FIFTH JOINT DEBATE, AT GALESBURGH,

OCTOBER 7, 1858

Mr. LINCOLN'S REPLY.

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS: A very large portion of the speech which Judge

Douglas has addressed to you has previously been delivered and put in

print. I do not mean that for a hit upon the Judge at all.--- If I

had not been interrupted, I was going to say that such an answer as I

was able to make to a very large portion of it had already been more

than once made and published. There has been an opportunity afforded

to the public to see our respective views upon the topics discussed

in a large portion of the speech which he has just delivered. I make

these remarks for the purpose of excusing myself for not passing over

the entire ground that the Judge has traversed. I however desire to

take up some of the points that he has attended to, and ask your

attention to them, and I shall follow him backwards upon some notes

which I have taken, reversing the order, by beginning where he

concluded.

The Judge has alluded to the Declaration of Independence, and

insisted that negroes are not included in that Declaration; and that

it is a slander upon the framers of that instrument to suppose that

negroes were meant therein; and he asks you: Is it possible to

believe that Mr. Jefferson, who penned the immortal paper, could have

supposed himself applying the language of that instrument to the

negro race, and yet held a portion of that race in slavery? Would he

not at once have freed them? I only have to remark upon this part of

the Judge's speech (and that, too, very briefly, for I shall not

detain myself, or you, upon that point for any great length of time),

that I believe the entire records of the world, from the date of the

Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be

searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man,

that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence; I

think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that he ever said so, that

Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any

member of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the

whole earth ever said so, until the necessities of the present policy

of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that

affirmation. And I will remind Judge Douglas and this audience that

while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was,

in speaking upon this very subject he used the strong language that

"he trembled for his country when he remembered that God was just";

and I will offer the highest premium in my power to Judge Douglas if

he will show that he, in all his life, ever uttered a sentiment at

all akin to that of Jefferson.

The next thing to which I will ask your attention is the Judge's

comments upon the fact, as he assumes it to be, that we cannot call

our public meetings as Republican meetings; and he instances Tazewell

County as one of the places where the friends of Lincoln have called

a public meeting and have not dared to name it a Republican meeting.

He instances Monroe County as another, where Judge Trumbull and Jehu

Baker addressed the persons whom the Judge assumes to be the friends

of Lincoln calling them the "Free Democracy." I have the honor to

inform Judge Douglas that he spoke in that very county of Tazewell

last Saturday, and I was there on Tuesday last; and when he spoke

there, he spoke under a call not venturing to use the word

"Democrat." [Turning to Judge Douglas.] what think you of this?

So, again, there is another thing to which I would ask the Judge's

attention upon this subject. In the contest of 1856 his party

delighted to call themselves together as the "National Democracy";

but now, if there should be a notice put up anywhere for a meeting of

the "National Democracy," Judge Douglas and his friends would not

come. They would not suppose themselves invited. They would

understand that it was a call for those hateful postmasters whom he

talks about.

Now a few words in regard to these extracts from speeches of mine

which Judge Douglas has read to you, and which he supposes are in

very great contrast to each other. Those speeches have been before

the public for a considerable time, and if they have any

inconsistency in them, if there is any conflict in them, the public

have been able to detect it. When the Judge says, in speaking on

this subject, that I make speeches of one sort for the people of the

northern end of the State, and of a different sort for the southern

people, he assumes that I do not understand that my speeches will be

put in print and read north and south. I knew all the while that the

speech that I made at Chicago, and the one I made at Jonesboro and

the one at Charleston, would all be put in print, and all the reading

and intelligent men in the community would see them and know all

about my opinions. And I have not supposed, and do not now suppose,

that there is any conflict whatever between them. But the Judge will

have it that if we do not confess that there is a sort of inequality

between the white and black races which justifies us in making them

slaves, we must then insist that there is a degree of equality that

requires us to make them our wives. Now, I have all the while taken

a broad distinction in regard to that matter; and that is all there

is in these different speeches which he arrays here; and the entire

reading of either of the speeches will show that that distinction was

made. Perhaps by taking two parts of the same speech he could have

got up as much of a conflict as the one he has found. I have all the

while maintained that in so far as it should be insisted that there

was an equality between the white and black races that should produce

a perfect social and political equality, it was an impossibility.

