SECOND JOINT DEBATE, AT FREEPORT,

AUGUST 27, 1858

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first

met in public discussion. He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and

he replied for half an hour. The order is now reversed. I am to speak an

hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an hour. I

propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of what was

brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa. Of course

there was brought within the scope in that half-hour's speech something

of his own opening speech. In the course of that opening argument Judge

Douglas proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories. In my speech of

an hour and a half, I attended to some other parts of his speech, and

incidentally, as I thought, intimated to him that I would answer the rest

of his interrogatories on condition only that he should agree to answer as

many for me. He made no intimation at the time of the proposition, nor

did he in his reply allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no

injustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing

with me as though I had refused to answer his interrogatories. I now

propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that

he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I give him

an opportunity to respond.

The Judge remains silent. I now say that I will answer his

interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have

done so, I shall propound mine to him.

I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party at

Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of the

party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall answer I go

beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will be perceived

that no one is responsible but myself.

Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I

find them printed in the Chicago Times, and answer them seriatim. In order

that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the interrogatories

in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of these

interrogatories is in these words:

Question 1.--"I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did

in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"

Answer:--I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional

repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

Q. 2.--"I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did

in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the Union,

even if the people want them?" Answer:--I do not now, nor ever did, stand

pledged against the admission of any more slave States into the Union.

Q. 3.--"I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of

a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that

State may see fit to make?" Answer:--I do not stand pledged against the

admission of a new State into the Union, with such a constitution as the

people of that State may see fit to make.

Q. 4.--"I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition

of slavery in the District of Columbia?" Answer:--I do not stand to-day

pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5.--"I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the

prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?" Answer:--I

do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the

different States.

Q. 6.--"I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in

all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the

Missouri Compromise line?" Answer:--I am impliedly, if not expressly,

pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery

in all the United States 'Territories.

Q. 7.--"I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of

any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?" Answer:--I

am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any

given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition, accordingly as

I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery

question among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these

questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was

not pledged to this, that, or the other. The Judge has not framed his

interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered in

strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly, that

I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to which I have answered.

But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I

am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state

what I really think upon them.

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave law, I have never

hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under

the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States

are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law. Having said that,

I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave law,

further than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free

from some of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening its

efficiency. And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in regard to

an alteration or modification of that law, I would not be the man to

introduce it as a new subject of agitation upon the general question of

slavery.

In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission

of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that

I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position of having to

pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there

would never be another slave State admitted into the Union; but I must

add that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the

territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people

shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt

the constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave

constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among

them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into

the Union.

The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it being,

as I conceive, the same as the second.

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of

Columbia. In relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up.

I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the District of

Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to

abolish it. Yet as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present

views, be in favor of endeavoring to abolish slavery in the District

of Columbia, unless it would be upon these conditions: First, that the

abolition should be gradual; second, that it should be on a vote of the

majority of qualified voters in the District; and third, that compensation

should be made to unwilling owners. With these three conditions, I

confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the

District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our

capital that foul blot upon our nation."

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here that, as to the

question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different States,

I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about it.

It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that

would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold myself

entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been

prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we really

have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had

sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject; but I

have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge Douglas.

I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does

possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade among the

different States, I should still not be in favor of the exercise of that

power, unless upon some conservative principle as I conceive it, akin to

what I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the District

of Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all

the Territories of the United States is full and explicit within itself,

and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose in

regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any more

territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such

that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself better

understood, than the answer which I have placed in writing.

Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I suppose

he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set of

opinions for one place, and another set for another place; that I was

afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am

saying here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to

Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I am

saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and render them

enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this audience.

I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories, so far as I

have framed them. I will bring forward a new installment when I get them

ready. I will bring them forward now only reaching to number four. The

first one is:

Question 1.--If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely

unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and ask

admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite

number of inhabitants according to the English bill,--some ninety-three

thousand,--will you vote to admit them?

Q. 2.--Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way,

against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from

its limits prior to the formation of a State constitution?

Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States

cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing

in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of political action?

Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of

how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?

As introductory to these interrogatories which Judge Douglas propounded

to me at Ottawa, he read a set of resolutions which he said Judge Trumbull

and myself had participated in adopting, in the first Republican State

Convention, held at Springfield in October, 1854. He insisted that I and

Judge Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican party, were responsible

for the doctrines contained in the set of resolutions which he read, and

I understand that it was from that set of resolutions that he deduced the

interrogatories which he propounded to me, using these resolutions as a

sort of authority for propounding those questions to me. Now, I say here

to-day that I do not answer his interrogatories because of their springing

at all from that set of resolutions which he read. I answered them

because Judge Douglas thought fit to ask them. I do not now, nor ever did,

recognize any responsibility upon myself in that set of resolutions. When

I replied to him on that occasion, I assured him that I never had anything

to do with them. I repeat here to today that I never in any possible form

had anything to do with that set of resolutions It turns out, I believe,

that those resolutions were never passed in any convention held in

Springfield.

It turns out that they were never passed at any convention or any public

meeting that I had any part in. I believe it turns out, in addition to all

this, that there was not, in the fall of 1854, any convention holding a

session in Springfield, calling itself a Republican State Convention; yet

it is true there was a convention, or assemblage of men calling themselves

a convention, at Springfield, that did pass some resolutions. But so

little did I really know of the proceedings of that convention, or what

set of resolutions they had passed, though having a general knowledge that

there had been such an assemblage of men there, that when Judge Douglas

read the resolutions, I really did not know but they had been the

resolutions passed then and there. I did not question that they were the

resolutions adopted. For I could not bring myself to suppose that Judge

Douglas could say what he did upon this subject without knowing that it

was true. I contented myself, on that occasion, with denying, as I truly

could, all connection with them, not denying or affirming whether they

were passed at Springfield. Now, it turns out that he had got hold of some

resolutions passed at some convention or public meeting in Kane County.

I wish to say here, that I don't conceive that in any fair and just mind

this discovery relieves me at all. I had just as much to do with the

convention in Kane County as that at Springfield. I am as much responsible

for the resolutions at Kane County as those at Springfield,--the amount

of the responsibility being exactly nothing in either case; no more than

there would be in regard to a set of resolutions passed in the moon.

I allude to this extraordinary matter in this canvass for some further

purpose than anything yet advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his

statement upon that occasion as matters that he believed to be true,

but he stated them roundly as being true, in such form as to pledge his

veracity for their truth. When the whole matter turns out as it does, and

when we consider who Judge Douglas is, that he is a distinguished Senator

of the United States; that he has served nearly twelve years as such; that

his character is not at all limited as an ordinary Senator of the United

States, but that his name has become of world-wide renown,--it is most

extraordinary that he should so far forget all the suggestions of justice

to an adversary, or of prudence to himself, as to venture upon the

assertion of that which the slightest investigation would have shown him

to be wholly false. I can only account for his having done so upon the

supposition that that evil genius which has attended him through his life,

giving to him an apparent astonishing prosperity, such as to lead very

many good men to doubt there being any advantage in virtue over vice,--I

say I can only account for it on the supposition that that evil genius has

as last made up its mind to forsake him.

And I may add that another extraordinary feature of the Judge's conduct in

this canvass--made more extraordinary by this incident--is, that he is in

the habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charging falsehood upon

his adversaries, myself and others. I now ask whether he is able to find

in anything that Judge Trumbull, for instance, has said, or in anything

that I have said, a justification at all compared with what we have, in

this instance, for that sort of vulgarity.

I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of belief on my part

that, in the introduction of the Nebraska Bill into Congress, there was

a conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national. I have arranged from

time to time the evidence which establishes and proves the truth of this

charge. I recurred to this charge at Ottawa. I shall not now have time to

dwell upon it at very great length; but inasmuch as Judge Douglas, in

his reply of half an hour, made some points upon me in relation to it, I

propose noticing a few of them.

