Table of Contents

I. The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics

• P. 1-3, Meaning of “value-judgment”—role of “value-judgment” within science a different issue from desirability of espousing “value-judgments” in teaching—critique of two points of view on the latter issue—Weber’s own view
• P. 3-5, Waning of belief that ultimately only one point of view on practical problems is correct—implications thereof for “professorial prophets”—what the student should obtain today from the university
• P. 6, “Cult of personality” and pseudo ethical neutrality rejected
• P. 6-8, Difficulties in idea that university should be a forum for discussion of value problems from all standpoints
• P. 9-10, The difficulties involved in respecting the distinction between empirical statements of fact and “value-judgments”—dangers of pseudo-ethical neutrality—illusion of scientific warrant for truth of via media
• P. 10-12, The mistaken objections to the distinction between empirical statements of fact and “value-judgments”—the real issue concerns the separation of the investigator’s own practical valuations from the establishment of empirical facts—ambiguities of taking goals as facts
• P. 12-13, Historical and individual variations in evaluations does not prove the necessary subjectivity of ethics—deceptive self-evidence of widely accepted “value-judgments”—science as a critic of self-evidence—realistic “science of ethics” cannot determine what should happen
• P. 14, Empirical-psychological and genetic analysis of evaluations leads only to “understanding explanation,” but it is not negligible—its definite use in regard to causal analysis and clarification
• P. 16, Schmoller wrong in contention that ethical neutrality implies acknowledgment of only formal ethical rules—ethical imperatives not identical with cultural values—normative ethics per se cannot offer unambiguous directives for the solution of certain social-political problems—example of indeterminate implications of postulate of justice—specific ethical problems, personal and social, which ethics cannot settle by itself
• P. 16-18, So-called strictly “formal” ethical maxims do have substantive meaning—an illustration—both empirical and non-empirical value-analysis of the illustration inadequate to solve the crucial issue involved— human life a series of ultimate decisions by which the soul “chooses its own fate”
• P. 18-9, Three things can be contributed by an empirical discipline to the solution of policy issues—what it cannot supply—the distinction between normative and scientific problems stated in terms of a series of contrasted questions
• P. 20-1, Three functions of the discussion of “value-judgments”—such discussion is emphatically not meaningless
• P. 21-2, Selection of problems in social science a matter of value-relevance—cultural interests and direction of scientific work—the evaluative interests giving direction to scientific work can be clarified and differentiated by analysis of “value-judgments”—distinction between evaluation and value-interpretation
• P. 22-5, “Value-judgments” cannot be derived from factual trends—illustration of the syndicalist—ethical and political limitations of policy of “adaptation to the possible”
• P. 25-6, Two meanings of “adaptation”—dispensibility of the term when it is used evaluatively and not in its biological meaning
• P. 26-27, Conflict in social life cannot be excluded— its forms may vary—meaning of “peace”—evaluation of any type of social order must be preceded by empirical study of its modes of social selection, but the evaluation is distinct from the study
• P. 27-8, The problem of the meaning of “progress”—whether mental and psychological “progressive differentiation” is progress in sense of “inner richness” not scientifically deter-minable—however the cost of such “progress” can be studied empirically—P. 28-30, Applicability of “progress” in the empirical history of art—in this use the concept of “progress” means “rational,” “technical” progress—illustration of Gothic architecture
• P. 31-2, Another illustration from the historic development of music in Europe
• P. 32, Technical progress in art does not necessarily imply aesthetic improvement, although changes in technique are causally speaking, the most important factors in the development of art
• P. 32-3, Historians are apt to confuse causal analysis and “value-judgments”—causal analysis, aesthetic valuation and value interpretation are all distinct procedures
• P. 33-5, The meaning of “rational progress”—three senses thereof which are generally confused—distinction between subjectively “rational” action and rationally “correct” action—where technical progress exists—conditions for legitimate use of term “economic progress”
• P. 36-7, An illustration of debatable presuppositions of an action claimed to be “objectively evaluated” as “economically correct”
• P. 37-8, Meaning of technical evaluations of pure economics—they are unambiguous only when economic and social context are given—when technical evaluations are made this does not settle questions of ultimate evaluations
• P. 39-40, The normative validity of objects of empirical investigation is disregarded during the empirical investigation—example from mathematics—but this disregard does not affect the normative validity of normatively valid truths as an a priori basis of all empirical science—and yet “understanding” of human conduct is not in terms of that which is normatively correct as an a priori condition of all scientific investigations—the “understanding” knowledge of human conduct and culture involves conventional rather than normative validity
• P. 41-2, The truth value of ideas is the guiding value in the writing of intellectual history—an illustration from military history of the possible study of causal effects of erroneous thoughts and calculation—ideal types even of incorrect and self-defeating thought necessary for the determining of causation of empirical events
• P. 43, The normative correctness of the ideal type not necessary for its use—the function of ideal-types vis-à-vis empirical reality
• P. 43-6, Nature of pure economic theory—its ideal-typical character—it is apolitical, asserts no moral evaluations but is indispensible for analysis—critique of theses of opponents of pure economics—relationship of mean-end propositions to cause-effect propositions which economic science can supply—other problems of economics
• P. 46, Factual importance of the state in the modern social scene does not establish the state as an ultimate value—the view that the state is a means to value is defensible.