This you have seen in my printed speeches, and with it I have said

that in their right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,"

as proclaimed in that old Declaration, the inferior races are our

equals. And these declarations I have constantly made in reference

to the abstract moral question, to contemplate and consider when we

are legislating about any new country which is not already cursed

with the actual presence of the evil,--slavery. I have never

manifested any impatience with the necessities that spring from the

actual presence of black people amongst us, and the actual existence

of slavery amongst us where it does already exist; but I have

insisted that, in legislating for new countries where it does not

exist there is no just rule other than that of moral and abstract

right! With reference to those new countries, those maxims as to the

right of a people to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"

were the just rules to be constantly referred to. There is no

misunderstanding this, except by men interested to misunderstand it.

I take it that I have to address an intelligent and reading

community, who will peruse what I say, weigh it, and then judge

whether I advanced improper or unsound views, or whether I advanced

hypocritical, and deceptive, and contrary views in different portions

of the country. I believe myself to be guilty of no such thing as

the latter, though, of course, I cannot claim that I am entirely free

from all error in the opinions I advance.

The Judge has also detained us awhile in regard to the distinction

between his party and our party. His he assumes to be a national

party, ours a sectional one. He does this in asking the question

whether this country has any interest in the maintenance of the

Republican party. He assumes that our party is altogether sectional,

that the party to which he adheres is national; and the argument is,

that no party can be a rightful party--and be based upon rightful

principles--unless it can announce its principles everywhere. I

presume that Judge Douglas could not go into Russia and announce the

doctrine of our national Democracy; he could not denounce the

doctrine of kings and emperors and monarchies in Russia; and it may

be true of this country that in some places we may not be able to

proclaim a doctrine as clearly true as the truth of democracy,

because there is a section so directly opposed to it that they will

not tolerate us in doing so. Is it the true test of the soundness of

a doctrine that in some places people won't let you proclaim it? Is

that the way to test the truth of any doctrine? Why, I understood

that at one time the people of Chicago would not let Judge Douglas

preach a certain favorite doctrine of his. I commend to his

consideration the question whether he takes that as a test of the

unsoundness of what he wanted to preach.

There is another thing to which I wish to ask attention for a little

while on this occasion. What has always been the evidence brought

forward to prove that the Republican party is a sectional party? The

main one was that in the Southern portion of the Union the people did

not let the Republicans proclaim their doctrines amongst them. That

has been the main evidence brought forward,--that they had no

supporters, or substantially none, in the Slave States. The South

have not taken hold of our principles as we announce them; nor does

Judge Douglas now grapple with those principles. We have a

Republican State Platform, laid down in Springfield in June last

stating our position all the way through the questions before the

country. We are now far advanced in this canvass. Judge Douglas and

I have made perhaps forty speeches apiece, and we have now for the

fifth time met face to face in debate, and up to this day I have not

found either Judge Douglas or any friend of his taking hold of the

Republican platform, or laying his finger upon anything in it that is

wrong. I ask you all to recollect that. Judge Douglas turns away

from the platform of principles to the fact that he can find people

somewhere who will not allow us to announce those principles. If he

had great confidence that our principles were wrong, he would take

hold of them and demonstrate them to be wrong. But he does not do

so. The only evidence he has of their being wrong is in the fact

that there are people who won't allow us to preach them. I ask

again, is that the way to test the soundness of a doctrine?

I ask his attention also to the fact that by the rule of nationality

he is himself fast becoming sectional. I ask his attention to the

fact that his speeches would not go as current now south of the Ohio

River as they have formerly gone there I ask his attention to the

fact that he felicitates himself to-day that all the Democrats of the

free States are agreeing with him, while he omits to tell us that the

Democrats of any slave State agree with him. If he has not thought

of this, I commend to his consideration the evidence in his own

declaration, on this day, of his becoming sectional too. I see it

rapidly approaching. Whatever may be the result of this ephemeral

contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I see the day rapidly

approaching when his pill of sectionalism, which he has been

thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will be

crowded down his own throat.