The Judge insists that, in the first speech I made, in which I very

distinctly made that charge, he thought for a good while I was in fun!

that I was playful; that I was not sincere about it; and that he only

grew angry and somewhat excited when he found that I insisted upon it as

a matter of earnestness. He says he characterized it as a falsehood so far

as I implicated his moral character in that transaction. Well, I did

not know, till he presented that view, that I had implicated his moral

character. He is very much in the habit, when he argues me up into a

position I never thought of occupying, of very cosily saying he has no

doubt Lincoln is "conscientious" in saying so. He should remember that I

did not know but what he was ALTOGETHER "CONSCIENTIOUS" in that matter.

I can conceive it possible for men to conspire to do a good thing, and

I really find nothing in Judge Douglas's course of arguments that is

contrary to or inconsistent with his belief of a conspiracy to nationalize

and spread slavery as being a good and blessed thing; and so I hope he

will understand that I do not at all question but that in all this matter

he is entirely "conscientious."

But to draw your attention to one of the points I made in this case,

beginning at the beginning: When the Nebraska Bill was introduced, or a

short time afterward, by an amendment, I believe, it was provided that

it must be considered "the true intent and meaning of this Act not to

legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it therefrom,

but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate

their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the

Constitution of the United States." I have called his attention to the

fact that when he and some others began arguing that they were giving

an increased degree of liberty to the people in the Territories over and

above what they formerly had on the question of slavery, a question was

raised whether the law was enacted to give such unconditional liberty to

the people; and to test the sincerity of this mode of argument, Mr.

Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amendment, in which he made the law--if the

amendment were adopted--expressly declare that the people of the Territory

should have the power to exclude slavery if they saw fit. I have asked

attention also to the fact that Judge Douglas and those who acted with him

voted that amendment down, notwithstanding it expressed exactly the

thing they said was the true intent and meaning of the law. I have called

attention to the fact that in subsequent times a decision of the Supreme

Court has been made, in which it has been declared that a Territorial

Legislature has no constitutional right to exclude slavery. And I have

argued and said that for men who did, intend that the people of the

Territory should have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and

unconditionally, the voting down of Chase's amendment is wholly

inexplicable. It is a puzzle, a riddle. But I have said, that with men who

did look forward to such a decision, or who had it in contemplation that

such a decision of the Supreme Court would or might be made, the voting

down of that amendment would be perfectly rational and intelligible. It

would keep Congress from coming in collision with the decision when it was

made. Anybody can conceive that if there was an intention or expectation

that such a decision was to follow, it would not be a very desirable party

attitude to get into for the Supreme Court--all or nearly all its members

belonging to the same party--to decide one way, when the party in Congress

had decided the other way. Hence it would be very rational for men

expecting such a decision to keep the niche in that law clear for it.

After pointing this out, I tell Judge Douglas that it looks to me as

though here was the reason why Chase's amendment was voted down. I tell

him that, as he did it, and knows why he did it, if it was done for a

reason different from this, he knows what that reason was and can tell us

what it was. I tell him, also, it will be vastly more satisfactory to the

country for him to give some other plausible, intelligible reason why it

was voted down than to stand upon his dignity and call people liars. Well,

on Saturday he did make his answer; and what do you think it was? He

says if I had only taken upon myself to tell the whole truth about that

amendment of Chase's, no explanation would have been necessary on his part

or words to that effect. Now, I say here that I am quite unconscious of

having suppressed anything material to the case, and I am very frank to

admit if there is any sound reason other than that which appeared to me

material, it is quite fair for him to present it. What reason does

he propose? That when Chase came forward with his amendment expressly

authorizing the people to exclude slavery from the limits of every

Territory, General Cass proposed to Chase, if he (Chase) would add to his

amendment that the people should have the power to introduce or exclude,

they would let it go. This is substantially all of his reply. And because

Chase would not do that, they voted his amendment down. Well, it turns

out, I believe, upon examination, that General Cass took some part in the

little running debate upon that amendment, and then ran away and did not

vote on it at all. Is not that the fact? So confident, as I think, was

General Cass that there was a snake somewhere about, he chose to run away

from the whole thing. This is an inference I draw from the fact that,

though he took part in the debate, his name does not appear in the ayes

and noes. But does Judge Douglas's reply amount to a satisfactory answer?

