SIXTH JOINT DEBATE,

AT QUINCY, OCTOBER 13, 1858.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have had no immediate conference with Judge

Douglas, but I will venture to say that he and I will perfectly agree

that your entire silence, both when I speak and when he speaks, will

be most agreeable to us.

In the month of May, 1856, the elements in the State of Illinois

which have since been consolidated into the Republican party

assembled together in a State Convention at Bloomington. They

adopted at that time what, in political language, is called a

platform. In June of the same year the elements of the Republican

party in the nation assembled together in a National Convention at

Philadelphia. They adopted what is called the National Platform. In

June, 1858,--the present year,--the Republicans of Illinois

reassembled at Springfield, in State Convention, and adopted again

their platform, as I suppose not differing in any essential

particular from either of the former ones, but perhaps adding

something in relation to the new developments of political progress

in the country.

The Convention that assembled in June last did me the honor, if it be

one, and I esteem it such, to nominate me as their candidate for the

United States Senate. I have supposed that, in entering upon this

canvass, I stood generally upon these platforms. We are now met

together on the 13th of October of the same year, only four months

from the adoption of the last platform, and I am unaware that in this

canvass, from the beginning until to-day, any one of our adversaries

has taken hold of our platforms, or laid his finger upon anything

that he calls wrong in them.

In the very first one of these joint discussions between Senator

Douglas and myself, Senator Douglas, without alluding at all to these

platforms, or any one of them, of which I have spoken, attempted to

hold me responsible for a set of resolutions passed long before the

meeting of either one of these conventions of which I have spoken.

And as a ground for holding me responsible for these resolutions, he

assumed that they had been passed at a State Convention of the

Republican party, and that I took part in that Convention. It was

discovered afterward that this was erroneous, that the resolutions

which he endeavored to hold me responsible for had not been passed by

any State Convention anywhere, had not been passed at Springfield,

where he supposed they had, or assumed that they had, and that they

had been passed in no convention in which I had taken part. The

Judge, nevertheless, was not willing to give up the point that he was

endeavoring to make upon me, and he therefore thought to still hold

me to the point that he was endeavoring to make, by showing that the

resolutions that he read had been passed at a local convention in the

northern part of the State, although it was not a local convention

that embraced my residence at all, nor one that reached, as I

suppose, nearer than one hundred and fifty or two hundred miles of

where I was when it met, nor one in which I took any part at all. He

also introduced other resolutions, passed at other meetings, and by

combining the whole, although they were all antecedent to the two

State Conventions and the one National Convention I have mentioned,

still he insisted, and now insists, as I understand, that I am in

some way responsible for them.

At Jonesboro, on our third meeting, I insisted to the Judge that I

was in no way rightfully held responsible for the proceedings of this

local meeting or convention, in which I had taken no part, and in

which I was in no way embraced; but I insisted to him that if he

thought I was responsible for every man or every set of men

everywhere, who happen to be my friends, the rule ought to work both

ways, and he ought to be responsible for the acts and resolutions of

all men or sets of men who were or are now his supporters and

friends, and gave him a pretty long string of resolutions, passed by

men who are now his friends, and announcing doctrines for which he

does not desire to be held responsible.

This still does not satisfy Judge Douglas. He still adheres to his

proposition, that I am responsible for what some of my friends in

different parts of the State have done, but that he is not

responsible for what his have done. At least, so I understand him.

But in addition to that, the Judge, at our meeting in Galesburgh,

last week, undertakes to establish that I am guilty of a species of

double dealing with the public; that I make speeches of a certain

sort in the north, among the Abolitionists, which I would not make in

the south, and that I make speeches of a certain sort in the south

which I would not make in the north. I apprehend, in the course I

have marked out for myself, that I shall not have to dwell at very

great length upon this subject.

As this was done in the Judge's opening speech at Galesburgh, I had

an opportunity, as I had the middle speech then, of saying something

in answer to it. He brought forward a quotation or two from a speech

of mine delivered at Chicago, and then, to contrast with it, he

brought forward an extract from a speech of mine at Charleston, in

which he insisted that I was greatly inconsistent, and insisted that

his conclusion followed, that I was playing a double part, and

speaking in one region one way, and in another region another way. I

have not time now to dwell on this as long as I would like, and wish

only now to requote that portion of my speech at Charleston which the

Judge quoted, and then make some comments upon it. This he quotes

from me as being delivered at Charleston, and I believe correctly:

"I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of

bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the

white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of

making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold

office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say, in

addition to this, that there is a physical difference between the

white and black races which will forever forbid the two races living

together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as

they cannot so live while they do remain together, there must be the

position of superior and inferior. I am as much as any other man in

favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."