Now, in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his

speech) about the Compromise of 1850 containing the principles of the

Nebraska Bill, although I have often presented my views upon that

subject, yet as I have not done so in this canvass, I will, if you

please, detain you a little with them. I have always maintained, so

far as I was able, that there was nothing of the principle of the

Nebraska Bill in the Compromise of 1850 at all,--nothing whatever.

Where can you find the principle of the Nebraska Bill in that

Compromise? If anywhere, in the two pieces of the Compromise

organizing the Territories of New Mexico and Utah. It was expressly

provided in these two acts that when they came to be admitted into

the Union they should be admitted with or without slavery, as they

should choose, by their own constitutions. Nothing was said in

either of those acts as to what was to be done in relation to slavery

during the Territorial existence of those Territories, while Henry

Clay constantly made the declaration (Judge Douglas recognizing him

as a leader) that, in his opinion, the old Mexican laws would control

that question during the Territorial existence, and that these old

Mexican laws excluded slavery. How can that be used as a principle

for declaring that during the Territorial existence as well as at the

time of framing the constitution the people, if you please, might

have slaves if they wanted them? I am not discussing the question

whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New Mexican and Utah

laws patterns for the Nebraska Bill? I maintain that the

organization of Utah and New Mexico did not establish a general

principle at all. It had no feature of establishing a general

principle. The acts to which I have referred were a part of a

general system of Compromises. They did not lay down what was

proposed as a regular policy for the Territories, only an agreement

in this particular case to do in that way, because other things were

done that were to be a compensation for it. They were allowed to

come in in that shape, because in another way it was paid for,

considering that as a part of that system of measures called the

Compromise of 1850, which finally included half-a-dozen acts. It

included the admission of California as a free State, which was kept

out of the Union for half a year because it had formed a free

constitution. It included the settlement of the boundary of Texas,

which had been undefined before, which was in itself a slavery

question; for if you pushed the line farther west, you made Texas

larger, and made more slave territory; while, if you drew the line

toward the east, you narrowed the boundary and diminished the domain

of slavery, and by so much increased free territory. It included the

abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It

included the passage of a new Fugitive Slave law. All these things

were put together, and, though passed in separate acts, were

nevertheless, in legislation (as the speeches at the time will show),

made to depend upon each other. Each got votes with the

understanding that the other measures were to pass, and by this

system of compromise, in that series of measures, those two bills--

the New Mexico and Utah bills--were passed: and I say for that reason

they could not be taken as models, framed upon their own intrinsic

principle, for all future Territories. And I have the evidence of

this in the fact that Judge Douglas, a year afterward, or more than a

year afterward, perhaps, when he first introduced bills for the

purpose of framing new Territories, did not attempt to follow these

bills of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this

Nebraska Bill, I think you will discover that he did not exactly

follow them. But I do not wish to dwell at great length upon this

branch of the discussion. My own opinion is, that a thorough

investigation will show most plainly that the New Mexico and Utah

bills were part of a system of compromise, and not designed as

patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this Nebraska

Bill did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any

odious distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether

unaware that the Republicans are in favor of making any odious

distinctions between the free and slave States. But there is still a

difference, I think, between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in

this. I suppose that the real difference between Judge Douglas and

his friends, and the Republicans on the contrary, is, that the Judge

is not in favor of making any difference between slavery and liberty;

that he is in favor of eradicating, of pressing out of view, the

questions of preference in this country for free or slave

institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the

idea that there is any wrong in slavery. Everything that emanates

from him or his coadjutors in their course of policy carefully

excludes the thought that there is anything wrong in slavery. All

their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to exclude

the thought that there is anything whatever wrong in slavery. If you

will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed

sentences expressed by him,--as his declaration that he "don't care

whether slavery is voted up or down,"--you will see at once that this

is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong. If

you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he

don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge Douglas

declares that if any community wants slavery they have a right to

have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no

wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he

cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong. He

insists that upon the score of equality the owners of slaves and

owners of property--of horses and every other sort of property--

should be alike, and hold them alike in a new Territory. That is

perfectly logical if the two species of property are alike and are

equally founded in right. But if you admit that one of them is

wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and wrong.

