Chapter 3.  Organic Solidarity due to the Division of Labor

Part 4. Conclusion

We recognize two kinds of positive solidarity, solidarity which produces integration.  The first kind directly binds the individual to society while the second binds the individual indirectly, through reliance on the other people who collectively make up society.

Society is not seen in the same aspect in the two cases.  In the first, what we call society is more or less composed of the beliefs and values held in common by all people.  In contrast, the second case is composed of a system of different and unique functions which are united through interdependence.

In the first case, society is strong if the ideas and common tendencies are greater quantitatively and qualitatively than those ideas and habits held by individuals.  This kind of solidarity can grow only at the expense of individual personality.  In each of us there are two consciences, one common to our group and the other which is personal to us and distinct and that makes us an individual.  Solidarity through likeness is at its greatest when the collective conscience takes over our entire consciousness, [when what we think is what society thinks].  But at that moment we have no personality. Our personalities can only emerge if the community to which we belong has less control of us.  These are two opposing forces.  If we want to think and act for ourselves, we cannot also be strongly inclined to think and act as everyone else.  So, when this form of solidarity acts on us forcefully, our personality vanishes; we are no longer ourselves but the collective life.

The social molecules which cohere together in this way can act together only if they have no actions of their own; they are molecules of inorganic bodies.  For that reason we propose to call this type of solidarity mechanical.  This doesn’t mean it is produced by mechanical or artificial means, but only as an analogy to the cohesion uniting an inanimate body, as opposed to elements of a living body.  The individual conscience is dependent upon the collective conscience and follows all its movements, without a life of its own, so to speak.  In societies where this type of solidarity is strong, the individual does not really appear.  Personal rights are generally not recognized.

It is utterly different when we consider the solidarity which is produced by the division of labor. While the first type implied that individuals resemble each other, this type presumes they are differentiated. While the first type is possible only so much as the individual personality is subsumed by the collective personality, the second type is possible only if each individual person has a sphere of action unique to him or her, and so an individual personality. It is necessary for the collective conscience to recede to allow the individual conscience to operate freely. The more it does so, the stronger the cohesion which results [as each becomes reliant on every other member fulfilling his or her unique sphere of action].  Each one depends more on society as labor is divided, and each person’s activity becomes more specialized.