[Cries of "Yes," "Yes," and "No," "No."]

There is some little difference of opinion here. But I ask attention to

a few more views bearing on the question of whether it amounts to a

satisfactory answer. The men who were determined that that amendment

should not get into the bill, and spoil the place where the Dred Scott

decision was to come in, sought an excuse to get rid of it somewhere.

One of these ways--one of these excuses--was to ask Chase to add to his

proposed amendment a provision that the people might introduce slavery if

they wanted to. They very well knew Chase would do no such thing, that Mr.

Chase was one of the men differing from them on the broad principle of

his insisting that freedom was better than slavery,--a man who would not

consent to enact a law, penned with his own hand, by which he was made to

recognize slavery on the one hand, and liberty on the other, as precisely

equal; and when they insisted on his doing this, they very well knew they

insisted on that which he would not for a moment think of doing, and that

they were only bluffing him. I believe (I have not, since he made his

answer, had a chance to examine the journals or Congressional Globe and

therefore speak from memory)--I believe the state of the bill at that

time, according to parliamentary rules, was such that no member could

propose an additional amendment to Chase's amendment. I rather think this

is the truth,--the Judge shakes his head. Very well. I would like to know,

then, if they wanted Chase's amendment fixed over, why somebody else could

not have offered to do it? If they wanted it amended, why did they not

offer the amendment? Why did they not put it in themselves? But to put it

on the other ground: suppose that there was such an amendment offered,

and Chase's was an amendment to an amendment; until one is disposed of by

parliamentary law, you cannot pile another on. Then all these gentlemen

had to do was to vote Chase's on, and then, in the amended form in which

the whole stood, add their own amendment to it, if they wanted to put it

in that shape. This was all they were obliged to do, and the ayes and noes

show that there were thirty-six who voted it down, against ten who voted

in favor of it. The thirty-six held entire sway and control. They could in

some form or other have put that bill in the exact shape they wanted. If

there was a rule preventing their amending it at the time, they could pass

that, and then, Chase's amendment being merged, put it in the shape they

wanted. They did not choose to do so, but they went into a quibble with

Chase to get him to add what they knew he would not add, and because he

would not, they stand upon the flimsy pretext for voting down what they

argued was the meaning and intent of their own bill. They left room

thereby for this Dred Scott decision, which goes very far to make slavery

national throughout the United States.

I pass one or two points I have, because my time will very soon expire;

but I must be allowed to say that Judge Douglas recurs again, as he

did upon one or two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln, an

insignificant individual like Lincoln,--upon his ipse dixit charging a

conspiracy upon a large number of members of Congress, the Supreme Court,

and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I want to say that, in the

first place, I have made no charge of this sort upon my ipse dixit. I have

only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it, and presented it to the

understanding of others, saying what I think it proves, but giving you

the means of judging whether it proves it or not. This is precisely what

I have done. I have not placed it upon my ipse dixit at all. On this

occasion, I wish to recall his attention to a piece of evidence which

I brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing that he had made

substantially the same charge against substantially the same persons,

excluding his dear self from the category. I ask him to give some

attention to the evidence which I brought forward that he himself had

discovered a "fatal blow being struck" against the right of the people

to exclude slavery from their limits, which fatal blow he assumed as in

evidence in an article in the Washington Union, published "by authority."

I ask by whose authority? He discovers a similar or identical provision

in the Lecompton Constitution. Made by whom? The framers of that

Constitution. Advocated by whom? By all the members of the party in the

nation, who advocated the introduction of Kansas into the Union under the

Lecompton Constitution. I have asked his attention to the evidence that he

arrayed to prove that such a fatal blow was being struck, and to the facts

which he brought forward in support of that charge,--being identical

with the one which he thinks so villainous in me. He pointed it, not at

a newspaper editor merely, but at the President and his Cabinet and

the members of Congress advocating the Lecompton Constitution and those

framing that instrument. I must again be permitted to remind him that

although my ipse dixit may not be as great as his, yet it somewhat reduces

the force of his calling my attention to the enormity of my making a like

charge against him.