And from this difference of sentiment,--the belief on the part of one

that the institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that

belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong,

and this other sentiment, that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung

from that sentiment, which will tolerate no idea of preventing the

wrong from growing larger, and looks to there never being an end to

it through all the existence of things,--arises the real difference

between Judge Douglas and his friends on the one hand and the

Republicans on the other. Now, I confess myself as belonging to that

class in the country who contemplate slavery as a moral, social, and

political evil, having due regard for its actual existence amongst us

and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way,

and to all the constitutional obligations which have been thrown

about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy that looks to the

prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when as

a wrong it may come to an end.

Judge Douglas has again, for, I believe, the fifth time, if not the

seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of a conspiracy or

combination between the National Democrats and Republicans. What

evidence Judge Douglas has upon this subject I know not, inasmuch as

he never favors us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and

I do not choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the

division in the Judge's party. He got it up himself. It was all his

and their work. He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the

steps that led to the Lecompton Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had;

though at last, when they reached it, they quarreled over it, and

their friends divided upon it. I am very free to confess to Judge

Douglas that I have no objection to the division; but I defy the

Judge to show any evidence that I have in any way promoted that

division, unless he insists on being a witness himself in merely

saying so. I can give all fair friends of Judge Douglas here to

understand exactly the view that Republicans take in regard to that

division. Don't you remember how two years ago the opponents of the

Democratic party were divided between Fremont and Fillmore? I guess

you do. Any Democrat who remembers that division will remember also

that he was at the time very glad of it, and then he will be able to

see all there is between the National Democrats and the Republicans.

What we now think of the two divisions of Democrats, you then thought

of the Fremont and Fillmore divisions. That is all there is of it.

But if the Judge continues to put forward the declaration that there

is an unholy and unnatural alliance between the Republicans and the

National Democrats, I now want to enter my protest against receiving

him as an entirely competent witness upon that subject. I want to

call to the Judge's attention an attack he made upon me in the first

one of these

debates, at Ottawa, on the 21st of August. In order to fix extreme

Abolitionism upon me, Judge Douglas read a set of resolutions which

he declared had been passed by a Republican State Convention, in

October, 1854, at Springfield, Illinois, and he declared I had taken

part in that Convention. It turned out that although a few men

calling themselves an anti-Nebraska State Convention had sat at

Springfield about that time, yet neither did I take any part in it,

nor did it pass the resolutions or any such resolutions as Judge

Douglas read. So apparent had it become that the resolutions which

he read had not been passed at Springfield at all, nor by a State

Convention in which I had taken part, that seven days afterward, at

Freeport, Judge Douglas declared that he had been misled by Charles

H. Lanphier, editor of the State Register, and Thomas L. Harris,

member of Congress in that district, and he promised in that speech

that when he went to Springfield he would investigate the matter.

Since then Judge Douglas has been to Springfield, and I presume has

made the investigation; but a month has passed since he has been

there, and, so far as I know, he has made no report of the result of

his investigation. I have waited as I think sufficient time for the

report of that investigation, and I have some curiosity to see and

hear it. A fraud, an absolute forgery was committed, and the

perpetration of it was traced to the three,--Lanphier, Harris, and

Douglas. Whether it can be narrowed in any way so as to exonerate

any one of them, is what Judge Douglas's report would probably show.