II. "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy

• P. 49, Introductory note on the responsibility for and content of the essay
• P. 50-1, Problem of relationship of practical social criticism to scientific social research
• P. 51-2, Points of view hampering logical formulation of difference between “existential” and “normative” knowledge in social-economic science
• P. 52, Rejection of view that empirical science provides norms and ideals—however, criticism vis-à-vis “value-judgments” is not to be suspended
• P. 52-3, Appropriateness of means to, and chance of achieving, a given end are accessible to scientific analysis
• P. 53, Scientific analysis can predict “costs” of unintended or incidental consequences of action
• P. 53-4, Scientific treatment of “value-judgment” can reveal “ideas” and ideals underlying concrete ends
• P. 55, The judgment of the validity of values is a matter for faith or possibly for speculative philosophy, but not within province of empirical science—the distinction between empirical and normative not obliterated by the fact of cultural change
• P. 55-7, Illusory self-evidence of consensus on certain goals—problems of social policy are not merely technical—naive belief in the scientific deducibility of normatively desirable cultural values—cultural values are ethical imperatives only for dogmatically bound religious sects
• P. 57-8, The via media of the practical politician or syncretic relativism is not warranted as correct by science
• P. 58, The inexpugnable difference between arguments appealing to (I) enthusiasm and feeling (2) ethical conscience (3) capacity as a scientific knower
• P. 58-9, Scientifically valid social science analysis can strive for supra-cultural validity
• P. 59-60, Reasons for expressing “value-judgments” if they are clearly formulated as such and distinguished from scientific statements
• P. 61-2, The recognition of social problems is value-oriented— character of the Archiv in the past, in the future
• P. 63, What is the meaning of objectively valid truth in the social sciences
• P. 63-4, Scarcity of means is the basic characteristic of socio-economic subject matter—what a social science problem is
• P. 64-6, Distinction between “economic,” “economically relevant” and “economically conditioned” phenomena
• P. 66, Condition for the existence of social-economic problems—extent of the range of social-economics
• P. 66-7, Past concerns and central present aim of the Archiv
• P. 67, Study of society from the economic point of view “one-sided” but intentionally so—the “social” as subject of study needs specification
• P. 6871, Cultural phenomena not deducible from material interests—difference between crude monistic materialistic conception of history and useful critical use of the economic point of view—analogous dogmatic excesses on the part of other sciences
• P. 72, “Onesided” viewpoints necessary to realize cognitive goal of empirical social science inquiring into selected segments of concrete reality
• P. 72-3, Criteria of historian’s selection not solely from requirements of discovery of laws or ultimate psychological factors—these are at most preliminary to the desired type of knowledge—characterization of the latter
• P. 75-6, Four tasks of the desired type of social science knowledge
• P. 76, The decisive feature of the method of the cultural sciences—the significance of cultural configurations rooted in value-conditioned interest
• P. 77, Two types of analysis are logically distinct, in terms of laws and general concepts and in terms of value-rooted meaning—analysis of generic general features of phenomena a preliminary task to analysis of cultural significance of concrete historical fact
• P. 78-9, The “historical” is “the significant in its individuality”—impossibility of causal analysis of culture without selection of “essential” features—in the study of “historical individuals” it is a question of concrete causal relationships, not laws