This, I believe, is the entire quotation from Charleston speech, as

Judge Douglas made it his comments are as follows:

"Yes, here you find men who hurrah for Lincoln, and say he is right

when he discards all distinction between races, or when he declares

that he discards the doctrine that there is such a thing as a

superior and inferior race; and Abolitionists are required and

expected to vote for Mr. Lincoln because he goes for the equality of

races, holding that in the Declaration of Independence the white man

and negro were declared equal, and endowed by divine law with

equality. And down South, with the old-line Whigs, with the

Kentuckians, the Virginians and the Tennesseeans, he tells you that

there is a physical difference between the races, making the one

superior, the other inferior, and he is in favor of maintaining the

superiority of the white race over the negro."

Those are the Judges comments. Now, I wish to show you that a month,

or only lacking three days of a month, before I made the speech at

Charleston, which the Judge quotes from, he had himself heard me say

substantially the same thing It was in our first meeting, at Ottawa-

-and I will say a word about where it was, and the atmosphere it was

in, after a while--but at our first meeting, at Ottawa, I read an

extract from an old speech of mine, made nearly four years ago, not

merely to show my sentiments, but to show that my sentiments were

long entertained and openly expressed; in which extract I expressly

declared that my own feelings would not admit a social and political

equality between the white and black races, and that even if my own

feelings would admit of it, I still knew that the public sentiment of

the country would not, and that such a thing was an utter

impossibility, or substantially that. That extract from my old

speech the reporters by some sort of accident passed over, and it was

not reported. I lay no blame upon anybody. I suppose they thought

that I would hand it over to them, and dropped reporting while I was

giving it, but afterward went away without getting it from me. At

the end of that quotation from my old speech, which I read at Ottawa,

I made the comments which were reported at that time, and which I

will now read, and ask you to notice how very nearly they are the

same as Judge Douglas says were delivered by me down in Egypt. After

reading, I added these words:

"Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any great length; but this

is the true complexion of all I have ever said in regard to the

institution of slavery or the black race, and this is the whole of

it: anything that argues me into his idea of perfect social and

political equality with the negro, is but a specious and fantastical

arrangement of words by which a man can prove a horse-chestnut to be

a chestnut horse. I will say here, while upon this subject, that I

have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the

institution in the States where it exists. I believe I have no right

to do so. I have no inclination to do so. I have no purpose to

introduce political and social equality between the white and black

races. There is a physical difference between the two which, in my

judgment, will probably forever forbid their living together on the

footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity

that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in

favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I

have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that,

notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the

negro is not entitled to all the rights enumerated in the Declaration

of Independence,--the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white

man. I agree with Judge Douglas that he is not my equal in many

respects, certainly not in color, perhaps not in intellectual and

moral endowments; but in the right to eat the bread, without the

leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and

the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every other man."

I have chiefly introduced this for the purpose of meeting the Judge's

charge that the quotation he took from my Charleston speech was what

I would say down South among the Kentuckians, the Virginians, etc.,

but would not say in the regions in which was supposed to be more of

the Abolition element. I now make this comment: That speech from

which I have now read the quotation, and which is there given

correctly--perhaps too much so for good taste--was made away up North

in the Abolition District of this State par excellence, in the

Lovejoy District, in the personal presence of Lovejoy, for he was on

the stand with us when I made it. It had been made and put in print

in that region only three days less than a month before the speech

made at Charleston, the like of which Judge Douglas thinks I would

not make where there was any Abolition element. I only refer to this

matter to say that I am altogether unconscious of having attempted

any double-dealing anywhere; that upon one occasion I may say one

thing, and leave other things unsaid, and vice versa, but that I have

said anything on one occasion that is inconsistent with what I have

said elsewhere, I deny, at least I deny it so far as the intention is

concerned. I find that I have devoted to this topic a larger portion

of my time than I had intended. I wished to show, but I will pass it

upon this occasion, that in the sentiment I have occasionally

advanced upon the Declaration of Independence I am entirely borne out

by the sentiments advanced by our old Whig leader, Henry Clay, and I

have the book here to show it from but because I have already

occupied more time than I intended to do on that topic, I pass over

it.

At Galesburgh, I tried to show that by the Dred Scott decision,

pushed to its legitimate consequences, slavery would be established

in all the States as well as in the Territories. I did this because,

upon a former occasion, I had asked Judge Douglas whether, if the

Supreme Court should make a decision declaring that the States had

not the power to exclude slavery from their limits, he would adopt

and follow that decision as a rule of political action; and because

he had not directly answered that question, but had merely contented

himself with sneering at it, I again introduced it, and tried to show

that the conclusion that I stated followed inevitably and logically

from the proposition already decided by the court. Judge Douglas had

the privilege of replying to me at Galesburgh, and again he gave me

no direct answer as to whether he would or would not sustain such a

decision if made. I give him his third chance to say yes or no. He

is not obliged to do either, probably he will not do either; but I

give him the third chance. I tried to show then that this result,

this conclusion, inevitably followed from the point already decided

by the court. The Judge, in his reply, again sneers at the thought

of the court making any such decision, and in the course of his

remarks upon this subject uses the language which I will now read.

