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Fourth Debate: Shrine20220609 26356 173g372

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Shrine20220609 26356 173g372
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LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS FOURTH JOINT DEBATE,

AT CHARLESTON, SEPTEMBER 18, 1858.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--It will be very difficult for an audience so

large as this to hear distinctly what a speaker says, and

consequently it is important that as profound silence be preserved as

possible.

While I was at the hotel to-day, an elderly gentleman called upon me

to know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality

between the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to

myself on this occasion to say much on that subject, yet as the

question was asked me I thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes

in saying something in regard to it. I will say, then, that I am

not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the

social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am

not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of

negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry

with white people; and I will say, in addition to this, that there is

a physical difference between the white and black races which I

believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of

social and political equality. And in as much as they cannot so

live, while they do remain together there must be the position of

superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of

having the superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon

this occasion I do not perceive that because the white man is to have

the superior position the negro should be denied everything. I do

not understand that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I

must necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I can

just let her alone. I am now in my fiftieth year, and I certainly

never have had a black woman for either a slave or a wife. So it

seems to me quite possible for us to get along without making either

slaves or wives of negroes. I will add to this that I have never

seen, to my knowledge, a man, woman, or child who was in favor of

producing a perfect equality, social and political, between negroes

and white men. I recollect of but one distinguished instance that I

ever heard of so frequently as to be entirely satisfied of its

correctness, and that is the case of Judge Douglas's old friend

Colonel Richard M. Johnson. I will also add to the remarks I have

made (for I am not going to enter at large upon this subject), that I

have never had the least apprehension that I or my friends would

marry negroes if there was no law to keep them from it; but as Judge

Douglas and his friends seem to be in great apprehension that they

might, if there were no law to keep them from it, I give him the most

solemn pledge that I will to the very last stand by the law of this

State which forbids the marrying of white people with negroes. I

will add one further word, which is this: that I do not understand

that there is any place where an alteration of the social and

political relations of the negro and the white man can be made,

except in the State Legislature,--not in the Congress of the United

States; and as I do not really apprehend the approach of any such

thing myself, and as Judge Douglas seems to be in constant horror

that some such danger is rapidly approaching, I propose as the best

means to prevent it that the Judge be kept at home, and placed in the

State Legislature to fight the measure. I do not propose dwelling

longer at this time on this subject.

When Judge Trumbull, our other Senator in Congress, returned to

Illinois in the month of August, he made a speech at Chicago, in

which he made what may be called a charge against Judge Douglas,

which I understand proved to be very offensive to him. The Judge was

at that time out upon one of his speaking tours through the country,

and when the news of it reached him, as I am informed, he denounced

Judge Trumbull in rather harsh terms for having said what he did in

regard to that matter. I was traveling at that time, and speaking at

the same places with Judge Douglas on subsequent days, and when I

heard of what Judge Trumbull had said of Douglas, and what Douglas

had said back again, I felt that I was in a position where I could

not remain entirely silent in regard to the matter. Consequently,

upon two or three occasions I alluded to it, and alluded to it in no

other wise than to say that in regard to the charge brought by

Trumbull against Douglas, I personally knew nothing, and sought to

say nothing about it; that I did personally know Judge Trumbull; that

I believed him to be a man of veracity; that I believed him to be a

man of capacity sufficient to know very well whether an assertion he

was making, as a conclusion drawn from a set of facts, was true or

false; and as a conclusion of my own from that, I stated it as my

belief if Trumbull should ever be called upon, he would prove

everything he had said. I said this upon two or three occasions.

Upon a subsequent occasion, Judge Trumbull spoke again before an

audience at Alton, and upon that occasion not only repeated his

charge against Douglas, but arrayed the evidence he relied upon to

substantiate it. This speech was published at length; and

subsequently at Jacksonville Judge Douglas alluded to the matter. In

the course of his speech, and near the close of it, he stated in

regard to myself what I will now read:

"Judge Douglas proceeded to remark that he should not hereafter

occupy his time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull, but that,

Lincoln having indorsed the character of Trumbull for veracity, he

should hold him (Lincoln) responsible for the slanders."

I have done simply what I have told you, to subject me to this

invitation to notice the charge. I now wish to say that it had not

originally been my purpose to discuss that matter at all But in-as-

much as it seems to be the wish of Judge Douglas to hold me

responsible for it, then for once in my life I will play General

Jackson, and to the just extent I take the responsibility.

I wish to say at the beginning that I will hand to the reporters that

portion of Judge Trumbull's Alton speech which was devoted to this

matter, and also that portion of Judge Douglas's speech made at

Jacksonville in answer to it. I shall thereby furnish the readers of

this debate with the complete discussion between Trumbull and

Douglas. I cannot now read them, for the reason that it would take

half of my first hour to do so. I can only make some comments upon

them. Trumbull's charge is in the following words:

"Now, the charge is, that there was a plot entered into to have a

constitution formed for Kansas, and put in force, without giving the

people an opportunity to vote upon it, and that Mr. Douglas was in

the plot."

I will state, without quoting further, for all will have an

opportunity of reading it hereafter, that Judge Trumbull brings

forward what he regards as sufficient evidence to substantiate this

charge.