It is true that the set of resolutions read by Judge Douglas were

published in the Illinois State Register on the 16th of October,

1854, as being the resolutions of an anti-Nebraska Convention which

had sat in that same month of October, at Springfield. But it is

also true that the publication in the Register was a forgery then,

and the question is still behind, which of the three, if not all of

them, committed that forgery. The idea that it was done by mistake

is absurd. The article in the Illinois State Register contains part

of the real proceedings of that Springfield Convention, showing that

the writer of the article had the real proceedings before him, and

purposely threw out the genuine resolutions passed by the Convention

and fraudulently substituted the others. Lanphier then, as now, was

the editor of the Register, so that there seems to be but little room

for his escape. But then it is to be borne in mind that Lanphier had

less interest in the object of that forgery than either of the other

two. The main object of that forgery at that time was to beat Yates

and elect Harris to Congress, and that object was known to be

exceedingly dear to Judge Douglas at that time. Harris and Douglas

were both in Springfield when the Convention was in session, and

although they both left before the fraud appeared in the Register,

subsequent events show that they have both had their eyes fixed upon

that Convention.

The fraud having been apparently successful upon the occasion, both

Harris and Douglas have more than once since then been attempting to

put it to new uses. As the fisherman's wife, whose drowned husband

was brought home with his body full of eels, said when she was asked

what was to be done with him, "Take the eels out and set him again,"

so Harris and Douglas have shown a disposition to take the eels out

of that stale fraud by which they gained Harris's election, and set

the fraud again more than once. On the 9th of July, 1856, Douglas

attempted a repetition of it upon Trumbull on the floor of the Senate

of the United States, as will appear from the appendix of the

Congressional Globe of that date.

On the 9th of August, Harris attempted it again upon Norton in the

House of Representatives, as will appear by the same documents,--the

appendix to the Congressional Globe of that date. On the 21st of

August last, all three--Lanphier, Douglas, and Harris--reattempted it

upon me at Ottawa. It has been clung to and played out again and

again as an exceedingly high trump by this blessed trio. And now

that it has been discovered publicly to be a fraud we find that Judge

Douglas manifests no surprise at it at all. He makes no complaint of

Lanphier, who must have known it to be a fraud from the beginning.

He, Lanphier, and Harris are just as cozy now and just as active in

the concoction of new schemes as they were before the general

discovery of this fraud. Now, all this is very natural if they are

all alike guilty in that fraud, and it is very unnatural if any one

of them is innocent. Lanphier perhaps insists that the rule of honor

among thieves does not quite require him to take all upon himself,

and consequently my friend Judge Douglas finds it difficult to make a

satisfactory report upon his investigation. But meanwhile the three

are agreed that each is "a most honorable man."

Judge Douglas requires an indorsement of his truth and honor by a

re-election to the United States Senate, and he makes and reports

against me and against Judge Trumbull, day after day, charges which

we know to be utterly untrue, without for a moment seeming to think

that this one unexplained fraud, which he promised to investigate,

will be the least drawback to his claim to belief. Harris ditto. He

asks a re-election to the lower House of Congress without seeming to

remember at all that he is involved in this dishonorable fraud! The

Illinois State Register, edited by Lanphier, then, as now, the

central organ of both Harris and Douglas, continues to din the public

ear with this assertion, without seeming to suspect that these

assertions are at all lacking in title to belief.

After all, the question still recurs upon us, How did that fraud

originally get into the State Register? Lanphier then, as now, was

the editor of that paper. Lanphier knows. Lanphier cannot be

ignorant of how and by whom it was originally concocted. Can he be

induced to tell, or, if he has told, can Judge Douglas be induced to

tell how it originally was concocted? It may be true that Lanphier

insists that the two men for whose benefit it was originally devised

shall at least bear their share of it! How that is, I do not know,

and while it remains unexplained I hope to be pardoned if I insist

that the mere fact of Judge Douglas making charges against Trumbull

and myself is not quite sufficient evidence to establish them!

While we were at Freeport, in one of these joint discussions, I

answered certain interrogatories which Judge Douglas had propounded

to me, and then in turn propounded some to him, which he in a sort of

way answered. The third one of these interrogatories I have with me,

and wish now to make some comments upon it. It was in these words:

"If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that the

States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of

acquiescing in, adhering to, and following such decision as a rule of

political action?"