Speaking of me, the Judge says:

"He goes on and insists that the Dred Scott decision would carry

slavery into the free States, notwithstanding the decision itself

says the contrary." And he adds:

"Mr. Lincoln knows that there is no member of the Supreme Court that

holds that doctrine. He knows that every one of them in their

opinions held the reverse."

I especially introduce this subject again for the purpose of saying

that I have the Dred Scott decision here, and I will thank Judge

Douglas to lay his finger upon the place in the entire opinions of

the court where any one of them "says the contrary." It is very hard

to affirm a negative with entire confidence. I say, however, that I

have examined that decision with a good deal of care, as a lawyer

examines a decision and, so far as I have been able to do so, the

court has nowhere in its opinions said that the States have the power

to exclude slavery, nor have they used other language substantially

that, I also say, so far as I can find, not one of the concurring

judges has said that the States can exclude slavery, nor said

anything that was substantially that. The nearest approach that any

one of them has made to it, so far as I can find, was by Judge

Nelson, and the approach he made to it was exactly, in substance, the

Nebraska Bill,--that the States had the exclusive power over the

question of slavery, so far as they are not limited by the

Constitution of the United States. I asked the question, therefore,

if the non-concurring judges, McLean or Curtis, had asked to get an

express declaration that the States could absolutely exclude slavery

from their limits, what reason have we to believe that it would not

have been voted down by the majority of the judges, just as Chase's

amendment was voted down by Judge Douglas and his compeers when it

was offered to the Nebraska Bill.

Also, at Galesburgh, I said something in regard to those Springfield

resolutions that Judge Douglas had attempted to use upon me at

Ottawa, and commented at some length upon the fact that they were, as

presented, not genuine. Judge Douglas in his reply to me seemed to

be somewhat exasperated. He said he would never have believed that

Abraham Lincoln, as he kindly called me, would have attempted such a

thing as I had attempted upon that occasion; and among other

expressions which he used toward me, was that I dared to say forgery,

that I had dared to say forgery [turning to Judge Douglas]. Yes,

Judge, I did dare to say forgery. But in this political canvass the

Judge ought to remember that I was not the first who dared to say

forgery. At Jacksonville, Judge Douglas made a speech in answer to

something said by Judge Trumbull, and at the close of what he said

upon that subject, he dared to say that Trumbull had forged his

evidence. He said, too, that he should not concern himself with

Trumbull any more, but thereafter he should hold Lincoln responsible

for the slanders upon him. When I met him at Charleston after that,

although I think that I should not have noticed the subject if he had

not said he would hold me responsible for it, I spread out before him

the statements of the evidence that Judge Trumbull had used, and I

asked Judge Douglas, piece by piece, to put his finger upon one piece

of all that evidence that he would say was a forgery! When I went

through with each and every piece, Judge Douglas did not dare then to

say that any piece of it was a forgery. So it seems that there are

some things that Judge Douglas dares to do, and some that he dares

not to do.

[A voice: It is the same thing with you.]

Yes, sir, it is the same thing with me. I do dare to say forgery

when it is true, and don't dare to say forgery when it is false. Now

I will say here to this audience and to Judge Douglas I have not

dared to say he committed a forgery, and I never shall until I know

it; but I did dare to say--just to suggest to the Judge--that a

forgery had been committed, which by his own showing had been traced

to him and two of his friends. I dared to suggest to him that he had

expressly promised in one of his public speeches to investigate that

matter, and I dared to suggest to him that there was an implied

promise that when he investigated it he would make known the result.