It will be perceived Judge Trumbull shows that Senator Bigler, upon

the floor of the Senate, had declared there had been a conference

among the senators, in which conference it was determined to have an

enabling act passed for the people of Kansas to form a constitution

under, and in this conference it was agreed among them that it was

best not to have a provision for submitting the constitution to a

vote of the people after it should be formed. He then brings forward

to show, and showing, as he deemed, that Judge Douglas reported the

bill back to the Senate with that clause stricken out. He then shows

that there was a new clause inserted into the bill, which would in

its nature prevent a reference of the constitution back for a vote of

the people,--if, indeed, upon a mere silence in the law, it could be

assumed that they had the right to vote upon it. These are the

general statements that he has made.

I propose to examine the points in Judge Douglas's speech in which he

attempts to answer that speech of Judge Trumbull's. When you come to

examine Judge Douglas's speech, you will find that the first point he

makes is:

"Suppose it were true that there was such a change in the bill, and

that I struck it out,--is that a proof of a plot to force a

constitution upon them against their will?"

His striking out such a provision, if there was such a one in the

bill, he argues, does not establish the proof that it was stricken

out for the purpose of robbing the people of that right. I would

say, in the first place, that that would be a most manifest reason

for it. It is true, as Judge Douglas states, that many Territorial

bills have passed without having such a provision in them. I believe

it is true, though I am not certain, that in some instances

constitutions framed under such bills have been submitted to a vote

of the people with the law silent upon the subject; but it does not

appear that they once had their enabling acts framed with an express

provision for submitting the constitution to be framed to a vote of

the people, then that they were stricken out when Congress did not

mean to alter the effect of the law. That there have been bills

which never had the provision in, I do not question; but when was

that provision taken out of one that it was in? More especially does

the evidence tend to prove the proposition that Trumbull advanced,

when we remember that the provision was stricken out of the bill

almost simultaneously with the time that Bigler says there was a

conference among certain senators, and in which it was agreed that a

bill should be passed leaving that out. Judge Douglas, in answering

Trumbull, omits to attend to the testimony of Bigler, that there was

a meeting in which it was agreed they should so frame the bill that

there should be no submission of the constitution to a vote of the

people. The Judge does not notice this part of it. If you take this

as one piece of evidence, and then ascertain that simultaneously

Judge Douglas struck out a provision that did require it to be

submitted, and put the two together, I think it will make a pretty

fair show of proof that Judge Douglas did, as Trumbull says, enter

into a plot to put in force a constitution for Kansas, without giving

the people any opportunity of voting upon it.

But I must hurry on. The next proposition that Judge Douglas puts is

this:

"But upon examination it turns out that the Toombs bill never did

contain a clause requiring the constitution to be submitted."

This is a mere question of fact, and can be determined by evidence.

I only want to ask this question: Why did not Judge Douglas say that

these words were not stricken out of the Toomb's bill, or this bill

from which it is alleged the provision was stricken out,--a bill

which goes by the name of Toomb's, because he originally brought it

forward? I ask why, if the Judge wanted to make a direct issue with

Trumbull, did he not take the exact proposition Trumbull made in his

speech, and say it was not stricken out? Trumbull has given the

exact words that he says were in the Toomb's bill, and he alleges

that when the bill came back, they were stricken out. Judge Douglas

does not say that the words which Trumbull says were stricken out

were not so stricken out, but he says there was no provision in the

Toomb's bill to submit the constitution to a vote of the people. We

see at once that he is merely making an issue upon the meaning of the

words. He has not undertaken to say that Trumbull tells a lie about

these words being stricken out, but he is really, when pushed up to

it, only taking an issue upon the meaning of the words. Now, then,

if there be any issue upon the meaning of the words, or if there be

upon the question of fact as to whether these words were stricken

out, I have before me what I suppose to be a genuine copy of the

Toomb's bill, in which it can be shown that the words Trumbull says

were in it were, in fact, originally there. If there be any dispute

upon the fact, I have got the documents here to show they were there.

If there be any controversy upon the sense of the words,--whether

these words which were stricken out really constituted a provision

for submitting the matter to a vote of the people,--as that is a

matter of argument, I think I may as well use Trumbull's own

argument. He says that the proposition is in these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered

to the said Convention of the people of Kansas when formed, for their

free acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention

and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the

constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said

State of Kansas."

Now, Trumbull alleges that these last words were stricken out of the

bill when it came back, and he says this was a provision for

submitting the constitution to a vote of the people; and his argument

is this:

"Would it have been possible to ratify the land propositions at the

election for the adoption of the constitution, unless such an

election was to be held?"

This is Trumbull's argument. Now, Judge Douglas does not meet the

charge at all, but he stands up and says there was no such

proposition in that bill for submitting the constitution to be framed

to a vote of the people. Trumbull admits that the language is not a

direct provision for submitting it, but it is a provision necessarily

implied from another provision. He asks you how it is possible to

ratify the land proposition at the election for the adoption of the

constitution, if there was no election to be held for the adoption of

the constitution. And he goes on to show that it is not any less a

law because the provision is put in that indirect shape than it would

be if it were put directly. But I presume I have said enough to draw

attention to this point, and I pass it by also.