To this interrogatory Judge Douglas made no answer in any just sense

of the word. He contented himself with sneering at the thought that

it was possible for the Supreme Court ever to make such a decision.

He sneered at me for propounding the interrogatory. I had not

propounded it without some reflection, and I wish now to address to

this audience some remarks upon it.

In the second clause of the sixth article, I believe it is, of the

Constitution of the United States, we find the following language:

"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be

made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the

contrary notwithstanding."

The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence

which I will now read:

"Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion,

upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is

distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution."

I repeat it, "The right of property in a slave is distinctly and

expressly affirmed in the Constitution"! What is it to be "affirmed"

in the Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution, so made that it

cannot be separated from the Constitution without breaking the

Constitution; durable as the Constitution, and part of the

Constitution. Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution

which I have read--affirming that that instrument is the supreme law

of the land; that the judges of every State shall be bound by it, any

law or constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding;

that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that

Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it

without breaking it; durable as the instrument; part of the

instrument;--what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument

from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of

men capable of arguing whether, as I state it, in syllogistic form,

the argument has any fault in it:

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right

distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United

States.

The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed

in the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can

destroy the right of property in a slave.

I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming

the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity

at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it

as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood

in fact is a fault of the premises. I believe that the right of

property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the

Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is. I believe that the

Supreme Court and the advocates of that decision may search in vain

for the place in the Constitution where the right of property in a

slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed I say, therefore, that I

think one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is true with

Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme Court who pronounced it.

They are estopped from denying it, and being estopped from denying

it, the conclusion follows that, the Constitution of the United

States being the supreme law, no constitution or law can interfere

with it. It being affirmed in the decision that the right of

property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the

Constitution, the conclusion inevitably follows that no State law or

constitution can destroy that right. I then say to Judge Douglas and

to all others that I think it will take a better answer than a sneer

to show that those who have said that the right of property in a

slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, are

not prepared to show that no constitution or law can destroy that

right. I say I believe it will take a far better argument than a

mere sneer to show to the minds of intelligent men that whoever has

so said is not prepared, whenever public sentiment is so far advanced

as to justify it, to say the other. This is but an opinion, and the

opinion of one very humble man; but it is my opinion that the Dred

Scott decision, as it is, never would have been made in its present

form if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by

the elections. My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott decision,

deciding against the right of the people of the States to exclude

slavery, will never be made if that party is not sustained by the

elections. I believe, further, that it is just as sure to be made as

to-morrow is to come, if that party shall be sustained. I have said,

upon a former occasion, and I repeat it now, that the course of

arguement that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge

not his motives in this), is preparing the public mind for that new

Dred Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the

reasons for his first adherence to the Dred Scott decision as it is.

I have turned his attention to the fact that General Jackson differed

with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court

decision. I have asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson

differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme

Court decision. Jefferson said that "Judges are as honest as other

men, and not more so." And he said, substantially, that whenever a

free people should give up in absolute submission to any department

of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their

liberties were gone. I have asked his attention to the fact that the

Cincinnati platform, upon which he says he stands, disregards a

time-honored decision of the Supreme Court, in denying the power of

Congress to establish a National Bank. I have asked his attention to

the fact that he himself was one of the most active instruments at

one time in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

because it had made a decision distasteful to him,--a struggle ending

in the remarkable circumstance of his sitting down as one of the new

Judges who were to overslaugh that decision; getting his title of

Judge in that very way.