Go on, Judge Douglas.

Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

MY FRIENDS:--It will readily occur to you that I cannot, in half an hour,

notice all the things that so able a man as Judge Douglas can say in an

hour and a half; and I hope, therefore, if there be anything that he has

said upon which you would like to hear something from me, but which I

omit to comment upon, you will bear in mind that it would be expecting an

impossibility for me to go over his whole ground. I can but take up some

of the points that he has dwelt upon, and employ my half-hour specially on

them.

The first thing I have to say to you is a word in regard to Judge

Douglas's declaration about the "vulgarity and blackguardism" in the

audience, that no such thing, as he says, was shown by any Democrat while

I was speaking. Now, I only wish, by way of reply on this subject, to say

that while I was speaking, I used no "vulgarity or blackguardism" toward

any Democrat.

Now, my friends, I come to all this long portion of the Judge's

speech,--perhaps half of it,--which he has devoted to the various

resolutions and platforms that have been adopted in the different counties

in the different Congressional districts, and in the Illinois legislature,

which he supposes are at variance with the positions I have assumed before

you to-day. It is true that many of these resolutions are at variance

with the positions I have here assumed. All I have to ask is that we talk

reasonably and rationally about it. I happen to know, the Judge's opinion

to the contrary notwithstanding, that I have never tried to conceal my

opinions, nor tried to deceive any one in reference to them. He may go

and examine all the members who voted for me for United States Senator in

1855, after the election of 1854. They were pledged to certain things here

at home, and were determined to have pledges from me; and if he will find

any of these persons who will tell him anything inconsistent with what I

say now, I will resign, or rather retire from the race, and give him no

more trouble. The plain truth is this: At the introduction of the Nebraska

policy, we believed there was a new era being introduced in the history of

the Republic, which tended to the spread and perpetuation of slavery. But

in our opposition to that measure we did not agree with one another in

everything. The people in the north end of the State were for stronger

measures of opposition than we of the central and southern portions of the

State, but we were all opposed to the Nebraska doctrine. We had that one

feeling and that one sentiment in common. You at the north end met in your

conventions and passed your resolutions. We in the middle of the State and

farther south did not hold such conventions and pass the same resolutions,

although we had in general a common view and a common sentiment. So that

these meetings which the Judge has alluded to, and the resolutions he has

read from, were local, and did not spread over the whole State. We at last

met together in 1886, from all parts of the State, and we agreed upon a

common platform. You, who held more extreme notions, either yielded

those notions, or, if not wholly yielding them, agreed to yield them

practically, for the sake of embodying the opposition to the measures

which the opposite party were pushing forward at that time. We met you

then, and if there was anything yielded, it was for practical purposes. We

agreed then upon a platform for the party throughout the entire State of

Illinois, and now we are all bound, as a party, to that platform.

And I say here to you, if any one expects of me--in case of my

election--that I will do anything not signified by our Republican platform

and my answers here to-day, I tell you very frankly that person will be

deceived. I do not ask for the vote of any one who supposes that I have

secret purposes or pledges that I dare not speak out. Cannot the Judge be

satisfied? If he fears, in the unfortunate case of my election, that my

going to Washington will enable me to advocate sentiments contrary to

those which I expressed when you voted for and elected me, I assure him

that his fears are wholly needless and groundless. Is the Judge really

afraid of any such thing? I'll tell you what he is afraid of. He is afraid

we'll all pull together. This is what alarms him more than anything else.

For my part, I do hope that all of us, entertaining a common sentiment in

opposition to what appears to us a design to nationalize and perpetuate

slavery, will waive minor differences on questions which either belong

to the dead past or the distant future, and all pull together in this

struggle. What are your sentiments? If it be true that on the ground which

I occupy--ground which I occupy as frankly and boldly as Judge Douglas

does his,--my views, though partly coinciding with yours, are not as

perfectly in accordance with your feelings as his are, I do say to you

in all candor, go for him, and not for me. I hope to deal in all things

fairly with Judge Douglas, and with the people of the State, in this

contest. And if I should never be elected to any office, I trust I may go

down with no stain of falsehood upon my reputation, notwithstanding the

hard opinions Judge Douglas chooses to entertain of me.