Another one of the points that Judge Douglas makes upon Trumbull, and

at very great length, is, that Trumbull, while the bill was pending,

said in a speech in the Senate that he supposed the constitution to

be made would have to be submitted to the people. He asks, if

Trumbull thought so then, what ground is there for anybody thinking

otherwise now? Fellow-citizens, this much may be said in reply: That

bill had been in the hands of a party to which Trumbull did not

belong. It had been in the hands of the committee at the head of

which Judge Douglas stood. Trumbull perhaps had a printed copy of

the original Toomb's bill. I have not the evidence on that point

except a sort of inference I draw from the general course of business

there. What alterations, or what provisions in the way of altering,

were going on in committee, Trumbull had no means of knowing, until

the altered bill was reported back. Soon afterwards, when it was

reported back, there was a discussion over it, and perhaps Trumbull

in reading it hastily in the altered form did not perceive all the

bearings of the alterations. He was hastily borne into the debate,

and it does not follow that because there was something in it

Trumbull did not perceive, that something did not exist. More than

this, is it true that what Trumbull did can have any effect on what

Douglas did? Suppose Trumbull had been in the plot with these other

men, would that let Douglas out of it? Would it exonerate Douglas

that Trumbull did n't then perceive he was in the plot? He also asks

the question: Why did n't Trumbull propose to amend the bill, if he

thought it needed any amendment? Why, I believe that everything

Judge Trumbull had proposed, particularly in connection with this

question of Kansas and Nebraska, since he had been on the floor of

the Senate, had been promptly voted down by Judge Douglas and his

friends. He had no promise that an amendment offered by him to

anything on this subject would receive the slightest consideration.

Judge Trumbull did bring to the notice of the Senate at that time the

fact that there was no provision for submitting the constitution

about to be made for the people of Kansas to a vote of the people. I

believe I may venture to say that Judge Douglas made some reply to

this speech of Judge Trumbull's, but he never noticed that part of it

at all. And so the thing passed by. I think, then, the fact that

Judge Trumbull offered no amendment does not throw much blame upon

him; and if it did, it does not reach the question of fact as to what

Judge Douglas was doing. I repeat, that if Trumbull had himself been

in the plot, it would not at all relieve the others who were in it

from blame. If I should be indicted for murder, and upon the trial

it should be discovered that I had been implicated in that murder,

but that the prosecuting witness was guilty too, that would not at

all touch the question of my crime. It would be no relief to my neck

that they discovered this other man who charged the crime upon me to

be guilty too.

Another one of the points Judge Douglas makes upon Judge Trumbull is,

that when he spoke in Chicago he made his charge to rest upon the

fact that the bill had the provision in it for submitting the

constitution to a vote of the people when it went into his Judge

Douglas's hands, that it was missing when he reported it to the

Senate, and that in a public speech he had subsequently said the

alterations in the bill were made while it was in committee, and that

they were made in consultation between him (Judge Douglas) and

Toomb's. And Judge Douglas goes on to comment upon the fact of

Trumbull's adducing in his Alton speech the proposition that the bill

not only came back with that proposition stricken out, but with

another clause and another provision in it, saying that "until the

complete execution of this Act there shall be no election in said

Territory,"--which, Trumbull argued, was not only taking the

provision for submitting to a vote of the people out of the bill, but

was adding an affirmative one, in that it prevented the people from

exercising the right under a bill that was merely silent on the

question. Now, in regard to what he says, that Trumbull shifts the

issue, that he shifts his ground,--and I believe he uses the term

that, "it being proven false, he has changed ground," I call upon all

of you, when you come to examine that portion of Trumbull's speech

(for it will make a part of mine), to examine whether Trumbull has

shifted his ground or not. I say he did not shift his ground, but

that he brought forward his original charge and the evidence to

sustain it yet more fully,

but precisely as he originally made it. Then, in addition thereto,

he brought in a new piece of evidence. He shifted no ground. He

brought no new piece of evidence inconsistent with his former

testimony; but he brought a new piece, tending, as he thought, and as

I think, to prove his proposition. To illustrate: A man brings an

accusation against another, and on trial the man making the charge

introduces A and B to prove the accusation. At a second trial he

introduces the same witnesses, who tell the same story as before, and

a third witness, who tells the same thing, and in addition gives

further testimony corroborative of the charge. So with Trumbull.

There was no shifting of ground, nor inconsistency of testimony

between the new piece of evidence and what he originally introduced.

But Judge Douglas says that he himself moved to strike out that last

provision of the bill, and that on his motion it was stricken out and

a substitute inserted. That I presume is the truth. I presume it is

true that that last proposition was stricken out by Judge Douglas.

Trumbull has not said it was not; Trumbull has himself said that it

was so stricken out. He says: "I am now speaking of the bill as

Judge Douglas reported it back. It was amended somewhat in the

Senate before it passed, but I am speaking of it as he brought it

back." Now, when Judge Douglas parades the fact that the provision

was stricken out of the bill when it came back, he asserts nothing

contrary to what Trumbull alleges. Trumbull has only said that he

originally put it in, not that he did not strike it out. Trumbull

says it was not in the bill when it went to the committee. When it

came back it was in, and Judge Douglas said the alterations were made

by him in consultation with Toomb's. Trumbull alleges, therefore, as

his conclusion, that Judge Douglas put it in. Then, if Douglas wants

to contradict Trumbull and call him a liar, let him say he did not

put it in, and not that he did n't take it out again. It is said

that a bear is sometimes hard enough pushed to drop a cub; and so I

presume it was in this case. I presume the truth is that Douglas put

it in, and afterward took it out. That, I take it, is the truth

about it. Judge Trumbull says one thing, Douglas says another thing,

and the two don't contradict one another at all. The question is,

what did he put it in for? In the first place, what did he take the

other provision out of the bill for,--the provision which Trumbull

argued was necessary for submitting the constitution to a vote of the

people? What did he take that out for; and, having taken it out,

what did he put this in for? I say that in the run of things it is

not unlikely forces conspire to render it vastly expedient for Judge

Douglas to take that latter clause out again. The question that

Trumbull has made is that Judge Douglas put it in; and he don't meet

Trumbull at all unless he denies that.