So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge

Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that

he swells himself up and says, "All of us who stand by the decision

of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you

fellows that dare question it in any way are the enemies of the

Constitution." Now, in this very devoted adherence to this decision,

in opposition to all the great political leaders whom he has

recognized as leaders, in opposition to his former self and history,

there is something very marked. And the manner in which he adheres

to it,--not as being right upon the merits, as he conceives (because

he did not discuss that at all), but as being absolutely obligatory

upon every one simply because of the source from whence it comes, as

that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may be,--this is another

marked feature of his adherence to that decision. It marks it in

this respect, that it commits him to the next decision, whenever it

comes, as being as obligatory as this one, since he does not

investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or

wrong. So he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is

right or wrong. He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing

prepares the public mind to take the next decision when it comes,

without any inquiry. In this I think I argue fairly (without

questioning motives at all) that Judge Douglas is most ingeniously

and powerfully preparing the public mind to take that decision when

it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in various other ways.

In these general maxims about liberty, in his assertions that he

"don't care whether slavery is voted up or voted down,"; that

"whoever wants slavery has a right to have it"; that "upon principles

of equality it should be allowed to go everywhere"; that "there is no

inconsistency between free and slave institutions"--in this he is

also preparing (whether purposely or not) the way for making the

institution of slavery national! I repeat again, for I wish no

misunderstanding, that I do not charge that he means it so; but I

call upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the best

instrument you could, and then set it to work in the most ingenious

way, to prepare the public mind for this movement, operating in the

free States, where there is now an abhorrence of the institution of

slavery, could you find an instrument so capable of doing it as Judge

Douglas, or one employed in so apt a way to do it?

I have said once before, and I will repeat it now, that Mr. Clay,

when he was once answering an objection to the Colonization Society,

that it had a tendency to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves,

said that:

"Those who would repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate

emancipation must do more than put down the benevolent efforts of the

Colonization Society: they must go back to the era of our liberty and

independence, and muzzle the cannon that thunders its annual joyous

return; they must blow out the moral lights around us; they must

penetrate the human soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the

love of liberty!"

And I do think--I repeat, though I said it on a former occasion--that

Judge Douglas and whoever, like him, teaches that the negro has no

share, humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence,

is going back to the era of our liberty and independence, and, so far

as in him lies, muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous

return; that he is blowing out the moral lights around us, when he

contends that whoever wants slaves has a right to hold them; that he

is penetrating, so far as lies in his power, the human soul, and

eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty, when he is

in every possible way preparing the public mind, by his vast

influence, for making the institution of slavery perpetual and

national.

There is, my friends, only one other point to which I will call your

attention for the remaining time that I have left me, and perhaps I

shall not occupy the entire time that I have, as that one point may

not take me clear through it.

Among the interrogatories that Judge Douglas propounded to me at

Freeport, there was one in about this language:

"Are you opposed to the acquisition of any further territory to the

United States, unless slavery shall first be prohibited therein?"

I answered, as I thought, in this way: that I am not generally

opposed to the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would

support a proposition for the acquisition of additional territory

according as my supporting it was or was not calculated to aggravate

this slavery question amongst us. I then proposed to Judge Douglas

another interrogatory, which was correlative to that: "Are you in

favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how it may

affect us upon the slavery question?" Judge Douglas answered,--that

is, in his own way he answered it. I believe that, although he took

a good many words to answer it, it was a little more fully answered

than any other. The substance of his answer was that this country

would continue to expand; that it would need additional territory;

that it was as absurd to suppose that we could continue upon our

present territory, enlarging in population as we are, as it would be

to hoop a boy twelve years of age, and expect him to grow to man's

size without bursting the hoops. I believe it was something like

that. Consequently, he was in favor of the acquisition of further

territory as fast as we might need it, in disregard of how it might

affect the slavery question. I do not say this as giving his exact

language, but he said so substantially; and he would leave the

question of slavery, where the territory was acquired, to be settled

by the people of the acquired territory. ["That's the doctrine."]