I dared to suggest to the Judge that he could not expect to be quite

clear of suspicion of that fraud, for since the time that promise was

made he had been with those friends, and had not kept his promise in

regard to the investigation and the report upon it. I am not a very

daring man, but I dared that much, Judge, and I am not much scared

about it yet. When the Judge says he would n't have believed of

Abraham Lincoln that he would have made such an attempt as that he

reminds me of the fact that he entered upon this canvass with the

purpose to treat me courteously; that touched me somewhat. It sets

me to thinking. I was aware, when it was first agreed that Judge

Douglas and I were to have these seven joint discussions, that they

were the successive acts of a drama, perhaps I should say, to be

enacted, not merely in the face of audiences like this, but in the

face of the nation, and to some extent, by my relation to him, and

not from anything in myself, in the face of the world; and I am

anxious that they should be conducted with dignity and in the good

temper which would be befitting the vast audiences before which it

was conducted. But when Judge Douglas got home from Washington and

made his first speech in Chicago, the evening afterward I made some

sort of a reply to it. His second speech was made at Bloomington, in

which he commented upon my speech at Chicago and said that I had used

language ingeniously contrived to conceal my intentions, or words to

that effect. Now, I understand that this is an imputation upon my

veracity and my candor. I do not know what the Judge understood by

it, but in our first discussion, at Ottawa, he led off by charging a

bargain, somewhat corrupt in its character, upon Trumbull and

myself,--that we had entered into a bargain, one of the terms of

which was that Trumbull was to Abolitionize the old Democratic party,

and I (Lincoln) was to Abolitionize the old Whig party; I pretending

to be as good an old-line Whig as ever. Judge Douglas may not

understand that he implicated my truthfulness and my honor when he

said I was doing one thing and pretending another; and I

misunderstood him if he thought he was treating me in a dignified

way, as a man of honor and truth, as he now claims he was disposed to

treat me. Even after that time, at Galesburgh, when he brings

forward an extract from a speech made at Chicago and an extract from

a speech made at Charleston, to prove that I was trying to play a

double part, that I was trying to cheat the public, and get votes

upon one set of principles at one place, and upon another set of

principles at another place,--I do not understand but what he

impeaches my honor, my veracity, and my candor; and because he does

this, I do not understand that I am bound, if I see a truthful ground

for it, to keep my hands off of him. As soon as I learned that Judge

Douglas was disposed to treat me in this way, I signified in one of

my speeches that I should be driven to draw upon whatever of humble

resources I might have,--to adopt a new course with him. I was not

entirely sure that I should be able to hold my own with him, but I at

least had the purpose made to do as well as I could upon him; and now

I say that I will not be the first to cry "Hold." I think it

originated with the Judge, and when he quits, I probably will. But I

shall not ask any favors at all. He asks me, or he asks the

audience, if I wish to push this matter to the point of personal

difficulty. I tell him, no. He did not make a mistake, in one of

his early speeches, when he called me an "amiable" man, though

perhaps he did when he called me an "intelligent" man. It really

hurts me very much to suppose that I have wronged anybody on earth.

I again tell him, no! I very much prefer, when this canvass shall be

over, however it may result, that we at least part without any bitter

recollections of personal difficulties.

The Judge, in his concluding speech at Galesburgh, says that I was

pushing this matter to a personal difficulty, to avoid the

responsibility for the enormity of my principles. I say to the Judge

and this audience, now, that I will again state our principles, as

well as I hastily can, in all their enormity, and if the Judge

hereafter chooses to confine himself to a war upon these principles,

he will probably not find me departing from the same course.

We have in this nation this element of domestic slavery. It is a

matter of absolute certainty that it is a disturbing element. It is

the opinion of all the great men who have expressed an opinion upon

it, that it is a dangerous element. We keep up a controversy in

regard to it. That controversy necessarily springs from difference

of opinion; and if we can learn exactly--can reduce to the lowest

elements--what that difference of opinion is, we perhaps shall be

better prepared for discussing the different systems of policy that

we would propose in regard to that disturbing element. I suggest

that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest of terms, is no

other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong

and those who do not think it wrong. The Republican party think it

wrong; we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong. We

think it as a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the

States where it exists, but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to

say the least, that extends itself to the existence of the whole

nation. Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy

that shall deal with it as a wrong. We deal with it as with any

other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and

so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of

an end to it. We have a due regard to the actual presence of it

amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any

satisfactory way, and all the constitutional obligations thrown about

it. I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in the

nation, and to our constitutional obligations, we have no right at

all to disturb it in the States where it exists, and we profess that

we have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to

do it. We go further than that: we don't propose to disturb it

where, in one instance, we think the Constitution would permit us.

We think the Constitution would permit us to disturb it in the

District of Columbia. Still, we do not propose to do that, unless it

should be in terms which I don't suppose the nation is very likely

soon to agree to,--the terms of making the emancipation gradual, and

compensating the unwilling owners. Where we suppose we have the

constitutional right, we restrain ourselves in reference to the

actual existence of the institution and the difficulties thrown about

it. We also oppose it as an evil so far as it seeks to spread

itself. We insist on the policy that shall restrict it to its

present limits. We don't suppose that in doing this we violate

anything due to the actual presence of the institution, or anything

due to the constitutional guaranties thrown around it.

We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I

ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that

when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a

mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any

other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be

slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property

thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a

political rule which shall be binding on the voter to vote for nobody

who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of

Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually

concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be

bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays

the foundation, not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we

consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil

into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it

reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this

subject.