In the clause of Judge Douglas's speech upon this subject he uses

this language toward Judge Trumbull. He says:

"He forges his evidence from beginning to end; and by falsifying the

record, he endeavors to bolster up his false charge."

Well, that is a pretty serious statement--Trumbull forges his

evidence from beginning to end. Now, upon my own authority I say

that it is not true. What is a forgery? Consider the evidence that

Trumbull has brought forward. When you come to read the speech, as

you will be able to, examine whether the evidence is a forgery from

beginning to end. He had the bill or document in his hand like that

[holding up a paper]. He says that is a copy of the Toomb's bill,--

the amendment offered by Toomb's. He says that is a copy of the bill

as it was introduced and went into Judge Douglas's hands. Now, does

Judge Douglas say that is a forgery? That is one thing Trumbull

brought forward. Judge Douglas says he forged it from beginning to

end! That is the "beginning," we will say. Does Douglas say that is

a forgery? Let him say it to-day, and we will have a subsequent

examination upon this subject. Trumbull then holds up another

document like this, and says that is an exact copy of the bill as it

came back in the amended form out of Judge Douglas's hands. Does

Judge Douglas say that is a forgery? Does he say it in his general

sweeping charge? Does he say so now? If he does not, then take this

Toomb's bill and the bill in the amended form, and it only needs to

compare them to see that the provision is in the one and not in the

other; it leaves the inference inevitable that it was taken out.

But, while I am dealing with this question, let us see what

Trumbull's other evidence is. One other piece of evidence I will

read. Trumbull says there are in this original Toomb's bill these

words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered

to the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for

their free acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the

Convention and ratified by the people at the election for the

adoption of the constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United

States and the said State of Kansas."

Now, if it is said that this is a forgery, we will open the paper

here and see whether it is or not. Again, Trumbull says, as he goes

along, that Mr. Bigler made the following statement in his place in

the Senate, December 9, 1857:

"I was present when that subject was discussed by senators before the

bill was introduced, and the question was raised and discussed,

whether the constitution, when formed, should be submitted to a vote

of the people. It was held by those most intelligent on the subject

that, in view of all the difficulties surrounding that Territory, the

danger of any experiment at that time of a popular vote, it would be

better there should be no such provision in the Toomb's bill; and it

was my understanding, in all the intercourse I had, that the

Convention would make a constitution, and send it here, without

submitting it to the popular vote."

Then Trumbull follows on:

"In speaking of this meeting again on the 21st December, 1857

[Congressional Globe, same vol., page 113], Senator Bigler said:

"'Nothing was further from my mind than to allude to any social or

confidential interview. The meeting was not of that character.

Indeed, it was semi-official, and called to promote the public good.

My recollection was clear that I left the conference under the

impression that it had been deemed best to adopt measures to admit

Kansas as a State through the agency of one popular election, and

that for delegates to this Convention. This impression was stronger

because I thought the spirit of the bill infringed upon the doctrine

of non-intervention, to which I had great aversion; but with the hope

of accomplishing a great good, and as no movement had been made in

that direction in the Territory, I waived this objection, and

concluded to support the measure. I have a few items of testimony as

to the correctness of these impressions, and with their submission I

shall be content. I have before me the bill reported by the senator

from Illinois on the 7th of March, 1856, providing for the admission

of Kansas as a State, the third section of which reads as follows:

"That the following propositions be, and the same are hereby offered

to the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for

their free acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the

Convention and ratified by the people at the election for the

adoption of the constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United

States and the said State of Kansas."

The bill read in his place by the senator from Georgia on the 25th of

June, and referred to the Committee on Territories, contained the

same section word for word. Both these bills were under

consideration at the conference referred to; but, sir, when the

senator from Illinois reported the Toombs bill to the Senate with

amendments, the next morning, it did not contain that portion of the

third section which indicated to the Convention that the constitution

should be approved by the people. The words 'and ratified by the

people at the election for the adoption of the constitution" had been

stricken out.'"

Now, these things Trumbull says were stated by Bigler upon the floor

of the Senate on certain days, and that they are recorded in the

Congressional Globe on certain pages. Does Judge Douglas say this is

a forgery? Does he say there is no such thing in the Congressional

Globe? What does he mean when he says Judge Trumbull forges his

evidence from beginning to end? So again he says in another place

that Judge Douglas, in his speech, December 9, 1857 (Congressional

Globe, part I., page 15), stated:

"That during the last session of Congress, I [Mr. Douglas] reported a

bill from the Committee on Territories, to authorize the people of

Kansas to assemble and form a constitution for themselves.

Subsequently the senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs] brought forward a

substitute for my bill, which, after having been modified by him and

myself in consultation, was passed by the Senate."

Now, Trumbull says this is a quotation from a speech of Douglas, and

is recorded in the Congressional Globe. Is it a forgery? Is it

there or not? It may not be there, but I want the Judge to take

these pieces of evidence, and distinctly say they are forgeries if he

dare do it.

[A voice: "He will."]

