of a national existence. The nation may thus represent one race or many. It may speak one language or it may be polyglot. It may be a uni-cultural or a multicultural organism. To an artificial corporation brought into being by the fiat of human creativeness, homogeneity of racial or linguistic interests is not necessarily a source of strength, nor is heterogeneity a special weakness.

Political Engineering

The problems of "applied nationalism" are therefore clear. The practical statesman or the manufacturer of nations need not reflect too much on the historic traditions or the sentimental unities. The positive theory of the state would advise him to study principally, first, such of the lands and waters, mines and forests, i.e., the economic resources, as can be conveniently made into a unit, and secondly, such of the men and women, families and communities as choose to bring a free and independent organism into existence. The fundamental logic of nation-manufacture is that implied in prudence and expediency.

The will to create a state and the ability to protect and develop it are the sole items in the methodology of statesmanship. As much of the earth's area and of the human mass as can be organized effectively in a separate entity along the lines of least resistance should be regarded as the basis of the state. The sole guidance is furnished by the safe principle, familiar in economics, namely, "as much as the market will bear."

The state may consist of the heterogeneous elements, should they desire to be so organized. Or, the nation may have to renounce a section of the dearer and nearer relationships if that were necessary for the preservation of independence.

That is why Great Britain had to swallow the separation of the U. S. That is why not even the most pronounced chauvinists of France dare attempt annexing the French-speaking provinces of Belgium and Switzerland. That is why Italy would think hundred times before waging war against Switzerland on account of the Swiss-Italian Canton Tessin.

In political engineering even a tiny nucleus of sturdy independence is infinitely superior to a mammoth hotchpotch of golden servility. "Safety first" is a more reasonable rule in politics than romantic enthusiasm for one's "nationals," linguistic affiliations and cultural colonies. In nation-making and sovereignty the Hesiodic paradox still holds good, which says that the "part is greater than the whole."

Notes

  1. Cf. infra (The Little Entente), Chapter III. Also the chapter on "Leavings of the Great War" in the present author's Futurism of Young Asia (Leipzig, 1922).↩
  2. Independence and sovereignty must, however, be regarded as "limited" as a matter of course; for the same contract that brings a state into being can create also a system of international law, arbitration commissions, a League of Nations and such other institutions of positive public law.↩
  3. See "The Theory of International Relations in Hindu Political Philosophy" in the present author's Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus (Leipzig, 1922)↩
  4. See the present author's Science of History and the Hope of Mankind (London, 1912)↩

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