I will add this: that if there be any man who does not believe that

slavery is wrong in the three aspects which I have mentioned, or in

any one of them, that man is misplaced, and ought to leave us; while

on the other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is

impatient over the necessity springing from its actual presence, and

is impatient of the constitutional guaranties thrown around it, and

would act in disregard of these, he too is misplaced, standing with

us. He will find his place somewhere else; for we have a due regard,

so far as we are capable of understanding them, for all these things.

This, gentlemen, as well as I can give it, is a plain statement of

our principles in all their enormity.

I will say now that there is a sentiment in the country contrary to

me,--a sentiment which holds that slavery is not wrong, and therefore

it goes for the policy that does not propose dealing with it as a

wrong. That policy is the Democratic policy, and that sentiment is

the Democratic sentiment. If there be a doubt in the mind of any one

of this vast audience that this is really the central idea of the

Democratic party in relation to this subject, I ask him to bear with

me while I state a few things tending, as I think, to prove that

proposition. In the first place, the leading man--I think I may do

my friend Judge Douglas the honor of calling him such advocating the

present Democratic policy never himself says it is wrong. He has the

high distinction, so far as I know, of never having said slavery is

either right or wrong. Almost everybody else says one or the other,

but the Judge never does. If there be a man in the Democratic party

who thinks it is wrong, and yet clings to that party, I suggest to

him, in the first place, that his leader don't talk as he does, for

he never says that it is wrong. In the second place, I suggest to

him that if he will examine the policy proposed to be carried

forward, he will find that he carefully excludes the idea that there

is anything wrong in it. If you will examine the arguments that are

made on it, you will find that every one carefully excludes the idea

that there is anything wrong in slavery. Perhaps that Democrat who

says he is as much opposed to slavery as I am will tell me that I am

wrong about this. I wish him to examine his own course in regard to

this matter a moment, and then see if his opinion will not be changed

a little. You say it is wrong; but don't you constantly object to

anybody else saying so? Do you not constantly argue that this is not

the right place to oppose it? You say it must not be opposed in the

free States, because slavery is not here; it must not be opposed in

the slave States, because it is there; it must not be opposed in

politics, because that will make a fuss; it must not be opposed in

the pulpit, because it is not religion. Then where is the place to

oppose it? There is no suitable place to oppose it. There is no

place in the country to oppose this evil overspreading the continent,

which you say yourself is coming. Frank Blair and Gratz Brown tried

to get up a system of gradual emancipation in Missouri, had an

election in August, and got beat, and you, Mr. Democrat, threw up

your hat, and hallooed "Hurrah for Democracy!" So I say, again, that

in regard to the arguments that are made, when Judge Douglas Says he

"don't care whether slavery is voted up or voted down," whether he

means that as an individual expression of sentiment, or only as a

sort of statement of his views on national policy, it is alike true

to say that he can thus argue logically if he don't see anything

wrong in it; but he cannot say so logically if he admits that slavery

is wrong. He cannot say that he would as soon see a wrong voted up

as voted down. When Judge Douglas says that whoever or whatever

community wants slaves, they have a right to have them, he is

perfectly logical, if there is nothing wrong in the institution; but

if you admit that it is wrong, he cannot logically say that anybody

has a right to do wrong. When he says that slave property and horse

and hog property are alike to be allowed to go into the Territories,

upon the principles of equality, he is reasoning truly, if there is

no difference between them as property; but if the one is property

held rightfully, and the other is wrong, then there is no equality

between the right and wrong; so that, turn it in anyway you can, in

all the arguments sustaining the Democratic policy, and in that

policy itself, there is a careful, studied exclusion of the idea that

there is anything wrong in slavery. Let us understand this. I am

not, just here, trying to prove that we are right, and they are

wrong. I have been stating where we and they stand, and trying to

show what is the real difference between us; and I now say that

whenever we can get the question distinctly stated, can get all these

men who believe that slavery is in some of these respects wrong to

stand and act with us in treating it as a wrong,--then, and not till

then, I think we will in some way come to an end of this slavery

agitation.

Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

MY FRIENDS:--Since Judge Douglas has said to you in his conclusion

that he had not time in an hour and a half to answer all I had said

in an hour, it follows of course that I will not be able to answer in

half an hour all that he said in an hour and a half.

I wish to return to Judge Douglas my profound thanks for his public

annunciation here to-day, to be put on record, that his system of

policy in regard to the institution of slavery contemplates that it

shall last forever. We are getting a little nearer the true issue of

this controversy, and I am profoundly grateful for this one sentence.

Judge Douglas asks you, Why cannot the institution of slavery, or

rather, why cannot the nation, part slave and part free, continue as

our fathers made it, forever? In the first place, I insist that our

fathers did not make this nation half slave and half free, or part

slave and part free. I insist that they found the institution of

slavery existing here. They did not make it so but they left it so

because they knew of no way to get rid of it at that time. When

Judge Douglas undertakes to say that, as a matter of choice, the

fathers of the government made this nation part slave and part free,

he assumes what is historically a falsehood. More than that: when

the fathers of the government cut off the source of slavery by the

abolition of the slave-trade, and adopted a system of restricting it

from the new Territories where it had not existed, I maintain that

they placed it where they understood, and all sensible men

understood, it was in the course of ultimate extinction; and when

Judge Douglas asks me why it cannot continue as our fathers made it,

I ask him why he and his friends could not let it remain as our

fathers made it?