Well, sir, you had better not commit him. He gives other quotations,

--another from Judge Douglas. He says:

"I will ask the senator to show me an intimation, from any one member

of the Senate, in the whole debate on the Toombs bill, and in the

Union, from any quarter, that the constitution was not to be

submitted to the people. I will venture to say that on all sides of

the chamber it was so understood at the time. If the opponents of

the bill had understood it was not, they would have made the point on

it; and if they had made it, we should certainly have yielded to it,

and put in the clause. That is a discovery made since the President

found out that it was not safe to take it for granted that that would

be done, which ought in fairness to have been done."

Judge Trumbull says Douglas made that speech, and it is recorded.

Does Judge Douglas say it is a forgery, and was not true? Trumbull

says somewhere, and I propose to skip it, but it will be found by any

one who will read this debate, that he did distinctly bring it to the

notice of those who were engineering the bill, that it lacked that

provision; and then he goes on to give another quotation from Judge

Douglas, where Judge Trumbull uses this language:

"Judge Douglas, however, on the same day and in the same debate,

probably recollecting or being reminded of the fact that I had

objected to the Toombs bill when pending that it did not provide for

a submission of the constitution to the people, made another

statement, which is to be found in the same volume of the Globe, page

22, in which he says:

'That the bill was silent on this subject was true, and my attention

was called to that about the time it was passed; and I took the fair

construction to be, that powers not delegated were reserved, and that

of course the constitution would be submitted to the people.'

"Whether this statement is consistent with the statement just before

made, that had the point been made it would have been yielded to, or

that it was a new discovery, you will determine."

So I say. I do not know whether Judge Douglas will dispute this, and

yet maintain his position that Trumbull's evidence "was forged from

beginning to end." I will remark that I have not got these

Congressional Globes with me. They are large books, and difficult to

carry about, and if Judge Douglas shall say that on these points

where Trumbull has quoted from them there are no such passages there,

I shall not be able to prove they are there upon this occasion, but I

will have another chance. Whenever he points out the forgery and

says, "I declare that this particular thing which Trumbull has

uttered is not to be found where he says it is," then my attention

will be drawn to that, and I will arm myself for the contest, stating

now that I have not the slightest doubt on earth that I will find

every quotation just where Trumbull says it is. Then the question

is, How can Douglas call that a forgery? How can he make out that it

is a forgery? What is a forgery? It is the bringing forward

something in writing or in print purporting to be of certain effect

when it is altogether untrue. If you come forward with my note for

one hundred dollars when I have never given such a note, there is a

forgery. If you come forward with a letter purporting to be written

by me which I never wrote, there is another forgery. If you produce

anything in writing or in print saying it is so and so, the document

not being genuine, a forgery has been committed. How do you make

this forgery when every piece of the evidence is genuine? If Judge

Douglas does say these documents and quotations are false and forged,

he has a full right to do so; but until he does it specifically, we

don't know how to get at him. If he does say they are false and

forged, I will then look further into it, and presume I can procure

the certificates of the proper officers that they are genuine copies.

I have no doubt each of these extracts will be found exactly where

Trumbull says it is. Then I leave it to you if Judge Douglas, in

making his sweeping charge that Judge Trumbull's evidence is forged

from beginning to end, at all meets the case,--if that is the way to

get at the facts. I repeat again, if he will point out which one is

a forgery, I will carefully examine it, and if it proves that any one

of them is really a forgery, it will not be me who will hold to it

any longer. I have always wanted to deal with everyone I meet

candidly and honestly. If I have made any assertion not warranted by

facts, and it is pointed out to me, I will withdraw it cheerfully.

But I do not choose to see Judge Trumbull calumniated, and the

evidence he has brought forward branded in general terms "a forgery

from beginning to end." This is not the legal way of meeting a

charge, and I submit it to all intelligent persons, both friends of

Judge Douglas and of myself, whether it is.

The point upon Judge Douglas is this: The bill that went into his

hands had the provision in it for a submission of the constitution to

the people; and I say its language amounts to an express provision

for a submission, and that he took the provision out. He says it was

known that the bill was silent in this particular; but I say, Judge

Douglas, it was not silent when you got it. It was vocal with the

declaration, when you got it, for a submission of the constitution to

the people. And now, my direct question to Judge Douglas is, to

answer why, if he deemed the bill silent on this point, he found it

necessary to strike out those particular harmless words. If he had

found the bill silent and without this provision, he might say what

he does now. If he supposes it was implied that the constitution

would be submitted to a vote of the people, how could these two lines

so encumber the statute as to make it necessary to strike them out?

How could he infer that a submission was still implied, after its

express provision had been stricken from the bill? I find the bill

vocal with the provision, while he silenced it. He took it out, and

although he took out the other provision preventing a submission to a

vote of the people, I ask, Why did you first put it in? I ask him

whether he took the original provision out, which Trumbull alleges

was in the bill. If he admits that he did take it, I ask him what he

did it for. It looks to us as if he had altered the bill. If it

looks differently to him,--if he has a different reason for his

action from the one we assign him--he can tell it. I insist upon

knowing why he made the bill silent upon that point when it was vocal

before he put his hands upon it.

I was told, before my last paragraph, that my time was within three

minutes of being out. I presume it is expired now; I therefore

close.

Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: It follows as a matter of course that a half-hour

answer to a speech of an hour and a half can be but a very hurried

one. I shall only be able to touch upon a few of the points

suggested by Judge Douglas, and give them a brief attention, while I

shall have to totally omit others for the want of time.