The Judge has again addressed himself to the Abolition tendencies of a

speech of mine made at Springfield in June last. I have so often tried

to answer what he is always saying on that melancholy theme that I almost

turn with disgust from the discussion,--from the repetition of an answer

to it. I trust that nearly all of this intelligent audience have read

that speech. If you have, I may venture to leave it to you to inspect

it closely, and see whether it contains any of those "bugaboos" which

frighten Judge Douglas.

The Judge complains that I did not fully answer his questions. If I have

the sense to comprehend and answer those questions, I have done so fairly.

If it can be pointed out to me how I can more fully and fairly answer him,

I aver I have not the sense to see how it is to be done. He says I do not

declare I would in any event vote for the admission of a slave State into

the Union. If I have been fairly reported, he will see that I did give an

explicit answer to his interrogatories; I did not merely say that I would

dislike to be put to the test, but I said clearly, if I were put to the

test, and a Territory from which slavery had been excluded should

present herself with a State constitution sanctioning slavery,--a most

extraordinary thing, and wholly unlikely to happen,--I did not see how I

could avoid voting for her admission. But he refuses to understand that I

said so, and he wants this audience to understand that I did not say

so. Yet it will be so reported in the printed speech that he cannot help

seeing it.

He says if I should vote for the admission of a slave State I would be

voting for a dissolution of the Union, because I hold that the Union

cannot permanently exist half slave and half free. I repeat that I do not

believe this government can endure permanently half slave and half free;

yet I do not admit, nor does it at all follow, that the admission of a

single slave State will permanently fix the character and establish this

as a universal slave nation. The Judge is very happy indeed at working up

these quibbles. Before leaving the subject of answering questions, I aver

as my confident belief, when you come to see our speeches in print, that

you will find every question which he has asked me more fairly and boldly

and fully answered than he has answered those which I put to him. Is not

that so? The two speeches may be placed side by side, and I will venture

to leave it to impartial judges whether his questions have not been more

directly and circumstantially answered than mine.

Judge Douglas says he made a charge upon the editor of the Washington

Union, alone, of entertaining a purpose to rob the States of their power

to exclude slavery from their limits. I undertake to say, and I make the

direct issue, that he did not make his charge against the editor of the

Union alone. I will undertake to prove by the record here that he made

that charge against more and higher dignitaries than the editor of the

Washington Union. I am quite aware that he was shirking and dodging around

the form in which he put it, but I can make it manifest that he leveled

his "fatal blow" against more persons than this Washington editor. Will he

dodge it now by alleging that I am trying to defend Mr. Buchanan against

the charge? Not at all. Am I not making the same charge myself? I am

trying to show that you, Judge Douglas, are a witness on my side. I am not

defending Buchanan, and I will tell Judge Douglas that in my opinion, when

he made that charge, he had an eye farther north than he has to-day. He

was then fighting against people who called him a Black Republican and

an Abolitionist. It is mixed all through his speech, and it is tolerably

manifest that his eye was a great deal farther north than it is to-day.

The Judge says that though he made this charge, Toombs got up and declared

there was not a man in the United States, except the editor of the Union,

who was in favor of the doctrines put forth in that article. And thereupon

I understand that the Judge withdrew the charge. Although he had taken

extracts from the newspaper, and then from the Lecompton Constitution, to

show the existence of a conspiracy to bring about a "fatal blow," by which

the States were to be deprived of the right of excluding slavery, it all

went to pot as soon as Toombs got up and told him it was not true.