It is precisely all I ask of him in relation to the institution of

slavery, that it shall be placed upon the basis that our fathers

placed it upon. Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, once said, and truly

said, that when this government was established, no one expected the

institution of slavery to last until this day, and that the men who

formed this government were wiser and better than the men of these

days; but the men of these days had experience which the fathers had

not, and that experience had taught them the invention of the

cotton-gin, and this had made the perpetuation of the institution of

slavery a necessity in this country. Judge Douglas could not let it

stand upon the basis which our fathers placed it, but removed it, and

put it upon the cotton-gin basis. It is a question, therefore, for

him and his friends to answer, why they could not let it remain where

the fathers of the government originally placed it. I hope nobody

has understood me as trying to sustain the doctrine that we have a

right to quarrel with Kentucky, or Virginia, or any of the slave

States, about the institution of slavery,--thus giving the Judge an

opportunity to be eloquent and valiant against us in fighting for

their rights. I expressly declared in my opening speech that I had

neither the inclination to exercise, nor the belief in the existence

of, the right to interfere with the States of Kentucky or Virginia in

doing as they pleased with slavery Or any other existing institution.

Then what becomes of all his eloquence in behalf of the rights of

States, which are assailed by no living man?

But I have to hurry on, for I have but a half hour. The Judge has

informed me, or informed this audience, that the Washington Union is

laboring for my election to the United States Senate. This is news

to me,--not very ungrateful news either. [Turning to Mr. W. H.

Carlin, who was on the stand]--I hope that Carlin will be elected to

the State Senate, and will vote for me. [Mr. Carlin shook his head.]

Carlin don't fall in, I perceive, and I suppose he will not do much

for me; but I am glad of all the support I can get, anywhere, if I

can get it without practicing any deception to obtain it. In respect

to this large portion of Judge Douglas's speech in which he tries to

show that in the controversy between himself and the Administration

party he is in the right, I do not feel myself at all competent or

inclined to answer him. I say to him, "Give it to them,--give it to

them just all you can!" and, on the other hand, I say to Carlin, and

Jake Davis, and to this man Wogley up here in Hancock, "Give it to

Douglas, just pour it into him!"

Now, in regard to this matter of the Dred Scott decision, I wish to

say a word or two. After all, the Judge will not say whether, if a

decision is made holding that the people of the States cannot exclude

slavery, he will support it or not. He obstinately refuses to say

what he will do in that case. The judges of the Supreme Court as

obstinately refused to say what they would do on this subject.

Before this I reminded him that at Galesburgh he said the judges had

expressly declared the contrary, and you remember that in my Opening

speech I told him I had the book containing that decision here, and I

would thank him to lay his finger on the place where any such thing

was said. He has occupied his hour and a half, and he has not

ventured to try to sustain his assertion. He never will. But he is

desirous of knowing how we are going to reverse that Dred Scott

decision. Judge Douglas ought to know how. Did not he and his

political friends find a way to reverse the decision of that same

court in favor of the constitutionality of the National Bank? Didn't

they find a way to do it so effectually that they have reversed it as

completely as any decision ever was reversed, so far as its practical

operation is concerned?

And let me ask you, did n't Judge Douglas find a way to reverse the

decision of our Supreme Court when it decided that Carlin's father--

old Governor Carlin had not the constitutional power to remove a

Secretary of State? Did he not appeal to the "MOBS," as he calls

them? Did he not make speeches in the lobby to show how villainous

that decision was, and how it ought to be overthrown? Did he not

succeed, too, in getting an act passed by the Legislature to have it

overthrown? And did n't he himself sit down on that bench as one of

the five added judges, who were to overslaugh the four old ones,

getting his name of "judge" in that way, and no other? If there is a

villainy in using disrespect or making opposition to Supreme Court

decisions, I commend it to Judge Douglas's earnest consideration. I

know of no man in the State of Illinois who ought to know so well

about how much villainy it takes to oppose a decision of the Supreme

Court as our honorable friend Stephen A. Douglas.