• P. 80, But causal imputation of concrete causal effects to concrete cultural causes presupposes knowledge of recurrent causal sequences, i.e. of “adequate” causes—meaning thereof—certainty of imputation a function of comprehensiveness of general knowledge—why it is a meaningless ideal for social science to seek the reduction of empirical reality to laws
• P. 81, Non-equivalence of cultural significance with positive cultural value
• P. 82, Why the view persists that evaluative ideas are derivable from the “facts themselves”—the personal element in research
• P. 82, The necessity of “subjective” evaluative ideas does not mean causal knowledge is absent in cultural science—nor can causal knowledge be supplanted by “teleology”
• P. 83-4, Evaluative ideas are “subjective,” but the results of research are not subjective in the sense of being valid for one person and not for others
• P. 84-5, Meaninglessness of the idea of a closed system of concepts from which reality is deducible—shifts and movements in cultural problems
• P. 85, A basic question, the role of theory in the knowledge of cultural reality
• P. 85, Effect of natural law, rationalistic Weltanschauung, natural-science conceptualization on practical “arts” and on economics—seeming triumph of law-oriented analysis in historical study under the influence of evolutionary biology—the present confused situation and its origin
• P. 87-88, Meaning and contentions of “abstract” theoretical method in economics—fruitlessness of debate concerning these contentions—social institutions not deducible from psychological laws
• P. 89-90, A kind of concept construction peculiar to and, to a certain extent, indispensible to the cultural sciences—an illustration
• P. 90, The ideal-typical concept distinguished from an hypothesis, a description,an average—it is useful for both heuristic and expository purposes
• P. 90-1, Illustrations
• P. 91-2, “Ideal” in logical sense to be distinguished from “ideal in ethical sense
• P. 92-3, The sole criterion justifying the use of the ideal type—illustrations of idea-type concepts—they are not to be found according to a scheme of genus proximum, differentia specified—characteristics of ideal-type concepts—their relationship to category of objective possibility
• P. 93-4, Elaboration of ideal-type concepts of “church” and “sect”—cultural significance and ideal-type concepts
• P. 94-6, Three naturalistic misconceptions concerning ideal-typical concepts—the ideal-typical concept of an epoch’s features and the ideas actually governing men—the latter is indeed itself to be clearly formulated only in an ideal-type—an illustration
• P. 96-7, Varying relationship between ideal-type of ideas of an epoch and empirical reality
• P. 98, Ideal-types often used not in a logical but in an evaluative sense—an illustration—these senses frequently confused in historical writing
• P. 99, Ideal typical concept of the state discussed
• P. 100-1, The ideal-typical concept in its relationship to class, generic or average concepts
• P. 101-3, Distinction between history and ideal-typical constructs of developmental sequences—why it is difficult to maintain this distinction
• P. 103, Marxian “laws” are ideal-typical
• P. 103, A list of mental and conceptual constructs indicating ramifications of methodological problems in the cultural sciences
• P. 104-5, Sense in which maturing social science transcends its ideal-types—the tension between the possibility of new knowledge and old integrations the source of progress in the cultural sciences
• P. 105, interdependence of concept construction, problem setting and content of culture
• P. 106, Incompatibility of goal of social sciences as viewed by the Historical School and modern, Kantian theory of knowledge—the function of concepts is not the reproduction of reality
• P. 107-110, Dangers of neglect of clear cut concept construction—two illustrations
• P. 110-11, Recapitulation of the argument
• P. 112, “Subject matter specialists,” “interpretive specialists,” their excesses—genuine artistry of the research which avoids these excesses—and yet change of evaluative viewpoint occurs even in an age of necessary speculation.

III. Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences

I. A critique of Eduard Meyer's methodological views

• P. 113-4, Value of Meyer’s book as a focus of discussion
• P. 115-6, The role of methodology in the advance of science—methodological interest of present situation in history
• P. 116-7, List of theses concerning history attacked by Meyer
• P. 117-9, Meyer’s analysis of “chance” and its relationship to “free will”
• P. 119, Meyer on “freedom” and “Necessity”
• P. 119, Examination of Meyer’s conception of “free will”—his tendency to fuse ethical and causal analysis
• P. 122-4, Meyer’s error in blurring the distinction between historical knowledge and ethics, and in equating freedom with irrationality of action
• P. 124-5, Rationality and freedom
• P. 126-7, Contradictions in Meyer’s conception of historical causality—Meyer’s discussion of “freedom” and “necessity” in their relation to “general,” “particular,” “individual,” “collectivity”—confusion therein
• P. 129-30, What is historically significant cannot be reached by subtracting the common from unique traits
• P. 130-1, Meyer’s right instinct but poor formulation concerning the role of the general, i.e. rules and concepts in history—the logical problems of the ordering of historical phenomena by concepts—the meaning of the category of possibility
• P. 131-2, Meyer’s definition of “historical”—what determines the historian’s selection of events
• P. 132-3, Instances of confusion of ratio essendi with ratio cognoscendi in historical study P. 134-6, Two distinct logical uses of data of cultural reality—illustrations
• P. 136, Meyer’s confusion of heuristic device with fact—his narrow view of the interest governing the historian’s selection
• P. 137-8, What is the meaning of the effectiveness of cultures or their components
• P. 138-42, Meaning of the “significant” and its relationship to historical effectiveness— the illustration of Goethe’s letters
• P. 143, A type of significance which is neither heuristic nor causal—the object of interpretation—two kinds of interpretation
• P. 143-5, Meaning of “value-interpretation—its distinction from linguistic-textual analysis— which “value-interpretations” can claim to be scientifi c
• P. 145-7, How value interpretation is dealt with by Heyer
• P. 147-9, The relationship of facts of value analysis to facts of history—analysis of illustrative cases—Goethe’s letters and Marx’s Kapital—relevance of historical facts for value-interpretations
• P. 149-152, Nature of value analysis
• P. 152-6, Difficulties in Meyer’s discussion of the historical interest governing historian’s selection —role of the contemporaneity of the interest—confusion of historical individual and historical cause
• P. 156-8, Historical interest determined by values, not by objective causal relationships—confusion of “valuable” with “causally important”
• P. 158, Why the present is no subject matter for history
• P. 158160, Summary statement on Meyer’s inadequate equating of “effective” with “historical”—summary on meaning of interpretation
• P. 160, Relationships between the philosophy of history, value-analysis and historical work
• P. 161, Why historians are often not aware of the value-analysis implicit in their work—Meyer’s correct recognition of the difference between historical work and value-interpretation—problem of meaning of “systematics” in historical, cultural science
• P. 161-3, An illustration—three value oriented points of view from which the classical culture of antiquity can be treated.

II. Objective possibility and adequate causation in historical explanation

• P. 164-66, No idle question for history to inquire into what consequences were to be expected if certain conditions had been other than they were—importance of such questions in determining historical significance
• P. 166-9, Sources for theory of “objective” possibility—origins in juristic theory—history does not share jurisprudence’s ethical interest in the theory
• P. 169, Causal historical explanation deals with selected aspects of events having significance from general standpoints
• P. 171, A sufficient condition establishing causal irrelevance of given circumstances for an individual effect
• P. 171-2, Account, with an illustration, of logical operations which establish historical causal relations
• P. 172-3, Historians ought not to be reluctant to admit objective possibility
• P. 173-4, Isolations and generalizations required to secure “judgment of possibility”—category of objective possibility not an expression of ignorance or incomplete knowledge—such judgments presuppose known empirical rules—instance of the Battle of the Marathon
• P. 175, Meaning of “adequate causes”
• P. 175, The simplest historical judgment is not simple registration of something found and finished, rather does it presuppose the use of a forming category and a whole body of empirical knowledge
• P. 175-77, Psychological processes of historical discovery not to be confused with its logical structure
• P. 177-80, The causal analysis of personal actions must also distinguish between categorically formed constructs and immediate experience
• P. 180, Recognition of possibility in causal inquiry does not imply arbitrary historiography, for category of objective possibility enables the assessment of the causal significance of a historical fact
• P. 181, The certainty of judgments of objective possibility may vary in degree—objective historical possibility is an analogue, with important differences, of the kind of probability that is determined from observed frequencies
• P. 184-5, Definition of “adequate causation”—application to Battle of Marathon, the March Revolution, the unification of Germany—reiteration of constructive nature of historian’s conceptualization
• P. 186-7, Binding’s “anthropomorphic” misunderstanding of objective possibility—real meaning of “favoring” and “obstructing” conditions—the special character of causality when adequacy of causation is concerned needs further study.