Judge Douglas has said to you that he has not been able to get from

me an answer to the question whether I am in favor of negro

citizenship. So far as I know the Judge never asked me the question

before. He shall have no occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell

him very frankly that I am not in favor of negro citizenship. This

furnishes me an occasion for saying a few words upon the subject. I

mentioned in a certain speech of mine, which has been printed, that

the Supreme Court had decided that a negro could not possibly be made

a citizen; and without saying what was my ground of complaint in

regard to that, or whether I had any ground of complaint, Judge

Douglas has from that thing manufactured nearly everything that he

ever says about my disposition to produce an equality between the

negroes and the white people. If any one will read my speech, he

will find I mentioned that as one of the points decided in the course

of the Supreme Court opinions, but I did not state what objection I

had to it. But Judge Douglas tells the people what my objection was

when I did not tell them myself. Now, my opinion is that the

different States have the power to make a negro a citizen under the

Constitution of the United States if they choose. The Dred Scott

decision decides that they have not that power. If the State of

Illinois had that power, I should be opposed to the exercise of it.

That is all I have to say about it.

Judge Douglas has told me that he heard my speeches north and my

speeches south; that he had heard me at Ottawa and at Freeport in the

north and recently at Jonesboro in the south, and there was a very

different cast of sentiment in the speeches made at the different

points. I will not charge upon Judge Douglas that he wilfully

misrepresents me, but I call upon every fair-minded man to take these

speeches and read them, and I dare him to point out any difference

between my speeches north and south. While I am here perhaps I ought

to say a word, if I have the time, in regard to the latter portion of

the Judge's speech, which was a sort of declamation in reference to

my having said I entertained the belief that this government would

not endure half slave and half free. I have said so, and I did not

say it without what seemed to me to be good reasons. It perhaps

would require more time than I have now to set forth these reasons in

detail; but let me ask you a few questions. Have we ever had any

peace on this slavery question? When are we to have peace upon it,

if it is kept in the position it now occupies? How are we ever to

have peace upon it? That is an important question. To be sure, if

we will all stop, and allow Judge Douglas and his friends to march on

in their present career until they plant the institution all over the

nation, here and wherever else our flag waves, and we acquiesce in

it, there will be peace. But let me ask Judge Douglas how he is

going to get the people to do that? They have been wrangling over

this question for at least forty years. This was the cause of the

agitation resulting in the Missouri Compromise; this produced the

troubles at the annexation of Texas, in the acquisition of the

territory acquired in the Mexican War. Again, this was the trouble

which was quieted by the Compromise of 1850, when it was settled

"forever" as both the great political parties declared in their

National Conventions. That "forever" turned out to be just four

years, when Judge Douglas himself reopened it. When is it likely to

come to an end? He introduced the Nebraska Bill in 1854 to put

another end to the slavery agitation. He promised that it would

finish it all up immediately, and he has never made a speech since,

until he got into a quarrel with the President about the Lecompton

Constitution, in which he has not declared that we are just at the

end of the slavery agitation. But in one speech, I think last

winter, he did say that he did n't quite see when the end of the

slavery agitation would come. Now he tells us again that it is all

over and the people of Kansas have voted down the Lecompton

Constitution. How is it over? That was only one of the attempts at

putting an end to the slavery agitation--one of these "final

settlements." Is Kansas in the Union? Has she formed a constitution

that she is likely to come in under? Is not the slavery agitation

still an open question in that Territory? Has the voting down of

that constitution put an end to all the trouble? Is that more likely

to settle it than every one of these previous attempts to settle the

slavery agitation? Now, at this day in the history of the world we

can no more foretell where the end of this slavery agitation will be

than we can see the end of the world itself. The Nebraska-Kansas

Bill was introduced four years and a half ago, and if the agitation

is ever to come to an end we may say we are four years and a half

nearer the end. So, too, we can say we are four years and a half

nearer the end of the world, and we can just as clearly see the end

of the world as we can see the end of this agitation. The Kansas

settlement did not conclude it. If Kansas should sink to-day, and

leave a great vacant space in the earth's surface, this vexed

question would still be among us. I say, then, there is no way of

putting an end to the slavery agitation amongst us but to put it back

upon the basis where our fathers placed it; no way but to keep it out

of our new Territories,--to restrict it forever to the old States

where it now exists. Then the public mind will rest in the belief

that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. That is one way of

putting an end to the slavery agitation.

The other way is for us to surrender and let Judge Douglas and his

friends have their way and plant slavery over all the States; cease

speaking of it as in any way a wrong; regard slavery as one of the

common matters of property, and speak of negroes as we do of our

horses and cattle. But while it drives on in its state of progress

as it is now driving, and as it has driven for the last five years, I

have ventured the opinion, and I say to-day, that we will have no end

to the slavery agitation until it takes one turn or the other. I do

not mean that when it takes a turn toward ultimate extinction it will

be in a day, nor in a year, nor in two years. I do not suppose that

in the most peaceful way ultimate extinction would occur in less than

a hundred years at least; but that it will occur in the best way for

both races, in God's own good time, I have no doubt. But, my

friends, I have used up more of my time than I intended on this

point.