Judge Douglas also makes the declaration that I say the Democrats are

bound by the Dred Scott decision, while the Republicans are not. In

the sense in which he argues, I never said it; but I will tell you

what I have said and what I do not hesitate to repeat to-day. I have

said that as the Democrats believe that decision to be correct, and

that the extension of slavery is affirmed in the National

Constitution, they are bound to support it as such; and I will tell

you here that General Jackson once said each man was bound to support

the Constitution "as he understood it." Now, Judge Douglas

understands the Constitution according to the Dred Scott decision,

and he is bound to support it as he understands it. I understand it

another way, and therefore I am bound to support it in the way in

which I understand it. And as Judge Douglas believes that decision

to be correct, I will remake that argument if I have time to do so.

Let me talk to some gentleman down there among you who looks me in

the face. We will say you are a member of the Territorial

Legislature, and, like Judge Douglas, you believe that the right to

take and hold slaves there is a constitutional right The first thing

you do is to swear you will support the Constitution, and all rights

guaranteed therein; that you will, whenever your neighbor needs your

legislation to support his constitutional rights, not withhold that

legislation. If you withhold that necessary legislation for the

support of the Constitution and constitutional rights, do you not

commit perjury? I ask every sensible man if that is not so? That is

undoubtedly just so, say what you please. Now, that is precisely

what Judge Douglas says, that this is a constitutional right. Does

the Judge mean to say that the Territorial Legislature in legislating

may, by withholding necessary laws, or by passing unfriendly laws,

nullify that constitutional right? Does he mean to say that? Does

he mean to ignore the proposition so long and well established in

law, that what you cannot do directly, you cannot do indirectly?

Does he mean that? The truth about the matter is this: Judge Douglas

has sung paeans to his "Popular Sovereignty" doctrine until his

Supreme Court, co-operating with him, has squatted his Squatter

Sovereignty out. But he will keep up this species of humbuggery

about Squatter Sovereignty. He has at last invented this sort of

do-nothing sovereignty,--that the people may exclude slavery by a

sort of "sovereignty" that is exercised by doing nothing at all. Is

not that running his Popular Sovereignty down awfully? Has it not

got down as thin as the homeopathic soup that was made by boiling the

shadow of a pigeon that had starved to death? But at last, when it

is brought to the test of close reasoning, there is not even that

thin decoction of it left. It is a presumption impossible in the

domain of thought. It is precisely no other than the putting of that

most unphilosophical proposition, that two bodies can occupy the same

space at the same time. The Dred Scott decision covers the whole

ground, and while it occupies it, there is no room even for the

shadow of a starved pigeon to occupy the same ground.

Judge Douglas, in reply to what I have said about having upon a

previous occasion made the speech at Ottawa as the one he took an

extract from at Charleston, says it only shows that I practiced the

deception twice. Now, my friends, are any of you obtuse enough to

swallow that? Judge Douglas had said I had made a speech at

Charleston that I would not make up north, and I turned around and

answered him by showing I had made that same speech up north,--had

made it at Ottawa; made it in his hearing; made it in the Abolition

District,--in Lovejoy's District,--in the personal presence of

Lovejoy himself,--in the same atmosphere exactly in which I had made

my Chicago speech, of which he complains so much.

Now, in relation to my not having said anything about the quotation

from the Chicago speech: he thinks that is a terrible subject for me

to handle. Why, gentlemen, I can show you that the substance of the

Chicago speech I delivered two years ago in "Egypt," as he calls it.

It was down at Springfield. That speech is here in this book, and I

could turn to it and read it to you but for the lack of time. I have

not now the time to read it. ["Read it, read it."] No, gentlemen, I

am obliged to use discretion in disposing most advantageously of my

brief time. The Judge has taken great exception to my adopting the

heretical statement in the Declaration of Independence, that "all men

are created equal," and he has a great deal to say about negro

equality. I want to say that in sometimes alluding to the

Declaration of Independence, I have only uttered the sentiments that

Henry Clay used to hold. Allow me to occupy your time a moment with

what he said. Mr. Clay was at one time called upon in Indiana, and

in a way that I suppose was very insulting, to liberate his slaves;

and he made a written reply to that application, and one portion of

it is in these words:

"What is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana to liberate

the slaves under my care in Kentucky? It is a general declaration in

the act announcing to the world the independence of the thirteen

American colonies, that men are created equal. Now, as an abstract

principle, there is no doubt of the truth of that declaration, and it

is desirable in the original construction of society, and in

organized societies, to keep it in view as a great fundamental

principle."

When I sometimes, in relation to the organization of new societies in

new countries, where the soil is clean and clear, insisted that we

should keep that principle in view, Judge Douglas will have it that I

want a negro wife. He never can be brought to understand that there

is any middle ground on this subject. I have lived until my fiftieth

year, and have never had a negro woman either for a slave or a wife,

and I think I can live fifty centuries, for that matter, without

having had one for either. I maintain that you may take Judge

Douglas's quotations from my Chicago speech, and from my Charleston

speech, and the Galesburgh speech,--in his speech of to-day,--and

compare them over, and I am willing to trust them with you upon his

proposition that they show rascality or double-dealing. I deny that

they do.