It reminds me of the story that John Phoenix, the California railroad

surveyor, tells. He says they started out from the Plaza to the Mission

of Dolores. They had two ways of determining distances. One was by a chain

and pins taken over the ground. The other was by a "go-it-ometer,"--an

invention of his own,--a three-legged instrument, with which he computed

a series of triangles between the points. At night he turned to the

chain-man to ascertain what distance they had come, and found that by some

mistake he had merely dragged the chain over the ground, without keeping

any record. By the "go-it-ometer," he found he had made ten miles. Being

skeptical about this, he asked a drayman who was passing how far it was to

the Plaza. The drayman replied it was just half a mile; and the surveyor

put it down in his book,--just as Judge Douglas says, after he had made

his calculations and computations, he took Toombs's statement. I have

no doubt that after Judge Douglas had made his charge, he was as easily

satisfied about its truth as the surveyor was of the drayman's statement

of the distance to the Plaza. Yet it is a fact that the man who put forth

all that matter which Douglas deemed a "fatal blow" at State sovereignty

was elected by the Democrats as public printer.

Now, gentlemen, you may take Judge Douglas's speech of March 22, 1858,

beginning about the middle of page 21, and reading to the bottom of page

24, and you will find the evidence on which I say that he did not make his

charge against the editor of the Union alone. I cannot stop to read it,

but I will give it to the reporters. Judge Douglas said:

"Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions

advanced boldly by the Washington Union editorially, and apparently

authoritatively, and every man who questions any of them is denounced as

an Abolitionist, a Free-soiler, a fanatic. The propositions are, first,

that the primary object of all government at its original institution is

the protection of persons and property; second, that the Constitution

of the United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be

entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several

States; and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic

or otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in

another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited,

are direct violations of the original intention of the Government and

Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of

the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage on the rights of

property, in as much as it was involuntarily done on the part of the

owner.

"Remember that this article was published in the Union on the 17th of

November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the adhesion

of the Union to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:

"'KANSAS AND HER CONSTITUTION.--The vexed question is settled. The problem

is solved. The dead point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to

Kansas affairs is over and gone...."

"And a column, nearly, of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into

the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it

which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?

"'ARTICLE 7, Section i. The right of property is before and higher than

any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such

slave and its increase is the same and as invariable as the right of the

owner of any property whatever.'

"Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended

after 1864 by a two-thirds vote.

"'But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the

ownership of slaves.'

"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they

are identical in spirit with this authoritative article in the Washington

Union of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution.

"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by

the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November,

and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State

has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a

fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."

Here he says, "Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions

advanced boldly, and apparently authoritatively." By whose authority,

Judge Douglas? Again, he says in another place, "It will be seen by these

clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they are identical in spirit

with this authoritative article." By whose authority,--who do you mean

to say authorized the publication of these articles? He knows that the

Washington Union is considered the organ of the Administration. I demand

of Judge Douglas by whose authority he meant to say those articles were

published, if not by the authority of the President of the United States

and his Cabinet? I defy him to show whom he referred to, if not to these

high functionaries in the Federal Government. More than this, he says the

articles in that paper and the provisions of the Lecompton Constitution

are "identical," and, being identical, he argues that the authors

are co-operating and conspiring together. He does not use the word

"conspiring," but what other construction can you put upon it? He winds

up:

"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by

the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November,

and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State

has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a

fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."

I ask him if all this fuss was made over the editor of this newspaper. It

would be a terribly "fatal blow" indeed which a single man could strike,

when no President, no Cabinet officer, no member of Congress, was giving

strength and efficiency to the movement. Out of respect to Judge Douglas's

good sense I must believe he did n't manufacture his idea of the "fatal"

character of that blow out of such a miserable scapegrace as he represents

that editor to be. But the Judge's eye is farther south now. Then, it

was very peculiarly and decidedly north. His hope rested on the idea of

visiting the great "Black Republican" party, and making it the tail of

his new kite. He knows he was then expecting from day to day to turn

Republican, and place himself at the head of our organization. He has

found that these despised "Black Republicans" estimate him by a standard

which he has taught them none too well. Hence he is crawling back into his

old camp, and you will find him eventually installed in full fellowship

among those whom he was then battling, and with whom he now pretends to be

at such fearful variance.