Now, in regard to this matter about Trumbull and myself having made a

bargain to sell out the entire Whig and Democratic parties in 1854:

Judge Douglas brings forward no evidence to sustain his charge,

except the speech Matheny is said to have made in 1856, in which he

told a cock-and-bull story of that sort, upon the same moral

principles that Judge Douglas tells it here to-day. This is the

simple truth. I do not care greatly for the story, but this is the

truth of it: and I have twice told Judge Douglas to his face that

from beginning to end there is not one word of truth in it. I have

called upon him for the proof, and he does not at all meet me as

Trumbull met him upon that of which we were just talking, by

producing the record. He did n't bring the record because there was

no record for him to bring. When he asks if I am ready to indorse

Trumbull's veracity after he has broken a bargain with me, I reply

that if Trumbull had broken a bargain with me I would not be likely

to indorse his veracity; but I am ready to indorse his veracity

because neither in that thing, nor in any other, in all the years

that I have known Lyman Trumbull, have I known him to fail of his

word or tell a falsehood large or small. It is for that reason that

I indorse Lyman Trumbull.

[Mr. JAMES BROWN (Douglas postmaster): "What does Ford's History say

about him?"]

Some gentleman asks me what Ford's History says about him. My own

recollection is that Ford speaks of Trumbull in very disrespectful

terms in several portions of his book, and that he talks a great deal

worse of Judge Douglas. I refer you, sir, to the History for

examination.

Judge Douglas complains at considerable length about a disposition on

the part of Trumbull and myself to attack him personally. I want to

attend to that suggestion a moment. I don't want to be unjustly

accused of dealing illiberally or unfairly with an adversary, either

in court or in a political canvass or anywhere else. I would despise

myself if I supposed myself ready to deal less liberally with an

adversary than I was willing to be treated myself. Judge Douglas in

a general way, without putting it in a direct shape, revives the old

charge against me in reference to the Mexican War. He does not take

the responsibility of putting it in a very definite form, but makes a

general reference to it. That charge is more than ten years old. He

complains of Trumbull and myself because he says we bring charges

against him one or two years old. He knows, too, that in regard to

the Mexican War story the more respectable papers of his own party

throughout the State have been compelled to take it back and

acknowledge that it was a lie.

[Here Mr. LINCOLN turned to the crowd on the platform, and, selecting

HON. ORLANDO B. FICKLIN, led him forward and said:]

I do not mean to do anything with Mr. FICKLIN except to present his

face and tell you that he personally knows it to be a lie! He was a

member of Congress at the only time I was in Congress, and [FICKLIN]

knows that whenever there was an attempt to procure a vote of mine

which would indorse the origin and justice of the war, I refused to

give such indorsement and voted against it; but I never voted against

the supplies for the army, and he knows, as well as Judge Douglas,

that whenever a dollar was asked by way of compensation or otherwise

for the benefit of the soldiers I gave all the votes that FICKLIN or

Douglas did, and perhaps more.

[Mr. FICKLIN: My friends, I wish to say this in reference to the

matter: Mr. Lincoln and myself are just as good personal friends as

Judge Douglas and myself. In reference to this Mexican War, my

recollection is that when Ashmun's resolution [amendment] was offered

by Mr. Ashmun of Massachusetts, in which he declared that the Mexican

War was unnecessary and unconstitutionally commenced by the President

-my recollection is that Mr. Lincoln voted for that resolution.]

That is the truth. Now, you all remember that was a resolution

censuring the President for the manner in which the war was begun.

You know they have charged that I voted against the supplies, by

which I starved the soldiers who were out fighting the battles of

their country. I say that FICKLIN knows it is false. When that

charge was brought forward by the Chicago Times, the Springfield

Register [Douglas's organ] reminded the Times that the charge really

applied to John Henry; and I do know that John Henry is now making

speeches and fiercely battling for Judge Douglas. If the Judge now

says that he offers this as a sort of setoff to what I said to-day in

reference to Trumbull's charge, then I remind him that he made this

charge before I said a word about Trumbull's. He brought this

forward at Ottawa, the first time we met face to face; and in the

opening speech that Judge Douglas made he attacked me in regard to a

matter ten years old. Is n't he a pretty man to be whining about

people making charges against him only two years old!

The Judge thinks it is altogether wrong that I should have dwelt upon

this charge of Trumbull's at all. I gave the apology for doing so in

my opening speech. Perhaps it did n't fix your attention. I said

that when Judge Douglas was speaking at place--where I spoke on the

succeeding day he used very harsh language about this charge. Two or

three times afterward I said I had confidence in Judge Trumbull's

veracity and intelligence; and my own opinion was, from what I knew

of the character of Judge Trumbull, that he would vindicate his

position and prove whatever he had stated to be true. This I

repeated two or three times; and then I dropped it, without saying

anything more on the subject for weeks--perhaps a month. I passed it

by without noticing it at all till I found, at Jacksonville, Judge

Douglas in the plenitude of his power is not willing to answer

Trumbull and let me alone, but he comes out there and uses this

language: "He should not hereafter occupy his time in refuting such

charges made by Trumbull but that, Lincoln having indorsed the

character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold him [Lincoln]

responsible for the slanders." What was Lincoln to do? Did he not

do right, when he had the fit opportunity of meeting Judge Douglas

here, to tell him he was ready for the responsibility? I ask a

candid audience whether in doing thus Judge Douglas was not the

assailant rather than I? Here I meet him face to face, and say I am

ready to take the responsibility, so far as it rests on me.

Having done so I ask the attention of this audience to the question

whether I have succeeded in sustaining the charge, and whether Judge

Douglas has at all succeeded in rebutting it? You all heard me call

upon him to say which of these pieces of evidence was a forgery.