The Judge does not seem at all disposed to have peace, but I find he

is disposed to have a personal warfare with me. He says that my oath

would not be taken against the bare word of Charles H. Lanphier or

Thomas L. Harris. Well, that is altogether a matter of opinion. It

is certainly not for me to vaunt my word against oaths of these

gentlemen, but I will tell Judge Douglas again the facts upon which I

"dared" to say they proved a forgery. I pointed out at Galesburgh

that the publication of these resolutions in the Illinois State

Register could not have been the result of accident, as the

proceedings of that meeting bore unmistakable evidence of being done

by a man who knew it was a forgery; that it was a publication partly

taken from the real proceedings of the Convention, and partly from

the proceedings of a convention at another place, which showed that

he had the real proceedings before him, and taking one part of the

resolutions, he threw out another part, and substituted false and

fraudulent ones in their stead. I pointed that out to him, and also

that his friend Lanphier, who was editor of the Register at that time

and now is, must have known how it was done. Now, whether he did it,

or got some friend to do it for him, I could not tell, but he

certainly knew all about it. I pointed out to Judge Douglas that in

his Freeport speech he had promised to investigate that matter.

Does he now say that he did not make that promise? I have a right

to ask why he did not keep it. I call upon him to tell here to-day

why he did not keep that promise? That fraud has been traced up so

that it lies between him, Harris, and Lanphier. There is little room

for escape for Lanphier. Lanphier is doing the Judge good service,

and Douglas desires his word to be taken for the truth. He desires

Lanphier to be taken as authority in what he states in his newspaper.

He desires Harris to be taken as a man of vast credibility; and when

this thing lies among them, they will not press it to show where the

guilt really belongs. Now, as he has said that he would investigate

it, and implied that he would tell us the result of his

investigation, I demand of him to tell why he did not investigate it,

if he did not; and if he did, why he won't tell the result. I call

upon him for that.

This is the third time that Judge Douglas has assumed that he learned

about these resolutions by Harris's attempting to use them against

Norton on the floor of Congress. I tell Judge Douglas the public

records of the country show that he himself attempted it upon

Trumbull a month before Harris tried them on Norton; that Harris had

the opportunity of learning it from him, rather than he from Harris.

I now ask his attention to that part of the record on the case. My

friends, I am not disposed to detain you longer in regard to that

matter.

I am told that I still have five minutes left. There is another

matter I wish to call attention to. He says, when he discovered

there was a mistake in that case, he came forward magnanimously,

without my calling his attention to it, and explained it. I will

tell you how he became so magnanimous. When the newspapers of our

side had discovered and published it, and put it beyond his power to

deny it, then he came forward and made a virtue of necessity by

acknowledging it. Now he argues that all the point there was in

those resolutions, although never passed at Springfield, is retained

by their being passed at other localities. Is that true? He said I

had a hand in passing them, in his opening speech, that I was in the

convention and helped to pass them. Do the resolutions touch me at

all? It strikes me there is some difference between holding a man

responsible for an act which he has not done and holding him

responsible for an act that he has

done. You will judge whether there is any difference in the "spots."

And he has taken credit for great magnanimity in coming forward and

acknowledging what is proved on him beyond even the capacity of Judge

Douglas to deny; and he has more capacity in that way than any other

living man.

Then he wants to know why I won't withdraw the charge in regard to a

conspiracy to make slavery national, as he has withdrawn the one he

made. May it please his worship, I will withdraw it when it is

proven false on me as that was proven false on him. I will add a

little more than that, I will withdraw it whenever a reasonable man

shall be brought to believe that the charge is not true. I have

asked Judge Douglas's attention to certain matters of fact tending to

prove the charge of a conspiracy to nationalize slavery, and he says

he convinces me that this is all untrue because Buchanan was not in

the country at that time, and because the Dred Scott case had not

then got into the Supreme Court; and he says that I say the

Democratic owners of Dred Scott got up the case. I never did say

that I defy Judge Douglas to show that I ever said so, for I never

uttered it. [One of Mr. Douglas's reporters gesticulated

affirmatively at Mr. Lincoln.] I don't care if your hireling does say

I did, I tell you myself that I never said the "Democratic" owners of

Dred Scott got up the case. I have never pretended to know whether

Dred Scott's owners were Democrats, or Abolitionists, or Freesoilers

or Border Ruffians. I have said that there is evidence about the

case tending to show that it was a made-up case, for the purpose of

getting that decision. I have said that that evidence was very

strong in the fact that when Dred Scott was declared to be a slave,

the owner of him made him free, showing that he had had the case

tried and the question settled for such use as could be made of that

decision; he cared nothing about the property thus declared to be his

by that decision. But my time is out, and I can say no more.