May be it is; let us consider that for a while. This will probably,

in the run of things, become one of the concrete manifestations of

this slavery question. If Judge Douglas's policy upon this question

succeeds, and gets fairly settled down, until all opposition is

crushed out, the next thing will be a grab for the territory of poor

Mexico, an invasion of the rich lands of South America, then the

adjoining islands will follow, each one of which promises additional

slave-fields. And this question is to be left to the people of those

countries for settlement. When we get Mexico, I don't know whether

the Judge will be in favor of the Mexican people that we get with it

settling that question for themselves and all others; because we know

the Judge has a great horror for mongrels, and I understand that the

people of Mexico are most decidedly a race of mongrels. I understand

that there is not more than one person there out of eight who is pure

white, and I suppose from the Judge's previous declaration that when

we get Mexico, or any considerable portion of it, that he will be in

favor of these mongrels settling the question, which would bring him

somewhat into collision with his horror of an inferior race.

It is to be remembered, though, that this power of acquiring

additional territory is a power confided to the President and the

Senate of the United States. It is a power not under the control of

the representatives of the people any further than they, the

President and the Senate, can be considered the representatives of

the people. Let me illustrate that by a case we have in our history.

When we acquired the territory from Mexico in the Mexican War, the

House of Representatives, composed of the immediate representatives

of the people, all the time insisted that the territory thus to be

acquired should be brought in upon condition that slavery should be

forever prohibited therein, upon the terms and in the language that

slavery had been prohibited from coming into this country. That was

insisted upon constantly and never failed to call forth an assurance

that any territory thus acquired should have that prohibition in it,

so far as the House of Representatives was concerned. But at last

the President and Senate acquired the territory without asking the

House of Representatives anything about it, and took it without that

prohibition. They have the power of acquiring territory without the

immediate representatives of the people being called upon to say

anything about it, and thus furnishing a very apt and powerful means

of bringing new territory into the Union, and, when it is once

brought into the country, involving us anew in this slavery

agitation. It is therefore, as I think, a very important question

for due consideration of the American people, whether the policy of

bringing in additional territory, without considering at all how it

will operate upon the safety of the Union in reference to this one

great disturbing element in our national politics, shall be adopted

as the policy of the country. You will bear in mind that it is to be

acquired, according to the Judge's view, as fast as it is needed, and

the indefinite part of this proposition is that we have only Judge

Douglas and his class of men to decide how fast it is needed. We

have no clear and certain way of determining or demonstrating how

fast territory is needed by the necessities of the country. Whoever

wants to go out filibustering, then, thinks that more territory is

needed. Whoever wants wider slave-fields feels sure that some

additional territory is needed as slave territory. Then it is as

easy to show the necessity of additional slave-territory as it is to

assert anything that is incapable of absolute demonstration.

Whatever motive a man or a set of men may have for making annexation

of property or territory, it is very easy to assert, but much less

easy to disprove, that it is necessary for the wants of the country.

And now it only remains for me to say that I think it is a very grave

question for the people of this Union to consider, whether, in view

of the fact that this slavery question has been the only one that has

ever endangered our Republican institutions, the only one that has

ever threatened or menaced a dissolution of the Union, that has ever

disturbed us in such a way as to make us fear for the perpetuity of

our liberty,--in view of these facts, I think it is an exceedingly

interesting and important question for this people to consider

whether we shall engage in the policy of acquiring additional

territory, discarding altogether from our consideration, while

obtaining new territory, the question how it may affect us in regard

to this, the only endangering element to our liberties and national

greatness. The Judge's view has been expressed. I, in my answer to

his question, have expressed mine. I think it will become an

important and practical question. Our views are before the public.

I am willing and anxious that they should consider them fully; that

they should turn it about and consider the importance of the

question, and arrive at a just conclusion as to whether it is or is

not wise in the people of this Union, in the acquisition of new

territory, to consider whether it will add to the disturbance that is

existing amongst us--whether it will add to the one only danger that

has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union or our own liberties.

I think it is extremely important that they shall decide, and rightly

decide, that question before entering upon that policy.

And now, my friends, having said the little I wish to say upon this

head, whether I have occupied the whole of the remnant of my time or

not, I believe I could not enter upon any new topic so as to treat it

fully, without transcending my time, which I would not for a moment

think of doing. I give way to Judge Douglas.