Does he say that what I present here as a copy of the original Toombs

bill is a forgery? Does he say that what I present as a copy of the

bill reported by himself is a forgery, or what is presented as a

transcript from the Globe of the quotations from Bigler's speech is a

forgery? Does he say the quotations from his own speech are

forgeries? Does he say this transcript from Trumbull's speech is a

forgery?

["He didn't deny one of them."]

I would then like to know how it comes about that when each piece of

a story is true the whole story turns out false. I take it these

people have some sense; they see plainly that Judge Douglas is

playing cuttle-fish, a small species of fish that has no mode of

defending itself when pursued except by throwing out a black fluid,

which makes the water so dark the enemy cannot see it, and thus it

escapes. Ain't the Judge playing the cuttle-fish?

Now, I would ask very special attention to the consideration of Judge

Douglas's speech at Jacksonville; and when you shall read his speech

of to-day, I ask you to watch closely and see which of these pieces

of testimony, every one of which he says is a forgery, he has shown

to be such. Not one of them has he shown to be a forgery. Then I

ask the original question, if each of the pieces of testimony is

true, how is it possible that the whole is a falsehood?

In regard to Trumbull's charge that he [Douglas] inserted a provision

into the bill to prevent the constitution being submitted to the

people, what was his answer? He comes here and reads from the

Congressional Globe to show that on his motion that provision was

struck out of the bill. Why, Trumbull has not said it was not

stricken out, but Trumbull says he [Douglas] put it in; and it is no

answer to the charge to say he afterwards took it out. Both are

perhaps true. It was in regard to that thing precisely that I told

him he had dropped the cub. Trumbull shows you that by his

introducing the bill it was his cub. It is no answer to that

assertion to call Trumbull a liar merely because he did not specially

say that Douglas struck it out. Suppose that were the case, does it

answer Trumbull? I assert that you [pointing to an individual] are

here to-day, and you undertake to prove me a liar by showing that you

were in Mattoon yesterday. I say that you took your hat off your

head, and you prove me a liar by putting it on your head. That is

the whole force of Douglas's argument.

Now, I want to come back to my original question. Trumbull says that

Judge Douglas had a bill with a provision in it for submitting a

constitution to be made to a vote of the people of Kansas. Does

Judge Douglas deny that fact? Does be deny that the provision which

Trumbull reads was put in that bill? Then Trumbull says he struck it

out. Does he dare to deny that? He does not, and I have the right

to repeat the question ,--Why Judge Douglas took it out? Bigler has

said there was a combination of certain senators, among whom he did

not include Judge Douglas, by which it was agreed that the Kansas

Bill should have a clause in it not to have the constitution formed

under it submitted to a vote of the people. He did not say that

Douglas was among them, but we prove by another source that about the

same time Douglas comes into the Senate with that provision stricken

out of the bill. Although Bigler cannot say they were all working in

concert, yet it looks very much as if the thing was agreed upon and

done with a mutual understanding after the conference; and while we

do not know that it was absolutely so, yet it looks so probable that

we have a right to call upon the man who knows the true reason why it

was done to tell what the true reason was. When he will not tell

what the true reason was, he stands in the attitude of an accused

thief who has stolen goods in his possession, and when called to

account refuses to tell where he got them. Not only is this the

evidence, but when he comes in with the bill having the provision

stricken out, he tells us in a speech, not then but since, that these

alterations and modifications in the bill had been made by HIM, in

consultation with Toombs, the originator of the bill. He tells us

the same to-day. He says there were certain modifications made in

the bill in committee that he did not vote for. I ask you to

remember, while certain amendments were made which he disapproved of,

but which a majority of the committee voted in, he has himself told

us that in this particular the alterations and modifications were

made by him, upon consultation with Toombs. We have his own word

that these alterations were made by him, and not by the committee.

Now, I ask, what is the reason Judge Douglas is so chary about coming

to the exact question? What is the reason he will not tell you

anything about How it was made, BY WHOM it was made, or that he

remembers it being made at all? Why does he stand playing upon the

meaning of words and quibbling around the edges of the evidence? If

he can explain all this, but leaves it unexplained, I have the right

to infer that Judge Douglas understood it was the purpose of his

party, in engineering that bill through, to make a constitution, and

have Kansas come into the Union with that constitution, without its

being submitted to a vote of the people. If he will explain his

action on this question, by giving a better reason for the facts that

happened than he has done, it will be satisfactory. But until he

does that--until he gives a better or more plausible reason than he

has offered against the evidence in the case--I suggest to him it

will not avail him at all that he swells himself up, takes on

dignity, and calls people liars. Why, sir, there is not a word in

Trumbull's speech that depends on Trumbull's veracity at all. He has

only arrayed the evidence and told you what follows as a matter of

reasoning. There is not a statement in the whole speech that depends

on Trumbull's word. If you have ever studied geometry, you remember

that by a course of reasoning Euclid proves that all the angles in a

triangle are equal to two right angles. Euclid has shown you how to

work it out. Now, if you undertake to disprove that proposition, and

to show that it is erroneous, would you prove it to be false by

calling Euclid a liar? They tell me that my time is out, and

therefore I close.

Annotate

Lincoln Douglas Debates from The Papers And Writings Of Abraham Lincoln, Volumes Three and Four, by Abraham Lincoln via The Gutenberg Project
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